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“Meanings inspired only by remote, confused, inauthentic intuitions – if by any intuitions at 
all – are not enough: we must go back to the ‘things themselves’”.  
Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations ([1913a] 1970, 1:168) 
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ABSTRACT 
A task confronting all the theoretical branches of philosophy is Peacocke’s Integration 
Challenge: “providing, for a given area, a simultaneously acceptable metaphysics and 
epistemology, and showing them to be so” (1999, 1). When it comes to the study of 
everyday events such as basketball shots and ripples on a pond, there is a phenomenological 
analogue of the Integration Challenge: the twofold task of explicating both the nature of 
such events and the way they show up in our perceptual consciousness. In this dissertation, I 
propose an account of events in response to the twofold challenge. On the one hand, an 
event is a complex entity constituted from tropes in accordance with its kind. On the other 
hand, our perceptual experiences of events differ from our other varieties of experiences 
because they uniquely feature the awareness of certain temporal phenomena that function as 
the boundaries between events.  
The dissertation is divided into five chapters. After a short introductory chapter, I 
develop a metaphysical theory of events. I follow a framework based on Evnine (2016) and 
divide theories of events into two groups: those that invoke the constitution relation and 
those that do not. Chapter 2 reviews and argues against the major theories in the first group, 
whereas Chapter 3 defends my own view against several alternatives in the second group. 
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Roughly, my view is that a number of events jointly constitute another if and only if the 
event-kind the latter falls under makes the latter dependent upon the former.  
The remaining chapters defend a Husserlian view about event perception. Chapter 4 
situates my favored view in the theoretical landscape. I argue for a representational view by 
drawing on Husserlian ideas, in particular the idea that any perceptual content has an 
expectational component in addition to a component that represents what is strictly visible. 
Chapter 5 expands on the view and supplies an analysis of event perception. By combining 
the theory of perceptually based expectations proposed by Yoshimi (2016) with results from 
linguistics and psychology, I argue that event perception can be better understood with the 
theoretical apparatus of possible worlds.  
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CHAPTER 1   
INTRODUCTION  
This dissertation addresses two issues at the intersection of metaphysics, philosophy 
of mind and phenomenology: what is the nature of events, and what distinguishes our 
conscious perception of events from the other forms of conscious perception? I defend a 
hylomorphic view in response to the first issue and a Husserlian view in response to the 
second. On the one hand, to be an event is to consist of certain form and matter. On the 
other hand, what makes conscious event perception special is that in undergoing them, we 
anticipate temporal boundaries in a distinctively perceptual manner. As a whole, my 
dissertation represents my attempt to pursue philosophy in a way that respects the 
divergence between different traditions but makes the most of their points of convergence.  
1.1 Motivating the Project  
Why care about events? Events are worth theorizing about if for no other reason 
than the roles they play in our everyday life. There are hardly moments in our life in which 
we are not participating in one event or another. Whether one is doing something as 
mundane as riding a bus to work or something as extraordinary as climbing Mount Everest, 
one is partaking in an event. In our everyday understanding of reality, therefore, events 
occupy a conspicuous place. We cannot make sense of the world around us without taking 
into account the various events that take place around us. Since philosophy is supposed to 
be rooted, at least in part, in common sense, the everyday significance of events alone makes 
events a worthy topic of philosophical investigation.  
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The nature of events used to be an intensely debated topic in metaphysics. 
Prominent metaphysicians of the era, such as David Lewis, W. V. O. Quine, Donald 
Davidson, Roderick Chisholm and Jaegwon Kim, among others, all contributed to the 
debate. As is well known, the 20th century even produced metaphysical systems that 
conceptualize events of some sort as the building blocks of reality, the most celebrated one 
being the system laid out by A. N. Whitehead in his Process and Reality. The theoretical 
landscape of contemporary metaphysics has nevertheless changed. Though the earlier 
theories of events are still mentioned, more often than not they are introduced for the 
purpose of clarifying one’s presuppositions rather than for the purpose of actively 
developing the theories. People became less interested in the issue not because some kind of 
consensus had been reached on the nature of events. What happened was more aptly 
characterized by the words used by Stephen Kosslyn to describe a phase of the debate on 
the nature of mental imagery: the debate “ended with a fizzle, with no clear consensus on a 
resolution… most researchers apparently got tired of the issues and moved on to other 
topics” (Kosslyn 1994, 12). I claim that this is a prime time to revisit the debate on the 
nature of events and propose new theories to resolve the old disputes. This is the case 
because more conceptual tools are available right now. In particular, recent years have seen 
increasingly sophisticated attempts to adapt theories of material constitution to the analysis 
of events. These attempts have opened up new avenues for research, and they will be 
examined in detail in this dissertation.  
Now, as one can tell from the title of this dissertation, my project is not exclusively 
metaphysical. It also addresses our perceptual experiences of events. The reason is that the 
kind of project I am interested in pursuing is one that may be described as phenomenologically 
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serious metaphysics. What this means is best illustrated with an example. Suppose I underwent a 
visual experience caused by a persimmon in front of me. Could I be said to veridically see 
that the object in front of me was a persimmon? Some might want to answer in the negative 
because they prioritize their theoretical commitment to physicalism. One could argue that 
physics is the true theory of the world. Strictly speaking, therefore, the only entities that exist 
are those posited by physics. Since physics doesn’t posit such properties as being a persimmon, 
nothing really is a persimmon. When we use the phrase “is a persimmon”, what we succeed 
in picking out is actually a pattern of activity that can be exhibited by fundamental particles. 
Given that persimmons don’t exist, there are only two ways to make sense of my experience. 
First, my experience represented something veridically, but what was represented was not a 
persimmon. Second, my experience did represent a persimmon. But this means that it 
represented something that didn’t exist, so it was nonveridical. Either way, I could not be 
said to veridically see a persimmon.  
This is not how I would want to answer the question. My preferred response to the 
question would give more credit to the first-person perspective. To give one such response, 
we could begin with considering how one would make judgments about the accuracy of 
one’s experience in everyday life. If I see something but find it missing when I take a second 
look, I would begin to doubt my initial experience. But nothing like the sort happened in the 
persimmon case. I stared at the persimmon for half a minute, and the persimmon remained 
in view over the entire course of my experience. Hence, if at this point I had been asked 
whether my initial experience had been accurate, I would have answered in the positive. 
Since my cognitive capacities were functioning normally and I was not in any peculiar 
environment, anyone theorizing about this situation should regard my judgment as providing 
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strong evidence for the accuracy of my experience. But insofar as my experience was 
accurate, the persimmon perceived by me actually existed in front of me. If we reason this 
way, therefore, what one can say about the metaphysics of one’s perceptual object is 
constrained by what one would say in the phenomenological description of one’s perceptual 
experience.  
If I am really drawn to physicalism, would this approach prevent me from upholding 
my theoretical commitments? No. I could defend the view that there are different levels of 
reality connected by such relations as grounding, parthood and material constitution. If I 
want to endorse physicalism, all I have to say is that the fundamental level of reality consists 
of only the entities posited by physics. Hence, even though a phenomenologically serious 
approach to metaphysics puts much emphasis on first-person observations, it need not lack 
metaphysical rigor. Needless to say, there are many ways to pursue phenomenologically 
serious metaphysics. What all these approaches would have in common is the idea that one 
ought to be serious about how things appear in one’s experience and what one’s experience 
reveals to one. And it is worth stressing that taking the first-person perspective seriously 
doesn’t entail commitments to such theses as phenomenalism about physical objects and the 
infallibility of introspection. It only entails that first-person phenomena shouldn’t be easily 
discounted. In cases where there are good metaphysical, empirical, or phenomenological 
reasons for discounting certain first-person observations, they should by all means be 
discounted.  
On this approach to metaphysics, metaphysics should be informed by 
phenomenology and philosophy of mind. We cannot have a satisfactory metaphysics of 
events if we do not, at the same time, have a satisfactory theory of our experiences of events. 
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This approach to metaphysics is certainly not universally accepted, but it is not idiosyncratic, 
either. Christopher Peacocke argues that there is a task confronting many branches of 
philosophy, which he calls the Integration Challenge: “providing, for a given area, a 
simultaneously acceptable metaphysics and epistemology, and showing them to be so” 
(1999, 1). I think the Integration Challenge needs to be met in all the major branches of 
theoretical philosophy. And when it comes to studying entities of the kind that we can 
interact with in our everyday life, such as pumpkins and storms, there is a phenomenological 
analogue of the Integration Challenge. We can ask: what is the nature of these everyday 
entities, and how is it possible for us to see things as they are when leading our everyday life? 
The goal of my dissertation is to defend an account of events that meets this 
phenomenological challenge.  
At the beginning of this introductory chapter, I said that my dissertation was inspired 
by ideas from different philosophical traditions. Obviously, one of my goals is to engage 
with academic philosophy in the English-speaking world. But it is not hard to tell that a 
tradition that is not the most prominent in the English-speaking world has also exerted 
tremendous influence on my views: the phenomenological tradition, especially Husserlian 
phenomenology. Would the project pursued here be consistent with Husserl’s philosophical 
goals? I believe so. According to Husserl, part of what it is to be a physical object is to be 
capable of being experienced in certain characteristic ways: “We know that belonging to the 
essence of the thing-objects, so far as they are veritably able to be, are not only these truths 
or others, but that it belongs to them to be apparent in one manner or another, to show 
themselves in some proving acts or others…” (Husserl 2008, 434). However, Husserl also 
acknowledges that it is by no means an easy task to explicate how exactly the nature of a 
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physical object is correlated with the possible ways to experience the object. This task is so 
weighty that Husserl takes it to be what partly defines phenomenology: “To elucidate these 
connections between veritable being and knowing and so in general to investigate the 
correlations between act, meaning, object is the task of transcendental phenomenology (or 
transcendental philosophy)” (Husserl 2008, 434). Now, though Husserl’s point of departure 
in these passages is physical objects, it is clear that his conclusion applies to objects of all 
kinds. Insofar as there are mental acts that are experiences of events, it should be a task of 
phenomenology to clarify the relation between these acts, the contents they carry and the 
objects they represent. If so, I believe that my project adheres to Husserl’s vision for 
philosophy.  
1.2 An Overview of Main Arguments  
The remaining chapters of the dissertation are divided into two parts. The first part 
(Chapters 2 and 3) focuses on the metaphysics of events, whereas the second part (Chapters 
4 and 5) defends a Husserlian view of event perception.  
Chapter 2 examines the traditional theories of events that are still influential today. These 
theories make different proposals about how events are individuated: by their spatiotemporal 
locations, by corresponding states of affairs or by the properties of which they are instances. 
What these theories have in common is that they don’t posit any relation similar to material 
constitution in the domain of events. I argue that the theories suffer from various drawbacks 
– some of the most serious drawbacks result from their common feature, i.e. the failure to 
take into account the phenomenon of constitution.  
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Chapter 3 discusses several recent theories of events. All these theories pay attention to the 
phenomenon of constitution, even though they don’t conceptualize constitution in exactly 
the same way. After examining the theories, I present what I take to be a better alternative to 
the theories. In particular, I argue that a theoretically fruitful way to make sense of events 
distinguishes between simple and complex events. Simple events are tropes, while complex 
events are bundles of simple events unified by the constitution relation. This raises a crucial 
question: is there a sufficiently broad conception of the constitution relation, on which 
events can be understood as the relata of the relation? I argue that there is. An event always 
falls under a certain kind, and its kind makes it dependent upon events of some other kinds. 
In other words, an event has needs for other events. On my proposal, if the needs of an 
event are satisfied by the events co-located with it, the former can be said to be constituted 
by the latter. A seminar can thus be said to be constituted by all the events of talking 
occurring in the seminar; similarly, a concert is constituted by all the performances that 
appear on its program. The details of my view are given in section 3.5.2; if the reader prefers 
to get a sense of my view before considering my arguments against alternative views, he or 
she could read the section first. The section presupposes materials presented in sections 
2.4.3 and 3.2, but the latter sections should be independently readable.  
Chapter 4 turns to the topic of event perception. My goal is to develop a Husserlian view that 
satisfactorily accounts for the relation between the objects and the representational contents 
of perceptual experiences. I begin by reviewing some Husserlian theories of perception; after 
that, I propose ways to refine them. On the view I defend, perceptual experiences represent 
systems of tropes via two kinds of contents. Contents of the first kind represent what is 
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strictly visible, such as the facing side of a pumpkin, whereas contents of the second kind 
represent what is expected on the basis of what is strictly visible, such as the occluded side of 
a pumpkin. The two kinds of contents enable us to perceive particulars, but the object of an 
experience is not uniquely determined by its contents. As I shall argue, one of the main 
virtues of this view is that it explains the phenomenological difference between seeing a 
cluster of properties and seeing the bearer of these properties. The details of this view are 
laid out in sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.5.  
Chapter 5 presents my account of our perceptual experiences of events. I argue that we 
perceive the ending of an event, thus perceptually individuating it, when we expect an 
incompatible event to occur at the next moment. Such expectations count as contents of 
perception because they are highly perspectival in nature. If I expect to see an event of color 
change when I see my friend put a slice of meat into boiling water, my expectation is to see 
the event from my present perspective. If I were to undergo a visual experience in which I 
see the meat changing color from my friend’s perspective, then my expectation would be 
violated despite the fact that an event of color change is perceived. I call these perspectival 
expectations “expectational contents” and propose to model the expectational content of an 
event-representing experience with two sets of possible worlds. The first set of worlds 
captures the situations that are expectable in a very broad sense: roughly put, it is the set of 
worlds that wouldn’t surprise one given what one is now seeing and what background 
knowledge one has. The second set of worlds corresponds to the set of situations that are 
expected in a more specific sense: a world is a member of the set only if it is anticipated by 
one in light of the event-kind under which the event unfolding in front of one falls. With the 
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postulation of these two sets of worlds, the everyday notion of expectation becomes a wieldy 
theoretical construct. Now we are able to both disambiguate the notion and use it to spell 
out why the way an event is experienced depends on the extent to which one is familiar with 
the event. As I will try to show, the view presented in the chapter sheds light on various 
phenomena related to event perception, including the indeterminacy inherent in such 
experiences. The considerations leading to the view are somewhat complicated, however, so 
the reader is advised to go directly to section 5.4.1 if he or she prefers to read a relatively 
precise formulation of the view first.  
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CHAPTER 2   
EVENTS: NON-HYLOMORPHIC ACCOUNTS  
Take a 21-gun salute that consists of a series of gunshots. Can we say that the series 
of gunshots is an event that differs from the salute, even though their spatiotemporal 
locations coincide with each other? Hylomorphism about events is true only if we can answer the 
question in the positive. Though hylomorphism about events is my preferred position, non-
hylomorphic theories are much more common. Before I defend my preferred position in the 
next chapter, therefore, I shall examine a variety of non-hylomorphic theories and argue 
against them in this chapter.   
The definition of hylomorphism employed here comes from Simon Evnine. Evnine 
defines the matter relation to be “the relation of being the matter of”, and a theory is hylomorphic 
if and only if it meets two conditions: the theory (a) affirms the existence of entities that 
stand in the matter relation and (b) takes the matter relation to be irreflexive and asymmetric 
(2016, 3). In the example just mentioned, I take the series of gunshots to be the matter of 
the salute. In addition, the relation the series of gunshots bears to the salute is irreflexive 
because the former is not its own matter; it is also asymmetric because the salute is not the 
matter of the series of gunshots. According to Evnine’s definition, these make my view a 
version of hylomorphism – my view entails that the salute is constituted by the series of 
gunshots, just as a car is constituted by steel and rubber.1  
                                                        
 
1 Evnine also uses the more common term “constitution relation” to refer to the matter relation, and 
I shall use the two terms interchangeably.  
  
11 
As one can tell from works reviewing the major theories of events, such as Casati 
and Varzi (2015) and Simons (2005), theories that do without the matter relation are 
probably still the mainstream in the metaphysics of events. It is therefore helpful to begin 
with them before one argues for hylomorphism about events. I take there to be four main 
non-hylomorphic approaches to events. First, primitivism holds that we should take events to 
be basic items in our ontology. The less fundamental entities need to be defined by invoking 
events, but we cannot define events in terms of other entities. Second, according to the space-
time view, events are occupants of spatiotemporal regions. Take a spatiotemporal region that 
has the right features; whatever it contains counts as an event. We need the proviso that the 
regions qualified to be events have the right features, because otherwise counterexamples 
abound – a discontinuous region that contains an avalanche and a tornado is presumably not 
a single event. Third, the state-of-affairs view says that events are entities structurally similar to 
propositions. How should we understand, say, the event of Carl’s speech? The proponents 
of the state-of-affairs view hold that an answer can be found by considering what 
expressions such as “that Carl is speaking” refer to. Fourth, according to the instantiation view, 
events are entities that come into existence when properties are instantiated. For example, 
Carl’s speech is an event occurring now because Carl instantiates the property of speaking 
now.  
I think the instantiation view offers the most plausible conception of events among 
the four approaches. Even so, it still lacks the resources to properly describe certain complex 
events. As I will try to show, the failure of the instantiation view is indicative of the 
inadequacy of non-hylomorphic theories in general. The inadequacy can only be remedied if 
we embrace a robust conception of constitution. Before proceeding, however, I shall note 
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that I will not consider primitivism in any detail. If we accept primitivism about events, not 
much work is left for us to do in the metaphysics of events. Are there people who actually 
hold primitivism? When Davidson says that his work on event identity “may be viewed as an 
indirect defence of events as constituting a fundamental ontological category” ([1969] 2001, 
180), his remark may be interpreted as endorsing primitivism.2 I don’t have much to say 
about primitivism. The main reason I am dissatisfied with it is that I take any form of 
primitivism to be the last resort. Even if events cannot be reduced to anything else, one 
should at least make an effort to explicate the relations between events and the other kinds 
of entities. It is unclear to me that the endorsement of primitivism would encourage such 
efforts. Therefore, I will set primitivism aside for the rest of the chapter.  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 clarifies what count as events in my 
discussion and briefly describes how I understand the notions of existence and identity. 
Sections 2.2–2.4 evaluate the space-time view, the state-of-affairs view and the instantiation 
view, respectively, and Section 2.5 concludes the chapter. As such, this chapter is polemical 
in character; my positive view will be presented in the next chapter.  
2.1 Preliminaries  
2.1.1 “Events”: Delimiting the Subject Matter  
What are the events I shall be discussing in this chapter? Here are some examples: 
storms, laser shows, congressional hearings, my friend’s playing of tennis and the tripling of 
                                                        
 
2 This is how Friederike Moltmann interprets Davidson (Moltmann 2003). I am not sure that 
Davidson has said enough to make this interpretation defensible.  
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a company’s profit.3 From this list, it should be obvious that my concern is with everyday 
events. Maybe the expansion of the universe or cases of quantum entanglement also count as 
events, but I have nothing to say about them in this chapter. My list of examples gives a 
rough idea of the kind of events I intend to study. However, a list is rarely sufficient for the 
purpose of reference-fixing. Consider a so-called “Cambridge change”: when South Sudan 
declared independence in 2011, Kosovo became the second youngest country in the world.4 
But all the intrinsic properties of Kosovo remained the same; the only thing that changed 
was the relation Kosovo bore to the remaining countries in the world. Is Kosovo’s 
emergence as the second youngest country an event? Should it be treated as an explanandum 
of our theory? A list of examples cannot tell us how we should answer the question. To 
remedy this problem, I shall employ the following criterion: an event is any entity that makes 
a Davidsonian existence claim about events true. To make sense of this criterion, let’s turn to 
Donald Davidson’s work on events.  
                                                        
 
3 When I name an event, I will use terms like “Edmund’s feeding of the cat” instead of “Edmund’s 
feeding the cat”. As Jonathan Bennett has convincingly argued, these two types of expressions 
exhibit important semantic differences (1988, 5–6). Compare the following sentences:  
(1) The lawyer’s questioning the witness was inappropriate.  
(2) The lawyer’s questioning of the witness was inappropriate.  
Sentence (1) can only be read as saying “it was inappropriate for the lawyer to question the witness”, 
but this is not the only reading sentence (2) has. Sentence (2) can also be read as saying something 
like “it was fine for the lawyer to question the witness, but the way the lawyer questioned the witness 
was inappropriate”. Bennett uses the term “imperfect nominals” to denote the gerunds that appear in 
sentences like (1); the gerunds that appear in sentences like (2) are called “perfect nominals” (1988, 
5). The referents of imperfect nominals are more fine-grained than those of perfect nominals. Given 
the semantic differences, it is advisable not to use the two types of nominals interchangeably.  
4 The idea of a Cambridge change is commonly attributed to Peter Geach (1969).  
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Davidson created event semantics with his 1967 paper. The main concern of the 
paper is the logical form we should attribute to the sentences in which action verbs appear. 
Consider the following inference:  
(Premise) Carl dozed off at noon.  
(Conclusion) Therefore, Carl dozed off.  
This is obviously a valid inference, but we cannot capture its validity by adopting the 
textbook procedure of translating the sentences with monadic predicates. That would result 
in the following logical form:  
(Premise) DOZE-OFF-AT-NOON (Carl)  
(Conclusion) DOZE-OFF (Carl)  
Since DOZE-OFF-AT-NOON and DOZE-OFF are different predicates, the formalized argument 
is invalid.5 Davidson argues that this problem can be solved by quantifying over events 
([1967] 2001, 118). On his proposal, the original argument can be formalized as follows:  
(Premise) ∃𝑒 (DOZE-OFF(Carl, 𝑒) ∧ AT(𝑒, noon)) 
 “There is some e such that e is a dozing off of Carl and e occurs at noon”.  
  
                                                        
 
5 In this chapter, I use expressions in small capitals in two ways. First, such expressions may be used 
as predicates in an object language. For example, “everyone likes pizza” might be translated as 
“∀𝑥 LIKE-PIZZA(𝑥)”. Second, such expressions may be used in the metalanguage to denote 
properties and kinds. For example, I might call the property of being a rational animal “RATIONAL 
ANIMAL” and the kind under which all frescoes fall “FRESCO”. I shall remain neutral on the exact 
relation between properties and kinds.  
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(Conclusion) ∃𝑒 DOZE-OFF(Carl, 𝑒) 
 “There is some e such that e is a dozing off of Carl”.  
The validity of this formalized argument follows from the rules of classical logic.  
It them emerges that on the Davidsonian approach, “Carl dozed off” is in fact an 
existence claim about an event. The semantic value of the verb predicate “dozed off” 
contains an event variable,6 which is bound by an existential quantifier introduced by other 
morphemes in the sentence.7 The sentence as a whole is true if some existing entity satisfies 
the condition of being a dozing off of Carl. It follows that the sentence “Carl dozed off” 
gives us reasons to introduce an entity into our ontology: if the sentence is true, then any 
entity that is quantified over by the existential quantifier in the sentence should be taken to 
exist. Our criterion simply says that we should take all such sentences into consideration 
when deciding what count as existing events. The application of this criterion isn’t always 
easy, but the criterion provides useful constraints on ontological disputes. Consider again 
Kosovo’s emergence as the second youngest country; does it count as an event on our 
criterion? Some might say “yes”, because “Kosovo became a younger country than South 
Sudan” is an existence claim on the Davidsonian approach, and it is made true by Kosovo’s 
emergence as the second youngest country. But there is at least one other entity that appears 
                                                        
 
6 “Semantic value” is a term of art widely used in contemporary linguistics. Alexander Miller uses the 
term to translate the Fregean term “Bedeutung” and offers the following definition: “The semantic 
value of any expression is that feature of it which determines whether sentences in which it occurs 
are true or false” (2007, 11; emphasis omitted). Miller’s reason for translating the term this way is that 
Fregean Bedeutungen are assigned to many expressions that would not typically be classified as 
referring expressions (2007, 11 fn. 7). For example, the Bedeutung of a sentence is a truth value. But if 
the term “refer” has the meaning it does in “the name ‘Frege’ refers to Frege”, then sentences hardly 
“refer” to anything. I shall follow Miller’s use of the term in this chapter.  
7 For details, see Kratzer (1998) and Champollion (2011).  
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to make the sentence true: South Sudan’s declaration of independence. To decide whether 
the sentence has multiple truth-makers and, if not, which of the two entities makes the 
sentence true, we must introduce additional linguistic data and engage with theories of truth. 
The criterion thus points to a way to proceed when we are unsure whether an entity should 
be put on our list of events.  
The criterion may nonetheless strike one as bizarre: what does the Davidsonian 
approach have to do with metaphysics? Even if the Davidsonian approach tells us something 
about the ontological commitments of natural language, why should we think that the 
approach tells us anything about what there are in the world? One reason can be found in J. 
L. Austin’s view on ordinary language: “our common stock of words embodies all the 
distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth 
marking, in the lifetimes of many generations” ([1957] 1979, 182). Words are devices 
language users employ to describe their environment. If so, a common pattern of word use 
can only emerge if it enables language users to interact with their environment more 
successfully. Patterns of word use thus provide reliable, if not infallible, information about 
the way things are. If, as suggested by the Davidsonian approach, part of the meaning 
conveyed by the utterance of a verb is that certain events occur, then we should take 
seriously the idea that the events so picked out really are elements of reality.  
Many scientifically minded philosophers would not sympathize with Austin’s view. 
Admittedly, natural language may give us some guidance in our metaphysical pursuits. Such 
guidance is nevertheless vastly inferior to that offered by the natural sciences. Why should 
we care about what natural language tells us about, say, minds, organisms and physical 
objects, when we can simply heed the results of neuroscience, biology and physics? It may or 
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may not be true that the natural sciences have the final say about the natures of the most 
fundamental entities, but the sciences cannot tell us everything there is to know about the 
world. This point if forcefully made by J. van Brakel. In defending the view that there is no 
way to reduce the everyday discourse to a scientific discourse about the putative bottom-
level entities, van Brakel cites schizophrenia as an example. Given that the very study of 
schizophrenia aims to better understand its behavioral symptoms, all theories of 
schizophrenia must be evaluated in terms of their behavioral implications. If so, a theory of 
schizophrenia can never become a purely biological theory: the biological mechanisms 
underlying the symptoms are only of interest to the extent that they shed light on behavioral 
phenomena (Van Brakel 1996, 272–73). Extrapolating from van Brakel’s claims, we could 
argue that the study of ordinary language tells us much about the natures of everyday 
entities. Indeed, it is hard to see how the natural sciences can tell us whether such entities as 
sovereign states, financial institutions, epistemically possible worlds and Cambridge changes 
should be accepted into our ontology. One could take the natural sciences to study nothing 
but the theoretical entities posited in them, but it then becomes unclear why the sciences 
should be the only authority in our attempt to understand the reality.  
One could argue that the help from natural language is vacuous, because the 
existence and nature of everyday entities do not raise any deep metaphysical questions. One 
could defend such a claim on the basis of Jonathan Schaffer’s view: metaphysics, in its 
Aristotelian form, “does not bother asking whether properties, meanings, and numbers exist. 
Of course they do! The question is whether or not they are fundamental” (2009, 347). To 
show that questions about existence are not substantive, Schaffer appeals to arguments that 
move from claims made in everyday life to existence claims. In one of his examples, he 
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argues that from the true claim “Arthur Conan Doyle created Sherlock Holmes”, one can 
conclude that “Sherlock Holmes exists” (2009, 359). If we apply such a proof procedure to 
issues about events, then all kinds of events obviously exist; there is no need to study the 
conditions on which events occur. Does Kosovo’s emergence as the second youngest 
country exist? Of course. Witness the following piece of reasoning:  
(Premise 1) Kosovo became the second youngest country in 2011.  
(Premise 2) If Kosovo became the second youngest country in 2011, then Kosovo’s 
becoming of the second youngest country occurred in 2011.  
(Premise 3) If Kosovo’s becoming of the second youngest country occurred in 2011, 
then Kosovo’s becoming of the second youngest country in 2011 exists.  
(Conclusion) Therefore, Kosovo’s becoming of the second youngest country in 2011 
exists.  
If such arguments are sound, we should simply say that all events exist. It follows that there 
are no serious metaphysical questions about everyday events. Since the Davidsonian 
approach is concerned with everyday events, my proposal to delimit the subject matter of my 
metaphysical investigation with the help of the Davidsonian approach is essentially 
misguided.  
The obvious response to such an objection is that arguments of the kind just 
mentioned are not valid. As Tobias Rosefeldt (2018) points out, the semantics of natural 
language sentences is far from transparent. Much linguistic evidence indicates a great 
mismatch between the class of natural language sentences that philosophers often take to be 
existence claims and the class of sentences that are actually existence claims. If so, even 
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though linguistics doesn’t study the most fundamental entities, it can be of immense help in 
our attempt to determine the kinds of non-fundamental entities there are (Rosefeldt 2018, 
176). If the above argument about Kosovo strikes one as weird, it is because the meanings of 
natural language terms are stretched too far in the argument. The remedy is to pay more 
attention to natural language semantics; only by doing so can we identify the real ontological 
commitments of natural language. This is why the Davidsonian approach, as a tool to clarify 
verb meanings, can be a valuable tool for metaphysics. It is reasonable to believe that the 
Davidsonian existence claims are ontologically significant; they are made true by real entities 
in the world. If so, a metaphysical study that takes these entities to be the subject matter is a 
worthwhile pursuit.  
2.1.2 Existence and Identity  
We have picked a criterion to single out the events that will be the subject matter of 
this chapter. But what are the questions about them that need to be answered? What is a 
metaphysical theory of events supposed to do? In his attempt to formulate such a theory, 
Jaegwon Kim chooses to focus on two conditions that events must satisfy: the existence 
condition, i.e. what must be the case for there to be an event, and the identity condition, i.e. what 
must be the case for two entities to count as the same event (1976, 160–61). Following Kim, 
one might say that the goal of a metaphysical theory of events just is to determine the 
existence and identity conditions for events in general. I think this is a good way to 
understand our tasks at hand, but the issue of identity conditions must be framed with care. 
As David Lewis has remarked, “There is never any problem about what makes something 
identical to itself; nothing can ever fail to be. And there is never any problem about what 
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makes two things identical; two things never can be identical” (1986d, 192–93). If so, it 
would seem that questions about event identity have more to do with our thoughts about 
events than with events themselves – aren’t we actually asking what it takes for two thoughts 
about events to have the same object? But if that’s the case, are we still doing metaphysics?  
Jonathan Bennett points to a way out of this impasse. He argues that the real issue is 
to provide a nonduplication principle: “If e1 exactly resembles e2 in respect K, then e1 is e2” 
(1988, 96).8 Consider an analogy with meanings. How are meanings individuated? A possible 
answer is that they are individuated by the sentences that can express them. This suggests a 
nonduplication principle for meanings: if m1 and m2 exactly resemble each other with respect 
to the sentences that can expresses them, then m1 and m2 are the same meaning. Such a 
principle enables us to draw the inference from partial qualitative identity to numerical 
identity. It is weaker than the so-called principle of the identity of indiscernibles, because it 
doesn’t require us to consider every single property. Bennett’s idea is that the search for the 
conditions of event identity should be construed as the search for the nonduplication 
principle applicable to events. This is how I will understand the issue of identity in what 
follows.  
2.2 The Space-Time View  
Let’s now examine the space-time view. As we have seen, the view takes events to be 
what are contained in spatiotemporal regions. Two prominent defenders of the space-time 
                                                        
 
8 Bennett says that “nonduplication principle” is David Lewis’ term, but he doesn’t say where Lewis 
actually uses the term.  
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view are W. V. O. Quine and David Lewis. What are the existence and identity conditions 
posited by their views? Quine takes events to be broadly construed physical objects, where 
such an object “is the material content of any portion of space-time, however small, large, 
irregular, or discontinuous” (1985, 167). It follows that there is an event if and only if there 
is a non-empty spatiotemporal region. Quine also offers a straightforward criterion of event 
identity: two events are numerically distinct if and only if they occupy different regions 
(1985, 167). Therefore, if a showing of the movie Arrival has the same spatiotemporal 
location as a physical event in which light is projected on a screen, the showing is identical to 
the physical event. I find this to be a fairly unattractive view. On the assumption that the 
showing and the physical event of light projection both exist, they can be said to have 
different properties. The showing is an expression of Denis Villeneuve’s artistic intentions; 
the physical event is not. It follows that the showing couldn’t take place if Villeneuve didn’t 
exist, but the physical event certainly could. This means that the two events have different 
aesthetic and modal properties, but Quine’s view cannot accommodate their difference.  
Lewis’ view can be regarded as an improvement over Quine’s. Lewis takes events to 
be classes that contain actual and possible spatiotemporal regions as their members (1986c, 
245). Suppose the aforementioned showing of Arrival attracted an audience of 100 people. 
The numerically identical showing would still have occurred, however, had there only been 
99 people in the audience. Let r and r* denote the spatiotemporal regions in which the actual 
and possible showings occur. While r is a part of the actual world, r* is a part of a merely 
possible world. On the simplifying assumption that the showing only exists in these two 
worlds, Lewis’ view implies that the showing just is the class whose only members are r and 
r*. Such a view avoids the problem facing Quine’s view. While the physical event of light 
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projection exists in those worlds where Villeneuve has never been born, the showing does 
not. On Lewis’ view, it follows that the two events are to be identified with different classes 
of regions; his view thus supports the observation that the two events are numerically 
distinct. Despite its virtues, nevertheless, Lewis’ view also has its quirks. To begin, it may 
strike one as bizarre to identify events with spatiotemporal regions or classes thereof. Since a 
region need not contain what it actually contains, regions are presumably distinct from their 
occupants. If so, wouldn’t it be a category mistake to identify events with regions, as 
opposed to their occupants? This is a legitimate worry, but it shouldn’t be a serious problem 
on a charitable interpretation of Lewis. Lewis seems to use the term “region” loosely so that 
its referents could include both spatiotemporal regions and their occupants. It is also an 
option available to him to make spatiotemporal regions the most fundamental property-
bearers; I don’t know whether Lewis would be willing to do so, but his talk of the 
“qualitative character” of a region at least suggests this possibility (1986c, 262). If he takes 
this route, then the occupants of a region can certainly be thought of as the qualities of the 
region. This is not the only worry one might have about Lewis’ view, however. As I see it, 
Lewis’ view suffers from a more serious problem, identified by Evnine in a different context. 
To explain this problem, a brief digression is in order.  
In reviewing theories of material constitution, Evnine reconstructs the Modal Cross-
Temporal Calculus of Individuals (MCCI) developed by Judith Jarvis Thomson (1983, 1998) 
and interprets her view as committed to a somewhat set-theoretic understanding of physical 
objects (Evnine 2016, 37–40). Take a physical object and the set of entities that bear the 
parthood relation to the object; Thomson’s view implies that the identity of the object is 
determined by the members of this set. To state the view more precisely, let’s consider the 
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notion of fusion in the version of MCCI presented by Evnine. Let A be a class of physical 
entities. Then one of the axioms of MCCI guarantees that for any a ∈ A such that a exists at 
time t in possible world w, there is an entity x such that x shares at least one part with a at t 
in w. In other words, given any class of physical objects, there is an entity that is the fusion 
of these objects exactly when these objects exist and in exactly those worlds where the 
objects exist. According to Evnine, this is the theoretical apparatus used by Thomson to 
model the relation a physical object bears to its ever-changing parts. Take, for example, my 
copy of Monadology; call it M. Let P be the collection of M’s pages and all the other physical 
components of M, such as its front cover. In the actual world, M just is the fusion of P’s 
members. This is nevertheless something contingent. If M were to miss a blank page, it 
would still exist; M thus exists in many possible worlds where M’s parts are not the members 
of P but those of another collection. As a result, M cannot be straightforwardly identified 
with any single fusion of parts; M must be understood as a class of world-fusion pairs or 
fusions relative to worlds. According to Evnine’s reconstruction of Thomson’s view, a 
physical object is nothing over and above such a class.  
Evnine argues that this conception of physical objects is problematic. His main 
objection is that such a conception lacks the resources to differentiate between ordinary 
objects and weird fusions. Consider London Brain, an entity whose only parts are the 
London Eye and my brain. It can certainly be named, but there is nothing that unifies its 
parts other than my inexplicable impulse to use it as an example. According to Evnine, it 
would be a mistake to model ordinary objects upon fusions like London Brain. Doing so 
would make the individuality of objects dependent upon human activity: “It will be merely a 
contingent feature of our interests (or possibly a deeper but still contingent feature of the 
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way our minds work) which such fusions we pick out and name” (Evnine 2016, 40). Given 
that this is implied by Thomson’s view, Thomson’s view should be rejected.  
I think Lewis’ view of events is susceptible to a similar criticism. Applying Evnine’s 
insight to the metaphysics of events, we should make it a desideratum for any satisfactory 
theory of events to answer the following question: given a real event, what makes it a single 
event, as opposed to an arbitrary collection of entities? That is, what is the principle of unity 
that governs events? I don’t think Lewis has the resources to answer this question. Just as 
Thomson’s view lumps together real objects and London Brain, Lewis’ view treats real 
events and arbitrary collections of regions on a par. To see this, consider MF, the class of all 
the regions in which I type on a keyboard at home now while a monkey eats bananas on 
Mount Fuji. Let’s assume that all the members of MF exist at the same time. MF is 
presumably not a single event; nothing unifies the various entities that are involved. By 
contrast, the event that is my typing now is a real event. What can Lewis say to differentiate 
MF from my typing now? Lewis does hold that not every class of regions counts as an event. 
Certain conditions must be met for a class of regions to be formally eligible to be an event: 
such a class must contain “one region each from some worlds, none from others, and never 
more than one from the same world” (1986c, 245). However, the difference between MF 
and my typing cannot be one regarding formal eligibility; MF meets the criterion of formal 
eligibility. There may be many monkeys eating bananas on Mount Fuji, but we could simply 
select one such monkey from each possible world in deciding the members of MF.  
What else can Lewis say? He does say that the members of an event should not be 
too dissimilar: the classes qualified to be events are those “consisting of regions of many 
worlds united by suitable relations of similarity” (1986c, 247). We don’t have to delve into 
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the details of Lewis’ view about similarity to see that the members of MF are indeed very 
dissimilar. The description of MF doesn’t pick out any single monkey, nor does it specify the 
number of bananas that the monkey has to eat. Hence, a region where a tiny monkey eats 
one banana and a region where King Kong eats a ton both belong to MF; these 
spatiotemporal regions don’t share many features with each other. Lewis could then invoke 
his requirement on similarity to rule out the eventhood of MF. If so, one could argue that 
MF is not a counterexample to Lewis’ account. However, this response doesn’t really solve 
the problem. Lewis still hasn’t told us what it is that unifies a real event but is missing in MF. 
Similarity is insufficient for unity. Consider an analogous case in the domain of people. Let 
W be the class of all the possible worlds in which I have a doppelgänger. Take the class that 
contains the actual me and my doppelgängers in the members of W. Can this class be 
identified with a single person? Since neither I nor my doppelgänger can be identified with 
this class, the answer is “no”. This is so despite the fact that the members of this class are 
perfectly similar. It follows that unity cannot be confounded with similarity. However similar 
the members of a class are, the class might still lack unity. If so, Lewis’ attempt to reduce 
events to classes of regions is fundamentally flawed.  
As a rejoinder, a proponent of Lewis’ view could argue that there is no need to 
derive any principle of unity from Lewis’ similarity requirement. If certain spatiotemporal 
regions belong to the same class, they already feature a kind of unity: the joint membership 
in a class. Lewis’ events obviously feature such minimal unity. However, this is a very weak 
kind of unity; many would take any two things to form a class. Classes do not even obey the 
axioms of set theory, as witnessed by the standard mathematical definition of a proper class: 
“A proper class is a class which is not a set” (Di Nasso 2002, 316). Even if joint membership 
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in a class counts as some kind of unity, it falls short of the kind of unity featured by events. 
The appeal to classes thus fails to show that Lewis’ events are sufficiently different from 
London Brain. We can certainly name the Lewisian events and postulate certain conditions 
for their existence, but these names hardly pick out any genuine elements of reality.  
To be sure, Lewis would not be discouraged by my objections, as he has a vision for 
metaphysics that is very different from mine. His famous doctrine of Humean supervenience 
states that “if two worlds match perfectly in all matters of particular fact, they match 
perfectly in all other ways too” (1986a, 111). If the goal of metaphysics is to defend such 
supervenience, then we would have said enough about any event once we have specified all 
the spatiotemporal regions at which the event could possibly occur. The event certainly 
supervenes on this class of regions, whether or not this class of regions features any form of 
unity. It could be that all my dissatisfaction with Lewis’ theory boils down to my view that 
such a vision for metaphysics is objectionable. Of course, whether or not the idea of 
Humean supervenience is tenable is not an issue I could possibly address here. My goal right 
now is only to show that the space-time view of events carries a heavy theoretical burden. If 
one is unwilling to undertake a metaphysical project that is Lewisian in spirit, one would do 
better to look elsewhere.  
2.3 The State-of-Affairs View 
Let’s now turn to the state-of-affairs view. Though it is unclear whether ordinary 
English hypostatizes the referent of the term “state of affairs”, the term is widely used in 
everyday contexts. For example, a Democrat might say “the U.S. government was shut down 
and thousands of federal workers didn’t get paid; that was an extremely unfortunate state of 
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affairs”. The phrase “an extremely unfortunate state of affairs” in this sentence is a nominal 
predicate that describes a government shutdown, which appears to be an event. Uses of the 
term like this might provide prima facie reasons to identify events with states of affairs. In the 
philosophical literature on events, the champion of the state-of-affairs view is Roderick 
Chisholm. Therefore, I shall begin by examining his version of the view.  
Chisholm defines states of affairs as broadly construed propositions, which he in 
turn identifies with the possible objects of propositional attitudes (1970, 19–20). In doing so, 
he seems to presuppose a widely accepted view about belief-like states, which may be called 
the propositional-attitude view (PA). According to PA, mental states like belief and doubt are 
attitudes one could take towards propositions. Suppose I believe that Edmund is playing 
tennis. PA would characterize my belief as an affirmative attitude I take towards the 
proposition Edmund is playing tennis. This proposition is then the object of my belief, 
which means that it is a state of affairs on Chisholm’s view. According to Chisholm, a state 
of affairs is either an event or a narrowly construed proposition: while the latter is “any state 
of affairs which is necessarily such that either it or its negation does not occur”, the former is 
“any contingent state of affairs which is not a proposition and which implies change” (1970, 
20). It follows that the sentence “Edmund is playing tennis” expresses an event: it is possible 
for Edmund’s playing tennis to occur, so is Edmund’s not playing tennis.  
Chisholm’s main argument for his view seems to be the following: events are capable 
of recurring, and the state-of-affairs view best accommodates this observation (1970, 15). 
Suppose my car accelerates now, moves at a constant velocity for 10 seconds and then 
accelerates again. According to Chisholm’s view, a single event that is the acceleration of my 
car occurs over two disjoint time intervals separated by 10 seconds. The acceleration event is 
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thus capable of existing during the 10 seconds when it doesn’t occur; otherwise, upon 
recurring, the event would have to regain its identity after ceasing to be (1970, 23). How is 
this possible? The state-of-affairs view offers a simple explanation: the state of affairs that 
my car accelerates obtains for a while, stops obtaining for 10 seconds and then obtains again. 
Just as a false proposition still exists as a proposition, a non-obtaining state of affairs may 
still exist. If so, recurrence can be understood as a change in a state of affairs that outlasts 
the change.  
What should we say about Chisholm’s theory? As I see it, Chisholm is to be credited 
with the insight that there may be important analogies between the occurrence of an event 
and the obtaining of a state of affairs. There may be ways to defend the state-of-affairs view 
by further pursuing these analogies, as I shall soon discuss. That said, I think Chisholm’s 
own version of the state-of-affairs view is bizarre. Why should we think that a numerically 
identical event could occur on two separate occasions? In our car example, isn’t it just 
simpler to say that a second event occurs when my car accelerates again? There might be 
larger theoretical concerns that motivate Chisholm’s view, but I cannot find any explicit 
statements about such concerns. One way to interpret Chisholm charitably is to hypothesize 
that Chisholm is actually theorizing about event-types rather than event-tokens. 
Unfortunately, this interpretive hypothesis is easily refuted: Chisholm’s proposal is obviously 
intended to be an alternative to a theory that posits both types and tokens (1970, 15). The 
best one could do to defend Chisholm, therefore, is to claim that it is fine for a philosophical 
theory to be counterintuitive, insofar as it is not objectionable on independent grounds.  
But Chisholm’s theory is objectionable on independent grounds. To begin, many 
events seem incapable of recurring – the big bang and my birth, for example. These events 
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not only fail to recur in the actual world but also fail to do so in every other possible world. 
It doesn’t make much sense to say “the big bang still exists now; it just no longer occurs”. 
Why, then, should we take these events to be non-obtaining states of affairs that nonetheless 
continue to exist? An even more serious problem with Chisholm’s view is that it 
presupposes PA. It is certainly not uncommon for philosophers to consider belief-like states 
as directed at propositions, but I think PA is misguided. Suppose I believe that the brick in 
front of me is red. What is the object of my belief? The simplest answer is: the red brick in 
front of me. This answer seems good enough, and it doesn’t commit us to the existence of 
anything proposition-like. The friend of PA might argue that the simple answer doesn’t 
account for incorrect beliefs. Suppose I am mistaken about the red brick and believe that it is 
blue. Since nothing red figures in my belief, its object cannot be the red brick. Rather, the 
object of my belief is the proposition or state of affairs that the brick in front of me is blue. 
This line of reasoning is problematic, because it makes the incorrectness of my belief 
inexplicable. Why is it incorrect to believe that the brick is blue, if what is expressed by “that 
the brick is blue” is precisely the object of my belief? Doesn’t my belief represent this object 
in a perfectly accurate way? The better way to analyze the case, I submit, is to say that the 
content of my belief attributes the wrong properties to the object of my belief. The content of 
my belief can be expressed by the sentence “the brick in front of me is red”; my belief is 
incorrect because its object, the brick, is not red.9 There is no need to invoke proposition-
like entities to explain the incorrectness of my belief.  
                                                        
 
9 For more discussion of the content-object distinction, see section 4.1.  
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As a rejoinder, the friend of PA could argue that the incorrectness of my belief can 
be easily explained by their view as well: my belief is incorrect because the object of my 
belief doesn’t correspond to anything in reality. But isn’t a proposition, as conceptualized by 
PA, a part of reality? Maybe the friend of PA would say that the proposition or state of 
affairs represented by my belief doesn’t obtain. My belief is incorrect for exactly the reason 
that it purports to represent something that fails to obtain. I am not satisfied with this 
response, but instead of directly arguing against it, I would only point out that this response 
has undesirable implications. If the object of an incorrect belief is a non-obtaining state of 
affairs, the object of a correct belief is presumably an obtaining state of affairs. It follows 
that the red brick is not the object of my belief; it is at best an object of my belief in a 
derivative sense. But why cannot my belief, as it were, directly reach the brick? Why does my 
representation of the brick have to be mediated by the representation of a proposition-like 
entity? The friend of PA could argue that I am prejudiced against states of affairs. The brick 
is a part of a state of affairs, and the parthood relation the brick bears to the state of affairs is 
the same relation that holds between, say, a brick and a wall. If it is misleading to say that the 
representation of a wall is mediated by the representations of its constituent bricks, it is no 
less misleading to say that the representation of a state of affairs has to be mediated by the 
representations of its parts. A problem with this response is that the parthood relation in 
these two cases cannot be the same. Bricks and walls belong to the same ontological 
category: they are both physical objects. A state of affairs is nonetheless not a physical 
object. While the parthood relation between a brick and a wall can be defined within a single 
category, i.e. the category of physical objects, the parthood relation between a brick and a 
state of affairs has to bridge two ontological categories. The analogy the friend of PA appeals 
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to thus breaks down. In any case, to defend their favored alternative, the friend of PA has to 
tell a very complicated story. If so, it makes more sense to stick to the simpler story: when I 
believe that the brick in front of me is red, the object of my belief is just the red brick in 
front of me. Given this conception of the so-called propositional attitudes, Chisholm’s 
version of the state-of-affairs view appears even less motivated.  
But the state-of-affairs view about events need not be tied to PA. There are other 
ways to define states of affairs, and it is certainly possible to formulate a version of the state-
of-affairs view that excludes the idiosyncratic features of Chisholm’s version. Let’s now 
examine this possibility. Kevin Mulligan and Fabrice Correia note that certain constructions 
in natural language seem to enable language users to refer to facts (2017, sec. 1.1). For 
example, by combining the phrase “it is a fact” with the clause “that Edmund is playing 
tennis”, one seems to convey that the clause names a fact, i.e. Edmund’s playing tennis. 
There is then the metaphysical question about the nature of facts. According to Mulligan and 
Correia, a major theory of facts takes a fact to be a state of affair that obtains. A state of 
affairs may or may not obtain; it does if “an object exemplifies a property or one or more 
objects stand in a relation” (2017, sec. 1.1 para. 6). In our example, the state of affairs of 
Edmund’s playing tennis obtains because Edmund exemplifies the property of playing 
tennis. By fixing the referent of the term “state of affairs” this way, we can avoid committing 
ourselves to PA or any particular theory of propositional attitudes.  
Mulligan and Correia list several metaphysical roles that a state of affairs might play, 
and I take the most important one to be the role of making propositions true (2017, sec. 
1.4). States of affairs are structurally similar to propositions, but they must be sharply 
distinguished from propositions. While there is an entity that is the content of the sentence 
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“Edmund is playing tennis”, there is another entity that makes the content true. The former 
is a proposition, while the latter is a state of affairs that obtains. One might worry that this 
view trivializes states of affairs. It is tempting to claim, say, that the proposition Annegret 
Kramp-Karrenbauer is a German is made true by Kramp-Karrenbauer herself: the 
proposition is true because she is indeed a German. Wouldn’t this claim render states of 
affairs metaphysically superfluous, if they are posited to fill the truth-making role? This 
worry may be lessened if we take into account the range of propositions that states of affairs 
can be considered to make true. According to Mark Textor, the possible outcomes of a 
statistical experiment are paradigmatic states of affairs (2016, sec. 1.2). If I draw a card from 
a deck of playing cards, one possible outcome is that I would draw the two of clubs. The 
outcome of my drawing the two of clubs is then a state of affairs. Since the probability 
distribution of a statistical experiment is an objective matter, this state of affairs exists 
whether or not I actually draw the two of clubs. Extrapolating from the claims made by 
Mulligan, Correia and Textor, we arrive at the conclusion that states of affairs also make 
propositions about probability true. Let X be an experiment in which I draw 13 cards from a 
deck of playing cards. Since the proposition more than 10 cards drawn in X are clubs 
corresponds to one of the possible outcomes, there is a state of affairs that can make the 
proposition true by obtaining. It is unclear that the truth-making role of this state of affairs 
can be played by any other entities. The suggestion that the cards themselves make the 
proposition true doesn’t sound promising: if I draw 13 clubs, which of the clubs make the 
proposition true? It thus emerges that we can motivate the ontological commitment to states 
of affairs without accepting Chisholm’s view. On the present view, if belief-contents are 
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propositions, then anyone believing Edmund to be playing tennis indeed counts as having a 
correct belief in virtue of the state of affairs. Despite this, the state of affairs should not be 
defined in terms of anyone’s belief; it obtains even if it is somehow impossible for anyone to 
believe that Edmund is playing tennis.  
Equipped with this alternative conception of states of affairs, we can now identify an 
event with the obtaining of a state of affairs. Edmund’s current playing of tennis is an event, 
and it can be identified with the current obtaining of the state of affairs that Edmund is 
playing tennis. We then have a theory that unifies events, facts and states of affairs, and 
parsimony is a great virtue for any metaphysical theory. Call this theory the unified theory (UT). 
Why not accept UT? The problem, I submit, is that the “obtainings” of states of affairs are 
not individuated the right way. Their properties simply fail to correspond to those of events. 
To see this, consider a distinction made by Textor (2016), which is in turn drawn from 
Pollock (1984). A state of affairs is either transient or nontransient. A transient state of affairs is 
one that meets the following modal criterion: it is possible for there to be times at which the 
state of affairs obtains as well as times at which it doesn’t. A state of affairs is nontransient if 
and only if it is not transient (Textor 2016, sec. 2.3 paras. 4-5). For example, the state of 
affairs of Edmund’s playing tennis is transient, while Edmund’s playing tennis on January 1, 
2000 is nontransient. As we shall see, both kinds of states of affairs differ from events in 
important ways.  
Let’s begin with nontransient states of affairs. Consider again Edmund’s playing 
tennis on January 1, 2000; call it s. Can UT identify the event that is Edmund’s playing of 
tennis with the obtaining of s? As a nontransient state of affairs, s always obtains if it obtains 
at all. Identifying the event with the obtaining of s is therefore tantamount to saying that the 
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event goes on forever. This is obviously problematic. As a rejoinder, one could dispute the 
decision to think of s as a nontransient state of affairs. Why not say that s only obtains on 
January 1, 2000? We cannot do that if the main role played by states of affairs is that of 
making propositions true. If the proposition Edmund will play tennis on January 1, 2000 
was ever true before January 1, 2000, then it was presumably made true by s. Similarly, if the 
proposition Edmund played tennis on January 1, 2000 continued to be true after January 1, 
2000, s would be the best candidate for its truth-maker. Since a state of affairs has to obtain 
to make a proposition true, it follows that s always obtains. We are then led back to the 
conclusion that states of affairs of the kind under consideration are eternally-obtaining. 
Observations like this could easily be used to motivate the stronger view that states of affairs 
are non-spatiotemporal, insofar as one assumes that nothing spatiotemporal has the eternal 
truth-making features exemplified by states of affairs. Indeed, the stronger view was 
historically influential, as witnessed by Barry Smith’s work on Sachverhalte, in which he 
interprets Adolf Reinach as taking states of affairs to be set-like abstract objects: “Like sets, 
Sachverhalte are built up (inter alia) out of ordinary objects in a way that somehow suspends 
the mutability of the latter” (B. Smith 1989, 64). If states of affairs are immutable, it is hard 
to see how their obtaining can be construed as the occurrence of events. After all, events are 
commonly regarded as the locus of change.  
Does it mean that we should take an event to be the obtaining of a transient state of 
affairs? That won’t do, either. Consider again experiment X, in which I draw 13 cards from a 
deck of playing cards. Let s1 and s2 be two transient states of affairs: the former is my 
drawing more than 10 clubs in X and the latter my drawing more than 12 clubs in X. Since 
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the probability of s1’s obtaining is different from that of s2’s obtaining, these two states of 
affairs are distinct. Suppose I carry out X at 10 am on January 1, 2020 and draw 13 clubs; it 
follows that s1 and s2 both obtain at 10 am on January 1, 2020. Given that s1 and s2 are 
distinct, the obtaining of s1 is distinct from the obtaining of s2. According to UT, I have 
made two events happen by drawing 13 cards. But there is only one event. Even modal 
considerations wouldn’t enable us to establish the existence of two distinct events: in any 
possible world in which I draw more than 12 clubs by drawing 13 clubs, that very drawing 
event is identical to the event of my drawing more than 10 clubs by drawing 13 clubs. This 
shows that UT gives the wrong identity condition of events. Of course, the friend of UT 
could weaken the theory: she could argue that the obtaining of a state of affairs is necessary, 
but insufficient, for the existence of an event. The friend of UT could then say that neither 
the obtaining of s1 nor the obtaining of s2 is sufficient for the existence of an event; only the 
obtaining of my drawing 13 clubs is. The problem is that even if s1 and s2 are necessary for 
the existence of the drawing event, they seem irrelevant to the nature of the drawing event. 
That is, they don’t appear to play any role in the identity condition of the drawing event; the 
identity of the drawing event seems to be completely determined by the state of affairs of my 
drawing 13 clubs. To defend UT, therefore, one has to assume that the existence of an event 
depends on something that has nothing to do with its nature. There may be ways to motivate 
such a view, but I don’t see much appeal of it. What then emerges is that neither Chisholm’s 
view nor UT captures the central features of events. For this reason, I shall not pursue the 
state-of-affairs view any further in this chapter.  
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2.4 The Instantiation View  
2.4.1 Kim’s Account  
According to the instantiation view of events, events occur when properties are 
instantiated. Kim is commonly credited with initiating this approach to events. In Kim’s 
account, events are taken to be “exemplifications by substances of properties at a time” 
(1976, 160; emphasis omitted). For example, the exemplification of rotation by the London 
Eye now is an event. Kim’s use of the term “substance” is very liberal; it includes both 
physical objects and the matter that constitutes them (1976, 159). If we take the paradigmatic 
examples of substances to be such entities as buildings, people and planets, then 
“continuants” would be a better term for what Kim calls “substances”.10 Kim also has a 
somewhat relaxed criterion of the properties constitutive of events: he doesn’t think that 
change is necessary for events (1976, 159–60). Therefore, the induced anesthesia in a patient 
could be an event, because the patient has the property of being anesthetic at the relevant 
time.  
What advantages might the instantiation view enjoy over the state-of-affairs view and 
the space-time view about events? I think the best way to motivate the view is to consider an 
example provided by Carol Cleland. Take a sphere that changes color while rotating; the 
rotation coincides spatiotemporally with the color change (Cleland 1991, 230). On Kim’s 
view, there is a simple way to understand the case: it involves two events, which are the 
                                                        
 
10 I will understand the term “continuant” the way Peter Simons defines it. Here’s Simons’ definition: 
“A continuant is any object which exists in time and which has no temporal parts, that is, parts which 
exist solely because of its existing at a certain time. Continuants persist by enduring” (2000a, 59).  
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sphere’s exemplification of rotation at the relevant time and its exemplification of color 
change at the same time. The analyses offered by the other two views are more contrived. 
Given the spatiotemporal coincidence, the space-time view would have it that the rotation 
and the color change are the same event; this is a very undesirable verdict. The state-of-
affairs view is faced with a different problem: in addition to the sphere and the properties, 
the view has to posit two entities called “the obtaining of the sphere’s rotating” and “the 
obtaining of the sphere’s changing color”. The comparison suggests that the instantiation 
view has more intuitive appeal than the other two views.  
This is not to say that Kim’s version of the instantiation view is without problems. I 
don’t think that every event is the instantiation of a property by a continuant. To begin, there 
are some putative counterexamples to this claim. As Casati and Varzi point out, it has been 
argued that weather events and the like do not involve any objects – though they also note 
that these may not be real counterexamples if we opt for a broader conception of objects 
(2008, 42). Given that Kim is willing to count quantities of matter among the continuants 
accommodated by his theory, he could argue that weather events such as storms still involve 
continuants – how could a storm possibly occur without some quantity of air?11 This may be 
true, but it is irrelevant unless Kim makes the further claim that the storm is a property of 
the quantity of air. This further claim is problematic. Suppose a storm persists for two hours; 
let Q be the quantity of air that allegedly instantiates the storm. I claim that Q is individuated 
                                                        
 
11 I will follow Evnine’s use of the term “quantity”. Evnine understands the term the way Helen 
Cartwright (1970) does: it refers to a collection of matter, not the amount of matter in such a 
collection (Evnine 2016, 3 fn. 5). Hence, “a quantity of sugar” doesn’t denote anything like 5 
tablespoons or 2 kilograms; it simply denotes a collection of sugar.  
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by the storm. For we could ask: what makes Q a single quantity of air? For every moment in 
the two-hour period, there is a quantity of air that occupies the same spatial region as the 
storm, and these quantities of air are all different from each other. What makes them a single 
quantity of matter? The most natural answer is: each of them occupies the same spatial 
region as the storm at some moment in time. This is what the air molecules in Q have in 
common. If so, we should say that the numerical identity of Q depends on that of the storm, 
not the other way around. But if the numerical identity of Q depends on that of the storm, 
there is little reason to think that the storm is a property of Q. The further claim Kim has to 
make is thus untenable.  
To be sure, the friend of Kim’s view could argue that I have confounded 
epistemological and metaphysical issues. For us to identify Q in our thoughts, we have to 
invoke the storm. But it doesn’t follow that the numerical identity of Q depends on that of 
the storm. We could simply assume that any two quantities of matter constitute a single 
quantity of matter. This is Tyler Burge’s view. He notes that stuff like water is cumulative 
(1977, 112). If we have two quantities of water, then their collection is also a quantity of 
water.12 This makes stuff very different from paradigmatic individuals: the collection of two 
human beings is not another human being. But there are at least two ways to conceptualize a 
                                                        
 
12 Burge’s theory of stuff is part of his more general theory of aggregates. His official definition of 
being cumulative is given in the following principle of cumulative reference:  
𝜑(𝑥) & 𝜑(𝑦) → 𝜑([𝑧: 𝑧𝛼𝑥 ∨ 𝑧𝛼𝑦])            (Burge 1977, 112) 
In Burge’s formalism, x, y and z are aggregates, φ is any one-place predicate that describes stuff, α is 
the two-place predicate of being a member-component, and “[ ]” stands for totality. Therefore, the 
principle of cumulative reference reads: if x and y are stuff (with certain characteristics), then the 
totality of their member-components is also stuff (with the specified characteristics).  
  
39 
quantity of matter. To see this, consider Lake Michigan and River Rhine. On the one hand, 
we could think of all the water molecules in them as constituting a single quantity of water. 
On the other hand, we could take Lake Michigan and River Rhine to be two distinct 
waterbodies. The two waterbodies have very different properties – there are many ships that 
could sail on Lake Michigan but not on River Rhine. It would hence be problematic to say 
that they constitute a single waterbody. To resume our discussion of the storm case, I believe 
that the second way to conceptualize quantities of matter is the more pertinent one. For a 
storm to occur in an air mass, the mass must have certain properties. If the mass were 
regarded as a homogenous collection of air molecules, the occurrence of the storm in the 
mass would be inexplicable. So construed, however, a quantity of air doesn’t just combine 
with any other quantity of air. It is simply implausible to hold that an air mass in Siberia and 
one in the Indian Ocean constitute a single air mass. If so, what enables us to speak of Q as 
the air mass in which the storm occurs? There is not a single air mass that stays unchanged 
during the entire storm. We can then run our earlier argument again and conclude that the 
storm is what makes the air masses a single air mass. My point thus stands: the numerical 
identity of Q depends on that of the storm, so to think that the storm is a property of Q is to 
have things backwards. Kim’s attempt to identify an event with the instantiation of a 
property by a continuant fails.  
2.4.2 Cleland’s Account 
A sophisticated alternative to Kim’s version of the instantiation view is defended by 
Cleland. Her account differs from Kim’s in at least two respects. First, while Kim allows the 
possibility that some events are not accompanied by changes, Cleland holds that all events 
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are changes (1991, 231). Therefore, though Kim would regard my stay at a hotel as an event, 
Cleland would not. Second, while Kim takes events to be property exemplifications by 
physical continuants, Cleland takes events to property exemplifications by tropes (1991, 
237–38). Tropes are particular instances of properties such as the temperature in my room 
and the whiteness of the London Eye. A useful way to conceptualize tropes is provided by 
Peter Simons, who takes them to be “a kind of dependent concrete particular” (1994, 557). 
Tropes are dependent because they don’t exist on their own,13 and they are concrete in that 
they have spatiotemporal locations. A tropes is therefore different from both the property of 
which it is an instance and the object on which it depends. On Cleland’s view, an event such 
as an onset of depression is not a change in a person but a change in the mental condition of 
a person, which is a trope.  
To make sense of the idea that events are property exemplifications by tropes, 
Cleland assumes that properties come in different degrees of specificity. For example, 
rotation is a specific kind of motion. The standard way to characterize their relation is to say 
that rotation is a determinate of motion while motion is the determinable of rotation.14 
Following Stephen Yablo’s terminology, we can say that rotation determines, or bears the 
determination relation to, motion (1992, 252). We are now ready to examine the details of 
Cleland’s account. The centerpiece of her account is the notion of a concrete change. Let p be a 
                                                        
 
13 The criterion of dependence probably has to be qualified. Simons himself accepts the existence of 
trope bundles that are not dependent on anything else (1994, 567–68). I see no harm in treating these 
trope bundles as complex tropes, but such complex tropes would then be capable of existing on their 
own. This shouldn’t be a serious problem, because we can still say that simple tropes are dependent 
particulars.  
14 The distinction between the determinate and the determinable is often attributed to W. E. Johnson 
(1921).  
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trope that is an instance of P. Suppose Q1 and Q2 are distinct properties that bear the 
determination relation to P. Then the successive exemplification of Q1 and Q2 by p is a 
concrete change, where Q1 and Q2 are called the initial state and terminal state of the change 
(1991, 238). For example, suppose that Germany’s GDP will triple between 2040 and 2050: 
its GDP will grow to 30,000 billion U.S. dollars by the end of 2050 from its 2040 value of 
10,000 billion dollars. To apply Cleland’s definition to this case, note that GDP is a property 
of an economy. We can thus take GDP to be P and Germany’s GDP to be p. What about Q1 
and Q2? Consider the property of having a GDP of 10,000 billion dollars and that of having 
a GDP of 30,000 billion dollars. Since these two properties bear the determination relation 
to GDP, we can take them to be Q1 and Q2. It follows that the tripling of Germany’s GDP 
between 2040 and 2050 is a concrete change: it is a pair of property exemplifications in 
which Germany’s GDP first exemplifies a value of 10,000 billion dollars and then a value of 
30,000 billion dollars. Notably, changes like this are called “concrete” because they need to 
be sharply distinguished from types of change. While the tripling of GDP is a type of 
change, the tripling of Germany’s GDP between 2040 and 2050 is a token of the type. This 
definition of a concrete change captures all the essentials of Cleland’s account – she simply 
identifies events with concrete changes (1991, 245).  
How does Cleland defend her account? One of the arguments she offers is that her 
account is able to accommodate those events that occur independently of physical 
continuants. As examples of such events, she cites the “purely temporal world of 
disembodied melodies, booms, bangs, shrieks, etc.” in the thought experiments presented by 
P. F. Strawson (1959), as well as “that shriek, this flash, that desire” and “fluctuations in 
gravitational and electromagnetic fields” (1991, 230–31). I certainly agree with Cleland that 
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these examples put pressure on accounts like Kim’s.15 However, even if the existence of 
physical continuants is not necessary for the occurrence of events, it doesn’t follow that 
events need to be conceived of as Cleland’s concrete changes. Indeed, why should we even 
say that change is necessary for events? Cleland’s answer is that this is how events are 
conceptualized in everyday life (1991, 231). Since a change-based theory of events better 
coheres with the common-sense worldview, it is to be preferred to theories that 
accommodates changeless events.  
I think Cleland’s claim about the everyday conception of events is false. Common 
sense has it that events are causes and effects, but causes and effects need not be changes. 
As Lewis puts it, “We cannot afford to count the unchanges as nonevents, for the unchanges 
may be needed to complete causal histories” (1986c, 261).16 Suppose Carl gets bored after 
staying in his room for the entire day. Carl’s stay in his room hardly counts as a change of 
any kind. However, it is the stay that causes Carl’s boredom; without treating the stay as a 
cause, his boredom would become inexplicable. It follows that changeless events are still 
events. Cleland could respond by saying that the above considerations are not really part of 
the common sense; rather, they are philosophical attempts to make our everyday conception 
                                                        
 
15 Though I agree with Cleland’s claim that events need not involve physical continuants, I am not 
sure that Cleland has made a strong case for this claim. As we have seen, Kim construes substances 
broadly such that they include quantities of matter. It is therefore insufficient to just cite such 
phenomena as sounds and flashes; one needs to explain why these phenomena cannot be understood 
as property exemplifications by quantities of matter. Cleland hasn’t done that. Among Cleland’s 
putative counterexamples, the only one that is straightforwardly incompatible with Kim’s account is 
the case of purely temporal worlds. However, I am not inclined to believe that these worlds are really 
possible. Even if I am wrong, the “sounds” in those worlds probably differ in kind from the sounds 
in the actual world. Why think that they have anything in common? For these reasons, I don’t think 
Cleland’s arguments are successful.  
16 A similar concern is raised by Kim (1976, 159–60).  
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of events more precise. This response isn’t really defensible. There is no straightforward way 
to decide what counts as part of the common sense and what doesn’t – philosophers’ 
intuitions are by no means the most authoritative guide in our attempt to make such 
decisions. One of the more reliable guides is natural language, and, as mentioned above, the 
place of events in natural language can be clarified with Davidsonian semantics of verb 
predicates. But the semantic values of verb predicates need not involve changes. Witness the 
following inference:17  
(Premise) Carl reluctantly stayed in his room.  
 ∃𝑒 (STAY(Carl, 𝑒) ∧ RELUCTANT(𝑒) ∧ IN(𝑒, Carl's room)) 
 “There is some e such that e is a stay, e is reluctant, and e occurs in Carl’s 
room”.  
(Conclusion) Therefore, Carl stayed in his room.  
 ∃𝑒 (STAY(Carl, 𝑒) ∧ IN(𝑒, Carl's room)) 
 “There is some e such that e is a stay and e occurs in Carl’s room”.  
This is a valid argument, and treating Carl’s staying as an event makes explicit why the 
argument is valid. If so, contrary to what Cleland says, change isn’t a necessary component 
of the everyday conception of events.  
If the only problem with Cleland’s account is her requirement that events be 
changes, then we could just drop this requirement. We could retain the idea that an event is 
                                                        
 
17 This, of course, is a much simplified representation of the inference. Tense is ignored, and no 
attention is paid to the syntax. Those complications can nevertheless be set aside for the present 
purposes.  
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defined by its initial and terminal states, each of which is a property exemplification. While 
Cleland insists that these two states must be different, we could allow the possibility that 
they are the same. On this revised account, my two-day stay at a hotel counts as an event: its 
initial state is my stay at the hotel on the first day and its terminal state is my stay on the 
second day. Though this revised account seems promising, it is faced with a difficulty raised 
by Paul Needham (2013). Needham argues against Cleland and maintains that events must 
be sharply distinguished from states; if his argument is sound, there is no hope for us to 
succeed in describing an event in terms of its initial and terminal states.18 Needham defends 
his claim by appealing to thermodynamics. In what follows, I shall examine two of 
Needham’s main arguments.  
Here’s Needham’s first argument: if we understand an event as the transition from 
one state to another, then we fail to make sense of cyclic processes (2013, 401). I may heat a 
cup of water and then leave it to cool down until it returns to the initial temperature. This 
process is clearly different from one in which I do nothing to the water. Nevertheless, the 
two processes would have identical initial and terminal states. It follows that a process 
cannot be defined by the states at its endpoints, however close the two endpoints are in 
time. In his second argument, Needham notes that a process might not correspond one-to-
one with the correlative state-change (2013, 404–5). One possible state-change is the 
increase in temperature by 20 degrees Fahrenheit, but this state-change does not define any 
actual process. How much thermal energy it would take to bring about such a change 
                                                        
 
18 Needham’s main concern is with what he calls “processes”. However, what he means by the term 
doesn’t seem different from what others mean by “events”, and he often appears to use the terms 
“processes” and “events” interchangeably.  
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depends on the heat capacity of the heated object. Take two objects, one made of copper 
and the other gold. Even if the temperatures of both objects are raised from 40 to 60 
degrees over the same period, their changes in fact consist in converting different amounts 
of energy. Moreover, any temperature change might result from mechanical work rather than 
thermal energy. Despite the absence of any hot objects, the temperature of a quantity of air 
may rise because of an increase in its internal pressure. Therefore, while one may use the 
concept of a 20-degree increase in temperature to refer to many processes, the referent of 
this concept is determined by a variety of contextual factors. The concept does not uniquely 
pick out any type or token of process. It is thus futile to conceptualize a process by using 
state concepts.  
I am not convinced that Needham’s arguments are sufficient to show that events 
cannot be individuated by states. To be sure, his first argument demonstrates the importance 
of temporal continuity: an event is individuated by the entire series of states it goes through, 
not just by the initial and terminal states. This is indeed an important insight, and it shows 
why a theory like Cleland’s doesn’t do justice to the temporal nature of events. Even so, 
Needham’s point can be accommodated without drawing a sharp distinction between events 
and states. We can formulate what may be called a continuity requirement for event as 
follows. Define TL(∙) to be a function that maps an event to its temporal location. Then for 
any event e and its temporal parts e1 and e2, if the mereological sum of TL(e1) and TL(e2) is 
not identical to TL(e), then e is not individuated by e1 and e2. When applied to Cleland’s 
account, this requirement says essentially the same thing as Needham’s point. Let e1 and e2 be 
the initial and terminal states of an event; the requirement says that the event is not 
individuated by them. The requirement thus captures Needham’s insight. Nevertheless, it is 
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compatible with the possibility that some events consist of series of states. If so, though 
Needham’s first argument establishes the continuity requirement, it doesn’t undermine our 
revised account.  
What about Needham’s second argument? Its conclusion is that given any series of 
temperatures, continuous or not, the series is not identical to any particular event of heating. 
However, it does not follow that the series is not identical to any event whatsoever. It may 
very well be that a temporal part of a heating process is always a complex event, of which 
temperatures are only components. Needham would object that temperatures cannot even 
function as such components. In thermodynamics, states like temperature are undefined for 
a system that is not in equilibrium. Hence, while being heated, a body is not in any state. Its 
putative states are “more realistically treated as patterns of states of small parts of the body, 
continuously varying over space, which adjust as the process proceeds unhindered until a 
uniform state of equilibrium under the prevailing constraints is attained” (2013, 411). Since 
temperatures do not even exist in a heating process, they are certainly unable to function as 
components of any kind. However, Needham’s own remark indicates a problem with the 
objection. Why cannot we define a complex state for the heated body in terms of the states 
of its parts? It may be that the complex state has no place in thermodynamics, but the state 
certainly has a place in metaphysics. If the parts of the body compose a complex entity (i.e. 
the body), it is reasonable to assume that the states those parts are in also compose a 
complex state. This complex state is a temporal part of the heating process. As it turns out, 
Needham’s second argument again fails to establish that events cannot be individuated by 
states.  
  
47 
Where does this leave us? Should we simply take Cleland’s account and drop the 
requirement that events be changes? This may be tempting, but further reflection shows that 
a simpler account is preferable. Consider a changeless event, such as an official’s 
acquiescence in government corruption. Should we say that this event is an exemplification 
of a property by a trope? Maybe the relevant trope is an instance of acquiescence, and the 
trope instantiates the property of being directed towards government corruption. Or maybe 
the relevant trope is a mental state, and the mental state instantiates the property of being an 
attitude of acquiescence. These descriptions of the event seem very contrived to me. 
Wouldn’t it be more apt to simply say that the event is a trope? Taking this approach, we 
could describe the event as an instance of acquiescence in government corruption, which is a 
trope located where the official is. If this approach is plausible, then Needham’s claims are 
too strong. There are ways to define events in terms of states without falling prey to the 
problems plaguing Cleland’s account. I think this is exactly what Bennett’s account does, so I 
will now turn to Bennett’s version of the instantiation view.  
2.4.3 Bennett’s Account 
Bennett differs from the other theorists we have considered so far in that he pays 
more attention to natural language semantics. An important point stressed by him is that 
there is no foolproof way to read off the tropes constitutive of an event from a name of the 
event. To state Bennett’s view more precisely, we need to define a new term. Consider event 
e and property P. Bennett says that P constitutes e if and only if “the whole intrinsic truth 
about e is that it is an instance of P” (1988, 93; emphasis omitted). To avoid confusion with 
the constitution relation that is the central concern of hylomorphism about events, I shall 
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use the term individuative properties to denote properties that constitute events in Bennett’s 
sense of “constitute”. For an expression to name an event, Bennett argues, it often suffices 
for the expression to name some components of the individuative property of the event 
(1988, 93–94). For example, the expression “the cowbird’s flap of wings” is a name of an 
event, even though the expression hardly specifies the entire cluster of properties 
constitutive of the event – a flap of wings is always done at a certain speed and in a certain 
direction, etc. These motion properties are also components of the individuative property of 
the cowbird’s flap of wings, but they are not described at all by the expression “the 
cowbird’s flap of wings”. It then transpires that events do not have unique names; even if 
two expressions describe different properties, it does not follow that they name distinct 
events. This is why, given an appropriate context, “the cowbird’s flap of wings” names the 
same event as “the cowbird’s sudden movement”. The moral is that we have to be careful 
when we attempt to determine the numerical identity of an event. Before we ask, say, 
whether my present experience and the present activity of my brain are the same event, we 
should first ask whether “my present experience” and “the present activity of my brain” name 
the same event. We risk confounding semantics and metaphysics if we fail to do so.  
With Bennett’s semantics in place, we can now discuss his metaphysics. Bennett 
takes an event to be a trope at a spatiotemporal region: “an event is the instantiation of a 
property at a zone. The zone will often be delimited by a substance and a time, but perhaps 
not always” (1988, 88). For example, if the property of pollution is instantiated throughout 
the spatial region occupied by a factory at time t, then the pollution in the factory at t is an 
event – this is the case on the assumption that the property of pollution is the kind of 
property whose instantiation is sufficient for the occurrence of an event. On Bennett’s 
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account, there is no straightforward way to determine whether this assumption holds. And 
unlike Kim and Cleland, Bennett is unwilling to take a stand on the issue of whether events 
must always exemplify properties whose instances are accompanied by changes. His reason 
is given in his 1996 paper: our ordinary event concepts, as manifested in our patterns of 
inference, warrant neither a positive answer to this question nor a negative one (1996, 150–
51). The imprecision of our event concepts also explains why, given any trope, there is no 
telling a priori whether the existence of the trope is sufficient for the occurrence of an event. 
All we can be sure about is that if something is an event, then it is a trope.  
Does Bennett’s theory provide an adequate description of the nature of events? I do 
not think so. The greatest virtue of Bennett’s account is its simplicity, but it comes with a 
price. Given that Bennett cannot resort to Kim’s continuants or Cleland’s instances of 
determinable properties, it is unclear how he can account for the unity of a complex event. 
Consider the passage of a particular no-confidence motion in a parliamentary democracy. 
Suppose the event takes place over time interval T and consists of two phases: the prime 
minister addresses the members of the parliament and defends the government, and then the 
parliament members vote to pass the no-confidence motion in response to the prime 
minister’s speech. Suppose the motion cannot be legally passed if either phase is omitted. 
Call the event as a whole no-confidence and the two subevents speech and vote. Now we 
ask: what is the relation between speech and vote, on the one hand, and no-confidence on 
the other? It is my contention that Bennett’s account doesn’t have the resources to answer 
this question appropriately.  
To see why, note that intimate relations obviously obtain among the three events. In 
any possible world where speech occurs but vote doesn’t, no-confidence fails to occur; the 
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same goes for the worlds where vote occurs but speech doesn’t.19 It thus seems that we 
cannot appropriately characterize the nature of no-confidence without invoking both 
speech and vote. The three events somehow form a whole. How should we understand this 
whole? The answer I prefer says that speech and vote jointly constitute no-confidence – 
speech and vote bear the matter relation to no-confidence. This is the analysis I shall 
develop in the next chapter. The constitution-based analysis is nevertheless unavailable to 
Bennett. He has indeed briefly considered the possibility that relations similar to material 
constitution may exist between events (1988, 124). However, as far as I know, he nowhere 
develops a theory based on such considerations. The best Bennett could do to accommodate 
the present observation is thus to defend the following hypotheses:  
(The Fusion Hypothesis) 
There is an event that is the fusion of speech and vote.  
(The Identity Hypothesis) 
The fusion of speech and vote is numerically identical to no-confidence.  
The combination of the Fusion and Identity Hypotheses is in fact an attractive alternative to 
the constitution-based analysis: if Bennett’s account has the resources to make this 
alternative work, maybe the constitution-based analysis is dispensable after all. 
Unfortunately, this turns out not to be the case.  
                                                        
 
19 In fact, I think it is more precise to say that no-confidence cannot occur without the occurrence 
of events e and f, where e and f fall under the kinds of which speech and vote are instances, 
respectively. For additional discussion, see section 3.5.2.  
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Let us set the Fusion Hypothesis aside for now and consider the Identity 
Hypothesis. We ask: on the assumption that speech and vote have a fusion (call the fusion 
sum), can Bennett identify their fusion with no-confidence? To answer this, we need to 
consider the relevant tropes. According to Bennett’s semantics, we could refer to no-
confidence by the definite description “the passage of the no-confidence motion”, and it 
picks out a trope located in the parliament building. This trope is an exemplification of the 
event’s individuative property. This property has many components, which not only includes 
the property of being the passage of a no-confidence motion but also those of pleasing the 
members of the opposition and being the last motion passed in the year, etc. Let NO-
CONFIDENCE denote the individuative property of no-confidence. Similarly, let SPEECH, 
VOTE and SUM denote the individuative properties of speech, vote and sum. It is clear that 
SPEECH, VOTE and NO-CONFIDENCE are distinct properties; each of these properties can be 
instantiated independently of the others. Hence, whether or not the conjunction of SPEECH 
and VOTE has the same extension as NO-CONFIDENCE, the former property is not the same 
as the latter property. It follows that SUM is distinct from NO-CONFIDENCE, which means 
that the exemplifications of these two properties are different tropes. We can then apply 
Bennett’s theory and conclude that sum and no-confidence are different events despite 
their spatiotemporal overlap. Bennett’s theory fails to vindicate the Identity Hypothesis. Had 
he taken Kim’s approach, he might be able to solve this problem by arguing that the 
complex property SUM is instantiated at the same time as NO-CONFIDENCE by the same 
unidentified substance. Whether or not this approach would turn out successful, it is not 
open to Bennett – substances do not appear in Bennett’s theory.  
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Bennett could argue that my objection rests on the failure to appreciate what he has 
said about the semantics of event names. The definite description “the passage of the no-
confidence motion” picks out an event that has many properties in addition to the property 
of being the passage of a no-confidence motion. If we examine these additional properties, it 
could turn out that SPEECH and VOTE are among them. If so, sum and no-confidence 
actually fail to name different events. It is unclear to me that this is really possible. Since SUM 
is formed by somehow combining SPEECH and VOTE, SUM doesn’t have any component that 
is not a component of SPEECH or VOTE. But the property of being the passage of a no-
confidence motion is neither a component of SPEECH nor a component of VOTE (recall our 
assumption that the law requires the prime minster to defend the government before the 
parliament members make the final decision). It follows that the property is not a 
component of SUM, either. If so, “the passage of the no-confidence motion” cannot be a 
name of sum; the expression obviously names an event whose properties include that of 
being the passage of a no-confidence motion.  
Perhaps there are ways to amend the semantics of event names and show that the 
ordinary-language names of no-confidence must also be names of sum. Such pursuits 
would be difficult in view of Bennett’s notion of an individuative property. Recall that 
SPEECH is not just the property of being a speech; it is the individuative property of speech, 
so its components may include such properties as being aggressive and being 10-minute 
long. It is hard to believe that the definite description “the passage of the no-confidence 
motion” has to secure its referent on the basis of such properties. However, even if one 
could come up with smart ways to defend the Identity Hypothesis for Bennett, Bennett 
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would not be able to defend the Fusion Hypothesis: his account doesn’t have the resources 
to show that speech and vote have a fusion. Let’s now turn to this issue.  
As I see it, the most promising defense of the Fusion Hypothesis Bennett could give 
appeals to what he calls zonal fusion. A case of fusion is zonal if “the zone occupied by the 
whole is a fusion of smaller zones occupied by its parts” (1988, 143). Hence, in our example, 
two conditions must be met if no-confidence is to be regarded as the zonal fusion of 
speech and vote: (1) no-confidence is the fusion of speech and vote, and (2) the 
spatiotemporal region occupied by no-confidence is the fusion of the spatiotemporal 
regions occupied by speech and vote. What is the relation between these two conditions? 
Bennett offers no explicit answers. One possibility is that they are mutually independent. In 
that case, condition (1) requires us to identify a criterion of event fusion without appealing to 
their spatiotemporal locations. Bennett does suggest one such criterion, although he remains 
neutral on whether it should be accepted. According to it, if two events are parts of a larger 
event, there must be a causal chain running from one to the other (1988, 154). 
Unfortunately, the criterion is not of much help in our example because speech can hardly 
be said to cause vote. As Lewis has famously argued, causal relations can be captured by 
counterfactual conditionals. In Lewis’ account, the conditions that must be met for an event 
to cause another depend on whether the events in question occur in the actual world. 
Consider events c and e. If they are non-actual, then e causally depends on c just in case that 
“e would have occurred if c had occurred”; if they are actual, then e causally depends on c just 
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in case that “if c had not been, e never had existed” (Lewis 1986b, 167).20 These condition are 
not met by speech and vote. If speech had not occurred, vote could still occur; it’s just that 
vote would lose its legal significance. In addition, in a possible world where speech occurs, 
vote could still fail to occur – the prime minister could be giving the same speech at the 
same time for a different purpose. These observations suggest that vote does not causally 
depend on speech. If so, one cannot appeal to causation to defend the Fusion Hypothesis.  
An alternative possibility is that conditions (1) and (2) are equivalent: no-confidence 
is the fusion of speech and vote if and only if the regions occupied by speech and vote 
compose the region occupied by no-confidence. Nonetheless, provided that unrestricted 
composition holds for spatiotemporal regions, this would imply that unrestricted 
composition also holds for events. And it does seem that any two spatiotemporal regions 
compose another: there is a spatiotemporal region that consists of Manhattan in 1990 and 
Manhattan in 2000. One might want to deny this because nothing seems to have a 
spatiotemporal location that coincides with this region; having such a location would require 
an entity to come into existence after ceasing to exist. Nevertheless, spatiotemporal regions 
are not individuated by the entities that occupy them. The O’Hare Airport and the Heathrow 
Airport were in the same space throughout 2018. There is thus a spatiotemporal region that 
contains both airports – the space in 2018. However, there is no one single thing whose 
spatiotemporal location coincides with this region. It follows that the unity of a 
spatiotemporal region does not depend on the existence of some entity whose 
                                                        
 
20 Lewis distinguishes between causation and causal dependence (1986b, 167). Take three distinct events, e, 
f, and g; assume that g causally depends on f and f on e. In this case, g is caused by e whether or not g 
causally depends on e. This distinction doesn’t have much bearing on our present discussion.  
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spatiotemporal location coincides with the region. Hence, the aforementioned objection is 
misguided, and unrestricted composition does hold for spatiotemporal regions. On the 
assumption that conditions (1) and (2) are equivalent, the same holds for events.  
This is an undesirable result. There are two reasons that unrestricted composition 
should not hold for events. First, there are numerous counterexamples to unrestricted 
composition, and Bennett himself has mentioned some. If there are two conference rooms 
in which scholars talk about issues in their field, do their activities constitute two distinct 
conferences or two parts of one conference? Bennett’s answer is that it depends on the 
relations between these people – if all the scholars are characterized by “overlap of interest 
and concern” and “a relevantly shared causal history”, then their activities compose one 
single conference (1988, 124). If not, then there is nothing of which the activities in the two 
rooms are both parts. However, Bennett’s answer is incompatible with unrestricted 
composition, which entails that the activities compose one single conference regardless of 
the relations between the scholars. If we accept Bennett’s analysis, conferences constitute 
counterexamples to unrestricted composition. Second, unrestricted composition leads to 
problems for causal explanation. Suppose there are two conferences, one on German 
Idealism and the other on contemporary metaphysics. To explain why Francis, a devoted 
idealist, is upset after attending the second conference, we might appeal to the following 
observation: very few scholars in the conference take idealism seriously. The conference 
causes Francis’ frustration because the conference has this property. Now, given unrestricted 
composition, the two conferences compose a complex conference, and the complex 
conference certainly does not have this property. It follows that the complex conference 
does not cause Francis’ frustration. But I take the following to be a plausible assumption: 
  
56 
provided that event e0 is a part of event e, if e0 causes some event f, then e also causes f. If an 
inappropriate comment in a talk caused a controversy, then the talk certainly caused the 
controversy. Unrestricted event-composition contradicts this plausible assumption. For these 
two reasons, we should not accept unrestricted composition, which means that conditions 
(1) and (2) cannot be equivalent.  
A third possibility is that the conditions are not equivalent but the satisfaction of 
condition (1) more or less depends on the satisfaction of condition (2). For example, it might 
be that no-confidence is the fusion of speech and vote if and only if the regions occupied 
by speech and vote compose a continuous region that is occupied by no-confidence. This 
criterion still posits too many events. Suppose no-confidence takes place right after the 
parliament passes the budget for the next fiscal year. The passage of the budget is 
spatiotemporally continuous with no-confidence, but there is little unity between the two 
events. Or consider some tourists’ visit to the parliament building. The tourists may be 
taking pictures outside the parliament building when the prime minister address the 
parliament, but such spatial continuity does not make the tourists’ activities and no-
confidence a single event. If so, whatever the logical relations between conditions (1) and 
(2) are, spatiotemporal continuity is insufficient to bridge the conditions. To hold onto the 
third possibility, we need additional constraints, but none seems forthcoming.  
As it turns out, though the case under discussion certainly involves the fusion of 
regions, Bennett’s theory of zonal fusion cannot establish the numerical identity between no-
confidence and the fusion of speech and vote. It then appears that Bennett’s account of 
events does not have enough theoretical resources to defend the Fusion Hypothesis. 
Therefore, the simplicity that is the strength of Bennett’s account is at the same time its 
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weakness. His account dispenses with the unnecessary entities posited in Kim’s and 
Cleland’s accounts, but it becomes inexplicable how the various elements of a complex event 
are unified the way they are.  
2.5 Conclusion  
Despite the shortcomings of Bennett’s account, I take it to be the most successful 
non-hylomorphic theory of events. Bennett’s insight that tropes are constitutive of events is 
still promising; what is missing in his account is the tool to handle the unity of a complex 
event. Hylomorphism may provide such a tool. The best way to proceed, I suggest, is to 
develop a theory of events by combining Bennett’s insight with some form of 
hylomorphism. This is what I will attempt in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3   
EVENTS: A HYLOMORPHIC PROPOSAL  
In formulating the existence and identity conditions of events, one has to decide 
whether to invoke the relation of constitution. If one does, then one is committed to 
hylomorphism about events. This chapter defends a version of hylomorphism. On my view, 
just as a fresco may be constituted by a quantity of lime plaster, a court trial may be 
constituted by a series of announcements, arguments, questions and responses. To 
appreciate the similarity between the two cases, note that the various events just mentioned 
can be said to supply what is needed for the trial to proceed. Furthermore, these events 
enable the trial to go on without turning the trial into something reducible to the collection 
of these events: the trial could still have happened had some questions not been raised, and 
the various events could all appear in a hearing without turning the hearing into a court trial 
(as opposed to, say, a congressional hearing). The relation between the trial and the 
collection of the events is thus analogous to that between a fresco and a quantity of lime 
plaster – the latter supplies what is needed for the former to exist without making the former 
reducible to the latter. A theoretically fruitful way to exploit the similarity is to take the court 
trial to be literally constituted by the series of events occurring in it. The events are the 
matter of the trial; to put it differently, the series of events has the form of a trial.  
The attempt to apply the notion of constitution to the metaphysics of events dates 
back to at least as early as Fine (1982), but it seems that Fine’s paper has received relatively 
little attention in the literature on events. Recent years have seen some renewed interest in 
the constitution of events. Different views about event constitution have been advanced by 
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Crowther (2011), Evnine (2016), Johnston (2006) and Jones (2013). What distinguishes my 
version of hylomorphism about events from the alternatives is my attempt to define the 
matter relation in terms of dependence relations. I shall argue that doing so resolves the 
difficulties faced by the other hylomorphic theories of events.  
Here’s the plan of the chapter. In Section 3.1, I will say a few words about the very 
idea of constitution and why it can be helpful to apply this idea to the analysis of events. 
Sections 3.2–3.4 examine the theories advanced by Crowther, Evnine and Jones in detail. My 
own proposal is laid out in Section 3.5. After that, I respond to some potential objections in 
Section 3.6 before I conclude the chapter in Section 3.7.  
3.1 Constitution in the Domain of Events  
As we have seen, an entity bears the constitution relation to another if the former is 
the matter of the latter. But what is it for something to be the matter of another? Intuitively, 
such a relation can be characterized as “the relation between something and what it is made 
of” (Evnine 2011, 212). When constitution is understood as material constitution, i.e. the kind 
of constitution relation that holds between matter and physical objects, its reality is hardly 
deniable: there is an obvious sense in which glaciers are made of ice, for example. To be 
sure, there may be the temptation to reduce the constitution relation to something else, say 
numerical identity; one may be inclined to say that a glacier is nothing over and above the 
quantity of ice that the glacier is made of. However, there are also strong reasons to resist 
this temptation. As noted by Lynne Rudder Baker, a physical entity and its underlying matter 
have very different persistence conditions (2007, 42). The glacier could survive even if one 
thirds of it were to be melted, but that would certainly destroy the quantity of ice. If so, the 
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relation between the glacier and the ice is not numerical identity. We are thus justified, at 
least in a prima facie way, in keeping the relation of material constitution in our ontology.  
It is less clear how the notion of constitution is to be applied to events. Are events 
made of anything? What does this question even mean? To answer these, we have to 
consider what motivates an analysis of events in terms of constitution. Kit Fine has argued 
that such an analysis is useful for clarifying the relation between actions and bodily 
movements (1982, 102). As an example, he considers what events happen when one carries 
out the action of raising one’s arm. The action certainly happens, and so does the bodily 
movement in which one’s arm goes up. However, the bodily movement could have occurred 
by reflex; in that case, there would have been no intention, thus no action on one’s part. Fine 
concludes that though the action and the bodily movement coincide spatiotemporally in the 
actual world, there are possible worlds in which only one of them exists. It is hence possible 
for two events to occupy the same spatiotemporal location while possessing different modal 
properties. As we have seen, this is precisely the reason that a constitution-based analysis is 
called for in the case of physical objects. If correct, then, Fine’s view shows that the 
phenomenon of constitution can be found outside the realm of physical objects. It should be 
thought of as the unity between spatiotemporally coinciding but modally differentiated 
entities; as Baker puts it, constitution is to be understood as a kind of “unity without 
identity” (2007, 32). Since unity need not be construed exclusively in terms of physical 
objects, there shouldn’t be any conceptual difficulties inherent in the idea of event 
constitution, even if the idea may, admittedly, strike one as somewhat surprising.  
I think hylomorphism about events is very promising. If not for any other reason, 
hylomorphism directs our attention to the modal features of events. So much ink has been 
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spilled on issues about the modal features of physical objects, but it is far from obvious that 
we can successfully settle those issues without getting clear on the corresponding issues in 
the domain of events. Modal considerations are also important for the purpose of theorizing 
about events themselves: issues about identity are rarely separable from issues about 
modality. Therefore, it would seem that hylomorphism is in a unique position to deal with 
the tasks we set for ourselves in the preceding chapter: to look for the existence and identity 
conditions that events are subject to. Formulating a plausible account of constitution is 
nonetheless no easy task. In what follows, I will evaluate several existing proposals.  
3.2 Crowther’s Account  
The first hylomorphic theory of events we shall consider is that offered by Thomas 
Crowther (2011). To evaluate Crowther’s theory, we need to introduce a widely accepted 
distinction made by Zeno Vendler (1957). Vendler divides the verb phrases that can be 
combined with the progressive aspect into two groups. Accomplishment terms describe events 
that “proceed toward a terminus which is logically necessary to their being what they are” 
(1957, 146), while activity terms describe events that do not do so. For example, “sail into 
harbor” is an accomplishment term. If a boat is to sail into harbor, then it has to end up 
within a harbor – the arrival at a harbor is the terminus necessary for the occurrence of this 
event. In contrast, “sail on the river” is an activity term. From the claim that a boat sails on 
the river, it doesn’t follow that there is anything in particular the boat has to do when the 
event reaches its end.  
Vendler’s distinction is widely accepted because it explains a variety of linguistic 
phenomena. There are many linguistic tests commonly used to separate accomplishment 
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terms from activity terms, and I shall mention two here. The first of them is offered by 
Vendler himself: the questions in which the two kinds of terms can appear are different 
(Vendler 1957, 145). Let S be a string of words such that any verb in S is uninflected. Only 
accomplishment terms can appropriately occur in questions of the form “how long did it 
take for S?” For instance, question (1) below sounds fine, but question (2) does not:  
(1) How long did it take for the boat to sail into harbor?  
(2) How long did it take for the boat to sail on the river?  
In contrast, only activity terms can be intelligibly used in questions of the form “for how 
long did S?” As an example, question (3) below is natural, but question (4) is not:  
(3) For how long did the boat sail on the river?  
(4) For how long did the boat sail into harbor?  
The test shows that the distinction between accomplishment and activity terms has semantic 
significance.  
The second test appeals to what linguists call the subinterval property.21 According to 
Lucas Champollion, “A predicate P has the subinterval property iff whenever it holds at an 
interval, it also holds at every one of its subintervals” (2017, 102).22 The validity of the 
inference from (5) to (6) suggests that activity terms have the subinterval property:  
                                                        
 
21 The idea of the subinterval property is typically attributed to Michael Bennett and Barbara H. 
Partee ([1978] 2004).  
22 A version of the test can be found in Vendler’s paper (1957, 145–46), but Champollion’s 
formulation is more precise.  
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(5) Between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m., the boat sailed on the river.  
(6) At any time between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m., the boat sailed on the river.  
But this is not the case for accomplishment terms. Consider the inference from (7) to (8), 
which is invalid:  
(7) Between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m., the boat sailed into harbor.  
(8) At any time between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m., the boat sailed into harbor.  
This suggests that accomplishment terms do not have the subinterval property.  
It has become standard to use the term “process” as another name of Vendler’s 
“activity”.23 As we have seen, Vendler’s main concern is how the semantic properties of 
accomplishment terms differ from those of process terms. In contrast, Crowther’s goal is to 
defend the metaphysical distinction between the events described by the two kinds of terms, 
i.e. accomplishments and processes themselves. Such a defense is needed because the appeal 
to a terminus isn’t sufficient for showing that the events really fall under different kinds. 
Crowther uses the example of walking to make his point. Walking is a process, but it has a 
terminus: the stop of walking. After walking for a certain amount of time, one has to stop. 
Therefore, everything that happens in the walking process can be regarded as what one does 
to reach the point at which one can stop walking. It follows that the stop of walking is the 
terminus of a process of walking (Crowther 2011, 9–10). If so, processes have a terminus no 
less than accomplishments do.  
                                                        
 
23 See Kearns (2011, 157).  
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To find a better way to differentiate accomplishments from processes, Crowther 
builds a theory of events that is hylomorphic in character. To do so, Crowther first appeals 
to linguistic observations to motivate a distinction orthogonal to the accomplishment-
process distinction. On the one hand, terms like “walking” refer to temporally extended 
entities that “are like masses or substance-stuffs in not being count-quantifiable, only mass 
quantifiable. There can no more be two walkings or three runnings than there can be two 
golds or more than one rain” (2011, 16). Crowther calls the referents of such terms temporal 
stuff.  His official definition of temporal stuff is “[w]hat things are doing throughout a period 
of time” (2011, 16). I take this to mean that kinds of temporal stuff are ways of taking up 
time. Since walking and running are two different ways of taking up time, they are different 
kinds of temporal stuff. On the other hand, terms like “walk” refer to temporally extended 
entities that “are countable, and cannot be mass-quantified. There can be more than one 
walk or more than one walk to the shops” (2011, 20). Crowther calls the referents of such 
terms temporal particulars and identifies events with them. Hence, both accomplishments and 
processes are temporal particulars.  
What is the relation between temporal stuff and temporal particulars? Crowther 
identifies a temporal particular with a completed quantity of temporal stuff (2011, 19). For 
example, a sail is a completed quantity of sailing. To explain what this implies, we need to 
define the notion of a temporal boundary. A temporal boundary exists at a time if a quantity 
of temporal stuff appears or disappears at that time (2011, 20). For instance, suppose an 
airborne plane starts descending and then stops doing so at time t. Since the plane’s 
descending is a quantity of temporal stuff and the stuff disappears at t, a temporal boundary 
exists at t. We can now describe the idea of completion. Let x and y be temporal entities; 
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then x is completed by y if y can be a temporal boundary of x without making x “improper 
or defective” (2011, 27). Crowther illustrates the idea by appealing to an analogy between 
events and physical objects. If we, say, arbitrarily draw a line on a painting and cut the 
painting along the line, we get two defective paintings. It follows that paintings are not 
completed by arbitrarily drawn lines. As Crowther points out, similar scenarios can be found 
in the realm of events. A ballet performance is a quantity of ballet dancing. But if one 
arbitrarily divides a ballet performance into two, the resulting quantities of ballet dancing are 
at best incomplete performances. To avoid treating such incomplete performances as 
temporal particulars, Crowther defines temporal particulars to be those quantities of 
temporal stuff that are completed.  
Crowther argues that the distinction between accomplishments and processes is akin 
to the distinction between physical objects and mere aggregates of matter (2011, 23). While 
dividing a painting into two leaves us two defective paintings, the situation is different if we 
divide a heap of sand into two. There is nothing defective about the resulting heaps of sand. 
It follows that mere aggregates of matter can be completed by any kind of spatial separation. 
According to Crowther, processes are the temporal analogues of mere aggregates of matter. 
In our earlier example, while the descent of the plane may be terminated either in midair or 
on the ground, these two options result in temporal boundaries of different kinds. If the 
pilot intends the plane to undergo a process of descending, then both options are fine. The 
process can be completed by either kind of temporal boundary. However, if the pilot intends 
the descending event to be an accomplishment of descending to an airport, then her only 
option is to terminate the descent on the ground. It thus emerges that while a process can be 
completed by any kind of temporal boundary, an accomplishment can only be completed by 
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boundaries of the kinds required by its nature. In Crowther’s words, accomplishments 
“possess a temporal form provided by a temporal sortal or temporal principle of 
individuation for complete events of that kind” (2011, 34).  
The extent to which Crowther engages with recent work in linguistics is impressive. 
However, his theory is not without problems. To begin, Crowther’s theory has salient 
hylomorphic features, but it is unclear how he thinks about the form-matter relation. In his 
theory, all events have both form and matter. Processes are required to have the form of 
boundedness, as Crowther doesn’t count a dispersed quantity of temporal stuff as a process: 
“A walk around, or a stretch of walking around is not stuff, but a bounded quantity of it” 
(2011, 25 fn. 39). The forms of accomplishments are even more complicated: such forms are 
as numerous and varied as what Crowther calls temporal sortals. But what exactly are 
temporal sortals? Take the descent of the plane. When the plane starts descending, is there 
any temporal sortal that is a component of the unfolding event? It seems that Crowther has 
to answer in the negative. Depending upon what happens in the future, the event could end 
up being an accomplishment or a process. Only then will the event become classifiable into a 
particular kind and feature a structure conforming to a temporal sortal. So construed, 
temporal sortals are properties exemplified by completed events; they do not exist in 
unfolding events.   
This appears to conflict with what Crowther says about temporal stuff. Take walking 
and walking to a shop; he seems to think that they are different kinds of temporal stuff 
(2011, 20, 24). Therefore, before quantities of walking and walking to a shop are completed, 
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they already exemplify different temporal sortals.24 This is inconsistent with my analysis in 
the preceding paragraph. To defend his position, Crowther has to claim that my analysis is 
wrong. But how does Crowther justify that? If I am walking to a shop, what I am doing 
doesn’t seem different from what I would be doing if I were to simply take a walk. It follows 
that they should be regarded as the same kind of temporal stuff, because one cannot create 
two kinds of temporal stuff by carrying out one single kind of action. There is thus no 
reason to think that two different temporal sortals are exemplified here. Crowther has a 
response to this worry: “what is going on at a time… can be determined by what goes on 
over a larger period of time” (2011, 12 fn. 24). This, unfortunately, fails to address the worry. 
Crowther’s claim only shows that a quantity of walking could either end up being a casual 
walk without a particular destination or a walk to a shop, not that a quantity of walking may 
have been a quantity of walking to a shop. Seeing things my way also accords with common 
sense better: if I am walking while debating with myself whether I should go to a shop, does 
such walking count as a kind of temporal stuff different from both walking and walking to a 
shop? The most reasonable answer is “no”. Walking, walking to a shop and walking while 
debating with oneself whether to go to a shop are the same kind of temporal stuff; otherwise 
our ontology would include unnecessarily many kinds of temporal stuff. If so, my analysis 
should be upheld: temporal sortals are only exemplified by completed events. What 
Crowther says about temporal stuff makes his theory inconsistent.  
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quantities of walking do not. Either way, my objection stands.  
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My second objection has to do with Crowther’s conception of constitution. 
According to him, all the properties actually exemplified by an event are necessarily 
exemplified by the event (2011, 36). This view has ramifications for his view on constitution. 
The constitution relation is not invoked to explain the relation between two spatiotemporally 
coinciding but modally distinguished events; there are no such events. Rather, it is invoked 
to describe the way temporal particulars exist in time. Drawing an analogy with particulars in 
space again, Crowther notes that having a spatial boundary is not a sufficient condition for 
being a particular in space. A hole has a spatial boundary, but it is not a particular the way a 
physical object is. To properly describe the spatial nature of a particular, one has to go 
beyond specifying its spatial boundary (2011, 37). On the one hand, one has to describe the 
matter that the particular is made of, because it is in virtue of its matter that the particular is 
spatially extended. On the other hand, one has to describe the way the matter of the 
particular is structured, because the particular has the spatial properties it does only on the 
basis of its spatial configuration. The same goes for temporal particulars. To properly 
describe the temporal nature of an event, one has to describe its matter and temporal 
structure. It is for this reason that we should speak of the constitution of an event.  
As I see it, this conception of constitution makes the constitution relation redundant. 
What Crowther takes to be the matter and structure of an event need not be so described. 
They are just what goes on when an event unfolds and the kind an event falls under. These 
can simply be treated as properties of an event, and it is unclear how these properties are 
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different from the other properties an event might have, such as its participants,25 terminus, 
temporal parts and spatial location. If those do not motivate an analysis of events in terms of 
constitution, neither do what Crowther takes to be the matter and structure of events. The 
issue of redundancy is aggravated by Crowther’s stance on the modal nature of events. If an 
actual walk to a shop could not have been a casual walk without a particular destination, why 
should we posit such an entity as a quantity of walking that is different from the walk to a 
shop? Isn’t such an entity needed only if we affirm the existence of something that actually 
constitutes a walk to a shop but could have constituted a casual walk? If we deny such a 
possibility, it make more sense to simply say that the actual walk to a shop has the same 
temporal parts as a possible casual walk in their initial phases. It is rarely denied that events 
have temporal parts. If it is enough to invoke temporal parts, there is no reason to be 
committed to the controversial idea of event constitution.  
The friend of Crowther’s view could argue that one need not resort to the modal 
considerations to motivate Crowther’s conception of constitution. Instead, one could argue 
that the conception goes hand in hand with the distinction between temporal stuff and 
temporal particulars. This brings us to my next objection: I think the distinction is not 
sufficiently motivated, either. Crowther defends the distinction by noting that count nouns 
and mass nouns admit of different modes of quantification, but these considerations may 
have to do with a feature of the English language rather than a feature of reality. Metaphysics 
is not English syntax; English is just one language among the huge number of languages 
                                                        
 
25 I follow Casati and Varzi in using the term “participant” to refer to any physical entity constitutive 
of an event (Casati and Varzi 2008, 37).  
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spoken in the world. Crosslinguistic data are desirable when one claims that the syntax of 
natural language mirrors reality. In Mandarin Chinese, nothing straightforwardly corresponds 
to the count nouns in English. One can draw a distinction between talking and particular 
talks in English by inflecting the word “talk”, but inflections do not exist in Mandarin. As 
Feng-hsi Liu points out, “syntactically Chinese nouns are similar to mass nouns in English, 
as they cannot combine directly with numerals, but must combine with classifiers” (2014, 
154). The sentence in (9) is ungrammatical:  
(9) 我   今天        做了    一   演講。 
wo   jing tian   zuo le   yi    yian jiang.  
I      today       did       a     talk.  
“I gave a talk today.” 
The reason is that the classifier chian is missing. When it is inserted between “a” and “talk”, 
the sentence becomes grammatical, as in (10):  
(10) 我   今天        做了    一場                 演講。 
wo   jing tian   zuo le   yi chiang           yian jiang.  
I      today       did       an occasion of   talk.  
“I gave a talk today.” 
The examples show that the Mandarin expression of “a talk (yi chiang yian jiang)” resembles “a 
glass of water” or “a gust of anger”; there is no way to grammatically omit the classifier. It is 
true that one cannot speak of “talkings” or “walkings” in Mandarin, but one cannot speak of 
“talks” or “walks”, either. Crowther’s linguistic argument for separating temporal stuff from 
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temporal particulars fails. To be sure, even if a distinction is not drawn syntactically, it 
doesn’t follow that the distinction is not drawn semantically. And even if a semantic 
distinction is not drawn in ordinary contexts, it doesn’t follow that the distinction cannot be 
drawn in technical contexts. My worry is just that Crowther appeals to a point about the 
English language to make a metaphysical claim. Doing so is fine insofar as there are no 
counterexamples from other languages or metaphysical theories, but in this case there are at 
least prima facie counterexamples. Crowther’s argument is therefore too quick.  
My fourth objection is that Crowther fails to address what I call the problem of 
constitution by a plurality (henceforth “the CP problem”): in virtue of what can multiple events 
jointly constitute a single event? Crowther himself allows the possibility of constitution by a 
plurality: “a temporal particular can be made of different stuff at different phases of its 
existence; the very same birthday party may have been composed of the exchange of small 
talk at t1 – t2, and debauchery at t8 – t10” (2011, 38). But how is that possible on Crowther’s 
account, exactly? The small talk ends when the debauchery begins; call the ending of the 
small talk e. Since e amounts to a temporal boundary, Crowther’s account entails that one of 
the following three states of affairs must obtain. First, there is a completed process of small 
talk whose temporal boundary is e. If so, the debauchery is just another event; there is no 
reason to hold that the birthday party is jointly constituted by the small talk and the 
debauchery. Second, there is a completed accomplishment constituted by the process of 
small talk; its temporal boundary is also e. Here the problem we encountered in the first 
scenario arises again. Moreover, it is unclear what the temporal sortal governing the 
accomplishment is. Third, there is an incomplete accomplishment that will only become 
completed if something other than small talk occurs. What is the temporal sortal here? The 
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only relevant one seems to be the sortal governing birthday parties. But why cannot there be 
a birthday party that involves nothing but small talk? Since none of the three possibilities 
entails that the small talk is a quantity of temporal stuff that remains to be completed by the 
debauchery, Crowther cannot explain the unity between the two. As we shall see, this 
problem is also faced by the other existing versions of hylomorphism about events. It is 
indeed one of the main reasons that an alternative hylomorphic theory is needed.  
3.3 Evnine’s Account  
Evnine’s hylomorphic theory of events is not as general as Crowther’s; it focuses 
exclusively on actions. Despite the narrower focus, however, the theory makes innovative 
use of the Aristotelian idea that formal and efficient causes are closely intertwined. Evnine 
tries to show that “actions are artifacts” (2016, 209). The central idea behind this claim, 
roughly put, is that actions depend on intentions the way artifacts do. Artifacts do not come 
into existence on their own; they need to be intentionally made. The existence and identity 
of an artifact thus depend on the intention to make the artifact. A monkey can smear 
materials of different colors on wet plaster, but what is created would not be a fresco – a 
fresco cannot exist if no one intends the end product of the smearing process to be a fresco. 
Actions feature a similar kind of dependence on intentions. Suppose I had never heard of 
laptops with a touchscreen. Even if I touch the screen of the laptop and then spread my 
fingers apart, what I am doing wouldn’t count as an action of enlarging the on-screen image. 
Without the intention to enlarge the image, actions of enlarging the image cannot occur. 
These suggest that the relation between an action and the intention of its agent is akin to that 
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between an artifact and the intention of its maker. If we can plausibly speak of an artifact as 
made by its maker, it is no less plausible to speak of an action as “made” by its agent.  
What does one have to do to make something? A natural answer is that one has to 
work on some matter and give it a particular form. But what would be the matter and form 
of an action? A possible answer is sketched by Fine. As we have seen, he takes one’s action 
to raise one’s arm to be distinct from the bodily movement co-occurring with the action. 
The two events are nevertheless entwined: the action occurs if the bodily movement 
exemplifies the property of being done with the intention to raise one’s arm. The action can 
therefore be viewed as a hylomorphic entity dependent upon the bodily movement and the 
property – while the former is the matter of the action, the latter is its form (Fine 1982, 102). 
Evnine is unwilling to conceptualize actions this way.26 He maintains that actions have 
matter but no forms. Therefore, though an action is different from the co-occurring bodily 
movement, their difference is not a difference in form but one in the means of production. 
While an action of raising one’s arm can only be produced with the intention to raise one’s 
arm, a bodily movement in which one’s arm is raised need not be produced with the 
intention to have one’s arm raised. Evnine calls his own theory amorphic hylomorphism, 
according to which hylomorphic entities “fall essentially under certain kinds and must be 
understood in terms of the kind-related processes of work on their (original) matter by 
which they come to exist” (2016, 12). Such a treatment of actions is again motivated by the 
                                                        
 
26 As far as I can tell, Evnine doesn’t explicitly argue against Fine’s hylomorphic analysis of actions. 
Therefore, Evnine’s main dissatisfaction with Fine’s analysis seems to be the framework in which 
Fine’s analysis is put forward, i.e. the theory of what Fine calls “qua objects”. See Evnine (2016, 
chap. 2) for his discussion of Fine’s qua objects.  
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analogy with artifacts. The main difference between, say, pasta and bread is arguably that 
they are produced in different ways. In Evnine’s view, the emphasis on the process of 
making makes his account more Aristotelian than many forms of contemporary 
hylomorphism; his theory respects the Aristotelian view that what something is is 
inseparable from how it comes to be.  
There are two ways in which an agent “makes” an action, depending on whether the 
action is basic. Evnine takes a basic action to be an action that one can perform without first 
performing another action. Suppose Anton winks at a colleague to show friendliness. In this 
case, the action of winking functions as a means to perform the action of showing 
friendliness. The action of showing friendliness is thus non-basic, while the action of 
winking is basic. Evnine claims that non-basic actions are made of other actions. Let F name 
a non-basic action and G an action that one performs for the purpose of performing F. 
Then to make F is to perform G with the twofold intention to perform F, on the one hand, 
and to perform F by performing G, on the other (2016, 232). In the example just mentioned, 
Anton succeeds in make the action of showing friendliness because he winks at his colleague 
with the intention to show friendliness, on the one hand, and he intends to show friendliness 
by means of winking, on the other. The action of winking thereby bears the matter relation 
to the action of showing friendliness; the former constitutes the latter. What it takes to make 
a basic action is somewhat different. To make a basic action H, an agent has to perform H 
intentionally, and her intention must cause appropriate bodily movements that enable her to 
perform H (2016, 233). Insofar as Anton’s intention to wink causes his winking, Anton 
succeeds in making the basic action of winking. It is unnecessary for Anton to have the 
intention to wink in any particular way; he need not intend to wink by means of winking at 
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the rate of ten times per minute, for example. When it comes to basic actions, therefore, the 
relata of the matter relation are not actions: basic actions are constituted by bodily 
movements.  
Intentions figure prominently not only in the existence conditions of actions but also 
in their identity conditions. Take possible actions A1 and A2; suppose they are performed 
with intentions I1 and I2, respectively. Then A1 and A2 are numerically identical if (a) I1 and I2 
are the same intention, and (b) A1 counts as a kind of action that fulfills I1; similarly for A2 
and I2 (2016, 245). For example, consider possible worlds w1 and w2. At w1, Anton winks at a 
rate of 10 times per minute; at w2, he winks at a rate of 15 times per minute. Insofar as the 
winking actions are performed with the same intention, they are numerically identical. Now 
suppose that because of some neurological disorder, the same intention causes Anton to 
open his mouth at w3. Since the action of opening his mouth by no means fulfills his 
intention, the action is numerically distinct from those performed at w1 and w2. Intentions 
also function to unify multistep actions. Evnine thus has a response to what I call the CP 
problem: “What accounts for the existence of a single action of which the other actions are 
the matter is the overarching intention that guides the performance and sequence of the acts 
that are the matter” (2016, 221). If Edmund intends to greet a friend by first saying hello and 
then giving the friend a hug, his intention unifies the actions of saying hello and hugging, 
turning them into an extended action.  
I have two main concerns with Evnine’s account. First, while the analogy between 
artifacts and actions is suggestive, the analogy may not be strong enough to warrant the 
application of his amorphic hylomorphism to actions. Second, Evnine takes successively 
unfolding actions to be unified by an overarching intention, but it is unclear that intentions 
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can play such a unifying role. I shall spell out the worries in turn. First, Evnine contends that 
his theory of artifacts also accounts for actions. He attempts to show this by exploiting the 
analogy between artifacts and actions. If we set aside Evnine’s treatment of physical artifacts, 
however, amorphic hylomorphism about events is a surprising position, to say the least. If 
one claims that an action may bear the matter relation to another, one is immediately faced 
with the question: what is present in the constituted action but missing from the constituting 
action? The simplest answer is “a form”, however forms are to be construed. However, as 
we have seen, Evnine chooses a different answer: nothing is missing from the constituting 
action. I think there are reasons to prefer the first answer to Evnine’s. For one thing, one 
could then follow the lead of Fine and identify the forms of events with properties. Given 
that properties have been extensively studied in metaphysics, one can defend hylomorphism 
with existing resources. For another, it is hard to see why we shouldn’t reify kinds. Amorphic 
hylomorphism entails that two actions cannot be of the same kind if they are performed 
with different kinds of intentions. It follows that for every action x, there is kind to which x 
belongs but the matter of x does not. What prevents us from identifying that kind, or the 
property of being that kind, with the form possessed by x but not by its matter? I am not 
sure how Evnine would respond. Admittedly these considerations do not refute amorphic 
hylomorphism. Nevertheless, they at least show that some version of Fine-style 
hylomorphism is to be preferred unless amorphic hylomorphism affords a superior analysis 
of the matter relation.  
Unfortunately, I don’t think it does. The conception of matter Evnine has been 
working with when he discusses the matter of actions isn’t sufficiently motivated. As Evnine 
himself points out, there is a reason that one may be unwilling to speak of bodily movements 
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as a kind of matter on which one can work (2016, 229–30). When Carl makes, say, an 
hourglass, the matter Carl uses consists of entities that are not brought into existence by Carl 
himself but can be manipulated by Carl. The sand and wood are simply found in nature. 
When Carl makes an action, however, the matter doesn’t consist of anything readily available 
for Carl to manipulate. Carl certainly manipulates his body, but that is not the matter of any 
action. The matter is Carl’s bodily movements, which are supposed to be caused by Carl’s 
intentions. If so, the following analysis would be more compelling than Evnine’s: Carl brings 
two events into being instead of making the one on the basis of the other. Evnine has a 
response to this worry: the difference between the matter of actions and that of physical 
artifacts only shows that there are different kinds of matter. When making physical artifacts, 
“we must work with what is already there” (2016, 233); the matter we manipulate in this case 
is given to us. When making actions, however, we can create the kind of matter we want to 
use. We don’t have to make do with existing materials and conform to the constraints they 
impose on us. To put it differently, in making actions, we bear a relation to the world 
different from the one we do in making physical artifacts. Given such a difference, there is 
no reason to think that the kinds of matter used in these two cases must be the same.  
I am not convinced by Evnine’s response. If the term “matter” has two radically 
different connotations, wouldn’t it be more defensible to claim that there are two matter 
relations, one of them involving artifacts and the other involving actions? But if so, why 
should we literally take actions to be artifacts, as Evnine does? Furthermore, Evnine’s 
response undermines a main advantage of amorphic hylomorphism. Amorphic 
hylomorphism aims to counter reductionism; it aims to tell us why there are tables, not just 
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particles arranged table-wise.27 Here’s Evnine’s answer: “we have made that further object. 
We took the bricks and mortar and made a house out of them. We took the bronze and 
made a statue out of it” (2016, 18). But if the matter of an action is freely created by us, in 
what sense do we make the further action? We do not take certain bodily movements and 
make an action out of them; we simply create an action that involves the bodily movements. 
Wouldn’t this make the action just “bodily movements arranged action-wise”? If so, the 
price Evnine has to pay to make his response work is to make amorphic hylomorphism 
appear unmotivated.  
My second worry concerns the unifying function Evnine attributes to intentions. In 
cases where one clearly knows what one intends to do and how one intends to do it, one’s 
intention seems capable of unifying the various actions one performs. There are nevertheless 
many cases in which such knowledge is lacking. Suppose Carl notices a new book in a 
bookstore. He skims through the book and finds it very entertaining. He wants to buy the 
book, but he has already spent too much money on books this month. So he begins to 
debate with himself, while picking up the book and putting it down several times. Eventually 
he makes up his mind and takes the book to the cashier. I don’t see any problem with 
viewing the entire process as a single action, which may be described as the action of 
thinking about whether to buy the book or that of persuading oneself to buy the book. But 
is there any overarching intention in this case? The best candidate is the intention to think 
about whether to buy the book, but it is easy to describe a scenario in which Carl doesn’t 
                                                        
 
27 The term “things arranged tablewise” comes from Peter van Inwagen. See van Inwagen (1990, 
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even have such an intention. Suppose that each time when Carl is about to put the book 
down, he feels ready to go home without the book. At these moments, his only intention is 
to go home. Whenever he actually puts the book down, however, it strikes him how hard it 
is to find a book one really likes. He then feels compelled to pick up the book once more 
and begins again to entertain the intention of buying it. Hence, while there is an interplay of 
the intentions of going home and buying the book, there is never the intention to think 
about buying the book. Despite the unity of the actions, no overarching intention can be 
found.  
One could certainly deny that the actions feature any unity. Nevertheless, while it is 
plausible to hold that the process can be divided into smaller units, I find it hard to believe 
that these smaller units do not in any sense make up a larger action. Going back and forth is 
typical of any kind of deliberation. If one refuses to grant any unity to the actions in our 
example, one has to hold the same position with regard to most deliberative actions. Such a 
conception of actions seems unnecessarily restrictive. Moreover, it is hard to see how there 
can be any collective actions on this picture. Since there is a clear sense in which any 
collective action results from a plurality of individual intentions to bring about an action with 
other people, collective actions degenerate into “individual actions arranged collectively”, to 
use a phrase similar to van Inwagen’s. No collective actions ever feature the kind of unity 
individual actions feature. This worry is in fact made clear by one of Evnine’s own examples, 
in which he describes a collective attempt to fell a tree (2016, 236–37). A few people work in 
shifts to cut down a tree, but the shift schedule is flexible. When a person is tired, there are 
multiple people that can take over. This case is offered as an example of actions that do not 
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unfold according to a predetermined plan.28 To further highlight my worry, we could 
stipulate that some of these people are training their skills while the others are just doing it 
for fun. There isn’t a set time before which the people must fell the tree – it doesn’t even 
matter if they stop before any tree is cut down. These people lack not only an overarching 
plan but also a consensus on the goals that must be completed. Given that the individual 
intentions do not overlap, nothing like a collective intention exists in this example. Even so, 
there is little doubt that the people are engaging in a collective action, that of felling a tree. It 
then becomes clear that many actions, individual or collective, are not unified by intentions. 
There isn’t any intention that is entertained throughout the whole process. Again, the CP 
problem remains an unresolved issue.  
3.4 Jones’ Account  
The third hylomorphic theory of events we shall consider is that of Tessa Jones. Her 
theory is formulated within the framework of Baker’s theory of material constitution, so it is 
instructive to begin by considering how Baker characterizes the constitution relation. Just 
like Evnine, Baker (2007) takes the relata of the constitution relation to be numerically 
distinct entities. Therefore, if The School of Athens is constituted by a quantity of lime plaster, 
the fresco and the lime plaster are numerically distinct. The relata of the constitution relation 
must fall under different primary kinds, where “A primary kind is a kind in virtue of which a 
thing has its persistence conditions” (2007, 35). For example, while BLUE WHALE is a primary 
                                                        
 
28 Evnine certainly doesn’t intend this example to be a counterexample to his theory; he invokes it 
while discussing whether the matter of an action may change in the way the matter of a physical 
artifact does. He thus seems unaware of its possible implications.  
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kind, ENDANGERED ANIMAL is not. It is in virtue of being a blue whale, and not in virtue of 
being an endangered animal, that a blue whale counts as continuing to exist after, say, being 
lightly wounded in the ocean. Therefore, though blue whales would continue to exist even if 
they cease to be endangered thanks to new recovery plans, they could never exist without 
being blue whales. Just like BLUE WHALE, both LIME PLASTER and FRESCO are primary kinds. 
For this reason, a fresco may be constituted by a quantity of lime plaster.  
For an entity to constitute another, the two must be suitably related. Say that an 
entity of primary kind F is in G-favorable circumstances if it meets a set of conditions C such that 
(a) the satisfaction of C by any entity of primary kind F guarantees the existence of an entity 
of primary kind G, but (b) the satisfaction of C by other entities may not (2007, 160). For 
example, one could create fresco-favorable circumstances for a quantity of lime plaster if one 
smears it on a wall and applies colors on it while it is wet, etc. But these circumstances may 
fail to bring about a fresco when entities of other primary kinds, such as a quantity of molten 
lava, are put in them. Baker defines constitution in terms of favorable circumstances. Take x 
and y, which fall under primary kinds F and G, respectively. Then x constitutes y if y is the 
entity that comes into existence when x is put in G-favorable circumstances (2007, 161). 
Note that this is the case only if certain constraints are not violated. First, y must occupy the 
same spatial location as x. A quantity of steel in Tokyo could never constitute the London 
Eye. Second, the basic kinds of stuff that characterize x and y must be the same. As Baker 
notes, the constraint is posited “to preclude the constitution of any immaterial thing by a 
material thing” (2007, 165). Third, the existence of an entity of primary kind F must not 
itself guarantee the existence of an entity of primary kind G. While the existence of a British 
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citizen is sufficient for the existence of an English speaker, British citizens can hardly be said 
to “constitute” English speakers. They are English speakers.  
As an example, consider again The School of Athens and the quantity of lime plaster co-
located with it. They do not violate any of the constraints. Hence, once the lime plaster is 
put in fresco-favorable circumstances, an entity of the primary kind FRESCO is created. In 
our example, this entity just is The School of Athens. It follows that The School of Athens is 
constituted by the lime plaster. According to Baker, though the two entities are numerically 
distinct, they are not separate: they share many properties on the basis of the constitution 
relation (2007, 169–70). The lime plaster would not have the property of being 
representative of the Renaissance style of art if it did not constitute The School of Athens. 
However, it doesn’t follow that the lime plaster fails to exemplify this property: no one 
would deny that a work of art representative of the Renaissance style would be destroyed if 
the lime plaster is destroyed. In Baker’s analysis, we should say that the lime plaster has the 
property, though it does so derivatively. By contrast, The School of Athens has the property non-
derivatively; to be representative of the Renaissance style, The School of Athens does not have to 
constitute, or be constituted by, any other entity (See Baker 2007, 166–69). If Baker’s theory 
is correct, numerically distinct entities can acquire properties from each other. It would then 
be a mistake to view the fresco and the lime plaster as completely unrelated entities.  
Jones (2013) argues that the conceptual resources provided by Baker also enable us 
to make sense of event constitution. One of her favorite examples is the ratification of the 
U.S. Constitution. Consider an event that is a signing of the Constitution. If such an event 
occurs in ratification-favorable circumstances, an event that is a ratifying of the Constitution 
occurs. The signing event can then be said to constitute the ratifying event (2013, 83). Jones 
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doesn’t say much about the ratification-favorable circumstances, but they are easily 
identifiable: the authority of the signers must be acknowledged by the public and the need 
for a constitution must have been agreed upon, etc. One complication in applying Baker’s 
theory to events is that an event may constitute another even if the two events unfold over 
slightly different time intervals. When the U.S. Constitution was signed in the Constitutional 
Convention, the ratification process was not yet over; it also had to be accepted by the 
legislatures of the states. It may be tempting to think that the events occurred successively 
and seek to understand their relation as something other than constitution (2013, 79–80). In 
Jones’ view, the main alternatives are supervenience and causation. She thus examines and 
argues against these alternatives.  
Jones attributes the supervenience-based view to Kim and offers counterexamples to 
it. Her example is the possible event in which Brutus failed to stab an immortal Caesar to 
death (2013, 74–76); I prefer a more mundane example. Suppose Anton’s hands undergo a 
pattern of movement that counts as an expression of “the bus left” in American Sign 
Language (ASL). What is the relation between Anton’s hand movement and the ASL 
utterance, if not constitution? One possible answer is that the utterance supervenes on the 
hand movement: if the properties of the utterance were different, the properties of the hand 
movement would be different. But this is false. In the actual world, Anton’s interlocutor 
understands ASL, but there may be possible worlds in which she does not. It follows that 
the utterance could lose the property of being a successful linguistic exchange while co-
occurring with the same hand movement. If so, the utterance does not supervene on the 
movement. Would it make more sense to say that the movement causes the utterance? Jones 
thinks that such an analysis is incompatible with Lewis’ counterfactual understanding of 
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causation (2013, 80–81). We briefly discussed Lewis’ conception of causation in the previous 
chapter.29 In the present example, for the utterance to causally depend on the movement, the 
utterance must occur if the movement were to occur. That would not be the case in many 
scenarios: Anton could coincidentally move his hands the same way in a world where ASL 
doesn’t exist. Therefore, if causation is understood counterfactually, it is implausible to treat 
the present case as one of causation.  
I agree with Jones that hylomorphism offers the best analysis of the kind of 
phenomena she is interested in, but I am not satisfied with Jones’ version of hylomorphism. 
It has two main problems. First, Jones tries to dispense with Baker’s notion of primary 
kinds, and this makes her account vulnerable to counterexamples. Second, just like the 
others, Jones is unable to successfully respond to the CP problem. Let’s begin with the first. 
Jones attributes a single primary kind to all events: “The primary-kind property of an event is 
to have happened” (2013, 78). A congressional hearing and a tennis game therefore fall 
under the same primary kind: they are both entities that have occurred. It is a short step 
from the idea that all events are of the same primary kind to the conclusion that primary 
kinds contribute nothing to the constitution of events. This is indeed the conclusion Jones 
draws (2013, 78 fn. 1). As a result, she dispenses with primary kinds in her official account 
and elects to invoke only kinds in general.  
Jones’ decision has unfortunate consequences. Take her example of the signing of 
the U.S. Constitution. This event certainly falls under the event-kind signing of the U.S. 
Constitution, but this is not the only kind the event falls under. It also falls under such kinds as 
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events occurring in September of 1787, events witnessed by George Mason, and indirect causes of the 
establishment of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1789. However, if all the kinds an event falls under 
may play a role in constituting another event, we are forced to say that sentences describing 
the constitution relation feature intensionality. If the signing of the Constitution bears the 
matter relation to the ratification of the Constitution, the reason is presumably not that the 
signing is an event witnessed by George Mason. Hence, when viewed one way, the signing 
event constitutes the ratification event, but the signing event fails to do so when viewed 
another way. It is unclear to me that there are linguistic data supporting such a claim about 
intensionality. And even if there are, I am not sure how to make sense of the metaphysics. 
Isn’t it the case that an event either constitutes another or it doesn’t? From what Jones 
actually says, it is unclear that she has a response to this worry. In specifying what must be 
the case for event x to bear the constitution relation to event y, Jones employs sentences that 
quantify over “any event of x’s kind” and events “of the kind of y” (2013, 83). 
Unfortunately, there are no kinds that can be regarded as x’s kind simpliciter or the kind of y. 
The only candidates for such kinds are the primary kinds of x and y, but Jones is unwilling to 
incorporate them into her theory. I am not sure what justifies her position.  
As a rejoinder, the friend of Jones’ view could say that x and y stand in the 
constitution relation insofar as one of the kinds x falls under is appropriately related to one 
of the kinds y falls under. This won’t do, either. Jones’ view that all events fall under the 
same primary kind entails that the only thing we can say about the necessary properties of an 
event is that it is necessarily something that has occurred. So long as an event has indeed 
occurred in the actual world, it doesn’t matter whether it falls under completely different 
event-kinds in other possible worlds. Hence, even if the actual signing of the U. S. 
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Constitution had not been a signing event, it could have been the very same event. It then 
transpires that for the suggested rejoinder to work, only the kinds that an event falls under in 
the actual world should be considered. For given any kind K under which an event falls, there 
will be possible worlds in which the event doesn’t fall under K. To make the decision on 
whether K is one of the kinds under which the event falls – a decision required by the 
suggested rejoinder – the most natural choice is to focus on the actual world. But now Jones’ 
account is faced with something similar to one of the problems plaguing Crowther’s 
account. Take Fine’s example of an arm-raising action. If we only focus on the event-kinds 
this event falls under in the actual world, then it certainly falls under the kind that defines the 
corresponding bodily movement. What reason is there to say that there are two events, an 
action and a bodily movement? None, I would think. If so, hylomorphism about events 
appears unmotivated; we should simply go for the more intuitive theories of events.  
Let’s now turn to my second objection: Jones’ view doesn’t offer a solution to the 
CP problem, either. Like Crowther and Evnine, Jones acknowledges the possibility of 
constitution by a plurality. Her example is a wedding constituted by the married couple’s 
vows, promises and other activities. Jones argues that the collection of events doesn’t feature 
a primary kind – in fact, what she says makes it sound as if the collection didn’t fall under 
any kind: “If it didn’t come to constitute the wedding, the collection would be like any other 
collection of events and just be a random sum, with the only thing essential to it being that it 
has the same members” (2013, 78 fn. 1). The only event-kind the collection falls under is the 
kind RANDOM SUM, if that counts as a kind at all. But such a view makes it inexplicable why 
the various events in the collection constitute any single event. To show that they do, we 
have to identify the wedding-favorable circumstances. Are there circumstances under which 
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the existence of a random sum of events is sufficient for the occurrence of a wedding? I 
cannot think of any. The following conditional certainly holds: if a random sum of events 
exists, then some events occur. But the application of Jones’ theory depends on the truth of 
a much stronger conditional that has the following form: if a random sum of events exists, 
then there is a kind K such that some events of kind K occur. I don’t believe that any 
conditional of such a form is true, let alone the one in which we substitute the kind 
WEDDING for K.  
But maybe Jones’ theory still has the resources to account for constitution by a 
plurality despite the problematic stance she officially takes on this issue. Maybe we should 
admit primary kinds into our theory again and say that even the collection of the events 
supposedly constituting the wedding falls under a primary kind. To see how this might help, 
consider again the case of the no-confidence vote discussed in section 2.4.3. We have used 
the name sum to call the mereological fusion of speech and vote, and we have used the 
name SUM to call the individuative property of sum. One could argue that SUM corresponds 
one-to-one to a kind, i.e. the kind a vote followed by a speech (henceforth abbreviated as V&S). 
Let’s take V&S to be the primary kind of sum. The following conditional seems true: if an 
event of the kind V&S is in circumstances favorable to a successful no-confidence motion, 
then there is an event of the kind under which all successful no-confidence motions fall. 
Doesn’t this show that sum constitutes no-confidence? If so, why don’t we treat the 
wedding similarly and take something like the kind vows followed by promises followed by blessings 
to be the primary kind of the wedding-constituting collection of events?  
We should not accept this response if we take into consideration Jones’ original 
insight. She is right in saying that a collection of events doesn’t feature any primary kind that 
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is relevant to the phenomenon of constitution: “The primary-kind property that collection 
has is assigned because it constitutes a wedding” (2013, 78 fn. 1). It may be true that sum 
falls under the kind V&S. Even so, one shouldn’t make the further claim that V&S is a kind 
responsible for the persistence conditions of all the entities that fall under it. If the primary 
minister’s speech counts as continuing to unfold after a cough by the prime minister, it is 
because the speech falls under the kind defined by SPEECH, not because the speech falls 
under the kind V&S. To claim that there are events that derive their persistence conditions 
from V&S is to admit entities like the fusion of my brain and the London Eye into the realm 
of events. As stated in Section 2.2, I believe that we shouldn’t accommodate such entities in 
our ontology. If my reasoning is correct, then at the end of the day, Jones’ account doesn’t 
fare better in solving the CP problem than the other hylomorphic theories on offer.  
3.5 An Alternative Hylomorphic Account  
3.5.1 Fine and Johnston on Event Constitution  
In this section, I shall defend an alternative hylomorphic account of events. Since 
some of the basic ideas in my proposal can be found in the work done by Kit Fine and Mark 
Johnston, it is instructive to briefly examine their work. We have already seen that Fine 
motivates a hylomorphic theory of events by arguing that an action differs modally from the 
bodily movement co-occurring with the action. The action is performed with a certain 
intention, and the property of being so performed supplies the action with a form. It may 
seem that Fine’s theory is only applicable to intentional actions, but he intends it to apply to 
events in general. To show how this is done, Fine discusses Sir Lancelot’s loss of virginity 
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(1982, 103–4). Suppose it happened at t. Had Sir Lancelot had sex before t, the same physical 
activity could still have happened at t, but it would have not been a losing of virginity. It 
follows that the loss of virginity and the physical activity were modally distinguished, even 
though they coincided spatiotemporally. There was a form present in the latter but absent 
from the former: the property of preceding any other sexual activity. These considerations 
justify speaking of the physical activity as constituting the loss of virginity. Since intentions 
do not figure in these considerations, they support a hylomorphic view of events in general. 
Fine even goes so far as to claim that a single class of events, occurrences, constitute all the 
other events: “Occurrences are the matter of events; and just as all material things are 
ultimately formed from matter… so are all events ultimately formed from occurrences” 
(1982, 104).  
Johnston has a similar view about events. On his view, the matter of an entity 
consists of its parts, while the form is the principle of unity that holds the parts of the entity 
together (2006, 676). Since parts are construed broadly, the successive phases of an event 
count as its parts. These parts stand in various relations to each other, and some of the 
relations may function as principles of unity. In Johnston’s example of a dinner party, the 
principle is “occupying a position in a sequence of events each effected either by the hosts or 
by the guests for the intended outcome of their mutual feeding, entertainment, and relief” 
(2006, 657; emphasis omitted). Since relations are usually taken to be polyadic properties, 
Johnston’s view resembles Fine’s in that forms are regarded as properties. However, 
Johnston’s view features an element not present in Fine’s view: the constitution relation 
holds not only between events but also between physical objects and events. For example, 
Hannah’s serve in a tennis game might be thought of as an event constituted by Hannah, the 
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tennis ball, the relation of hitting and the spatiotemporal region in which the game takes 
place. These entities constitute a serving event if they are governed by the following principle 
of unity: Hannah bears the relation of hitting to the ball at the region. In Johnston’s 
terminology, this principle of unity is item-generating: it takes certain extant items as input and 
generates a new item, which is an event. Principles of unity that generate events are called 
event-builders (2006, 676–77).  
The main issue with Fine’s and Johnston’s views is that they do not delve into 
details. They give us some general ideas that need fleshing out. Their central insight is that 
principles of unity should be understood as properties: a hylomorphic entity is more than its 
matter because it exemplifies properties that unify its matter. They are nevertheless silent on 
how exactly properties unify matter. Fine speaks of a historical property that unifies what Sir 
Lancelot does in a sexual encounter and generates his loss of virginity. But what’s so special 
about this historical property that it can play the unifying role in the particular context? What 
exactly is the relation between this historical property and the sexual activity? Saying that it is 
the matter relation or the constitution relation amounts to nothing more than naming the 
relation. Similarly, in trying to show what unifies a dinner party, Johnston cites a polyadic 
property whose components include temporal, causal, agential and social properties. This 
example barely gives us any hints on how we should go about looking for a general solution 
to the CP problem. In short, Fine and Johnston haven’t really identified the conditions on 
which an event or a set of events constitutes another. As things stand now, their views are 
not well-developed alternatives to the theories proposed by Crowther, Evnine and Jones, 
which appeal to temporal boundaries, intentions and favorable circumstances, respectively. 
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Therefore, in the next section, I shall develop a version of hylomorphism broadly based on 
Fine’s and Johnston’s views and work out some of the needed details.  
3.5.2 Dependence-Based Hylomorphism  
As I have tried to show, the CP problem is one of the main challenges faced by 
theories of events. Since my proposal is motivated by the need to respond to this problem, 
let’s address it head-on and return to the case of the no-confidence motion once again. What 
is the relation no-confidence bears to speech and vote? Obviously, the answer I prefer is 
that speech and vote jointly constitute no-confidence; they bear the matter relation to no-
confidence. But what are the conditions met by speech and vote such that they jointly 
constitute no-confidence? My answer, as I briefly suggested in the introductory section, is 
that they jointly supply what is needed for no-confidence to go on. To put it differently, 
they succeed one another in affording the means by which no-confidence continues to 
unfold. The event that is no-confidence is initiated precisely because speech occurs; it is in 
virtue of the prime minister’s speech that a passing of a no-confidence motion comes into 
being. In a similar fashion, when speech is over, no-confidence continues without 
interruption because vote occurs; the passage of the no-confidence motion is able to run its 
course in virtue of the collective action of the parliament members to vote in response to the 
prime minister’s speech. In this picture, the relation speech and vote collectively bear to no-
confidence is analogous to the relation the matter of the London Eye bears to the London 
Eye itself. Just as we can destroy the London Eye by destroying the quantity of metal it is 
made of, we can prevent no-confidence from occurring by preventing speech and vote 
  
92 
from occurring. We are thus justified in saying that speech and vote bear the constitution 
relation to no-confidence.  
What I have said is intended to be an intuitive characterization of my answer to the 
question: what are the conditions met by speech and vote such that they jointly constitute 
no-confidence? Now we need to make the answer more precise. It would seem that what I 
have said can be summarized in a single sentence: events e and f constitute another event g if 
and only if the successive occurrence of e and f is sufficient for the occurrence of g. This 
obviously has to be qualified. It doesn’t take much reflection for one to realize that the 
successive occurrence of speech and vote is not really sufficient for the occurrence of no-
confidence: if the parliamentary democracy under consideration had different laws, there 
could be speech and vote without no-confidence. In another possible world, the law could 
say that a no-confidence motion cannot be passed without a referendum; in that world, 
speech and vote only mark the beginning of a successful no-confidence motion. To be 
sufficient for no-confidence, speech and vote must take place while certain laws are in 
place. Should we then say that no-confidence is constituted by speech, vote and the 
relevant laws? No, because the same problem would arise again. The relevant laws would 
lose their binding power if law enforcement did not exist, so law enforcement too must 
figure in the sufficient conditions of no-confidence. Needless to say, it would be untenable 
to add law enforcement to the growing list of the entities by which no-confidence is 
constituted. While we might be able to stop extending the list after finitely many items are 
added to it, taking constitution to be a relation with such a huge number of relata renders 
any theory of constitution unintelligible.  
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The way out of this impasse, I submit, is to invoke a distinction drawn by Husserl. 
As Husserl points out, the dependence relation between two entities can be more or less 
immediate ([1913b] 1970, 2:28).30 Suppose Bernard was born with a rare disease whose lethal 
symptoms could only be suppressed by a medication patented by a pharmaceutical company. 
Since the company could not exist without its shareholders, Bernard could not exist if none 
of the shareholders did. While it is true that Bernard depends on the shareholders, he does 
so only because he depends on the medication. We could then say that the dependence 
relation between Bernard and the medication is immediate, but the dependence relation 
between Bernard and the shareholders is mediate. The same analysis can be applied to events. 
While no-confidence immediately depends on speech and vote, its dependence on the 
relevant laws, law enforcement and everything else is mediate. We can then refine our 
criterion: events e and f constitute another event g if and only if g immediately depends on 
nothing but the successive occurrence of e and f.  
Why is the dependence of no-confidence on speech and vote immediate? The 
reason is that they are the means by which no-confidence occurs. Without such means, 
nothing whatsoever would take place. In other words, in a world where the prime minster 
gives no speech and the parliament members fail to cast their votes, no-confidence is not 
only deprived of some of its properties; it is deprived of its very eventhood, thus its very 
existence. In contrast, in a world where the relevant laws aren’t in place, no-confidence 
could still occur, though it would lose its legal properties and some other properties. Even if 
                                                        
 
30 The context of Husserl’s analysis of dependence is his theory of foundation, where foundation 
should be regarded as a specific kind of dependence. For discussions of Husserl’s theory of 
foundation, see Simons (1982), Fine (1995) and Correia (2004).  
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one is reluctant to say that the event in that world is numerically identical to no-confidence, 
it can hardly be denied that some event of a similar kind would still exist. That event would 
still share many social and political properties with no-confidence and occupies exactly the 
same spatiotemporal location as no-confidence. This is not the case for a world where no 
speech and vote take place – in such a world, no events capable of bearing any property 
would exist at the spatiotemporal location of no-confidence. It is thus reasonable to say 
that no-confidence depends on the relevant laws only because it depends on speech and 
vote. Since the same can be said of any other entity upon which no-confidence depends, 
the dependence of no-confidence upon speech and vote is immediate.  
But we have to be careful about the kind of dependence we are talking about here. It 
is not true that no-confidence immediately depends on the very event tokens of speech 
and vote. It is possible for no-confidence to occur even if speech and vote did not. 
Suppose the prime minister wrote the speech herself but got sick before delivering it. As a 
result, a member of the cabinet steps in as her proxy and reads the speech word-for-word in 
front of the parliament members. This speech is presumably numerically distinct from 
speech, but I see no reason to hold that the event as a whole is numerically distinct from 
no-confidence. The speech so delivered is almost the same, so the legal and political 
properties of the no-confidence motion all remain unchanged.31 Similarly, there are different 
ways the members of the parliament could vote on the no-confidence motion. They could 
vote by raising their hand instead of pushing a button, and that would probably result in an 
                                                        
 
31 Many would probably remain unconvinced if I could not offer any general observations on how 
different an event could have been without amounting to a different event. I will say more about that 
in Section 3.6.2.  
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event different from vote. But again, I don’t think such a difference compels us to say that 
the event as a whole differs from no-confidence. It then becomes clear that no-confidence 
immediately depends on event tokens of the kinds under which speech and vote fall, 
respectively, but it doesn’t immediately depend on speech and vote. Our criterion thus 
needs further refinement.  
As a preliminary to formulating our criterion precisely, let’s follow Peter Simons in 
distinguishing between two different dependence relations (1994, 559–60, 567):  
(Individual Dependence)  
Let x and y be arbitrary entities. Then x individually depends on y if and only if y exists in 
every possible world that contains x.  
(Specific Dependence)  
Let J and K be kinds. Then entities of kind J specifically depend on entities of kind K if and 
only if there is some y of kind K in every possible world that contains some x of kind J.32  
For instance, there would be no democracies without electoral systems. It follows that any 
possible world containing a democratic country also contains an electoral system. By the 
above definition, entities of the kind DEMOCRACY specifically depend on entities of the kind 
ELECTORAL SYSTEM. Since Estonia is a democracy, we could say that Estonia specifically 
depends on an electoral system. Even so, Estonia doesn’t individually depend on its current 
                                                        
 
32 The term “specific dependence” means, in Simons’ own words, “dependence at the species level” 
(1994, 560). Simons’ account of dependence is based on his interpretation of Husserl’s theory of 
foundation. For additional conceptual and formal details of Simons’ interpretation of Husserl, see his 
(1982).  
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electoral system. Estonia would continue to exist even if Estonians were to change the 
current system and bypass the parliament in presidential elections, for example.  
To resume our discussion of event constitution, we should take the dependence of 
no-confidence on speech and vote to be specific rather than individual. The reason no-
confidence depends on the two events is that it falls under the kind under which all and 
only successful no-confidence motions fall.33 In any possible world where a successful no-
confidence motion occurs in the given country, a speech by the prime minister and a vote by 
the parliament members also occur. However, as we have seen, the speech and the vote need 
not be numerically identical to speech and vote. It follows that successful no-confidence 
motions specifically depend on the kinds under which speech and vote fall. To describe our 
case in Simons’ terminology, we could say that speech and vote satisfy the dependence needs of 
no-confidence (P. Simons 1994, 562). Unless otherwise noted, I shall use the term to 
denote needs for immediate specific dependence, so to say that the dependence needs of no-
confidence are satisfied by speech and vote is to say the following: on the one hand, the 
dependence of no-confidence on speech and vote is specific and immediate, and on the 
other hand, no-confidence only bears such a dependence relation to speech and vote. Now 
that we have defined dependence needs, we can revise our criterion of event constitution as 
follows. Suppose events e and f fall under kinds E and F. Then e and f constitute another 
event g if and only if there is a kind G such that g falls under G, on the one hand, and the 
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successful ones according to the actual legal system of the country under consideration.  
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dependence needs of any token of G are satisfied by both a token of E and a token of F, on 
the other.  
Before we can present an official formulation of our theory, additional comments are 
in order. First, my proposal explicitly invokes event-kinds to define event constitution. As 
things stand now, my proposal is confronted with the same difficulty confronting Jones’ 
theory: most, if not all, events fall under multiple kinds. Since dependence needs have their 
origins in kinds, the dependence needs an event has vary with our choices of the kinds to 
focus on and describe. What is even worse is that whether the dependence needs of an event 
are satisfied also becomes a description-relative matter. To avoid this problem, I shall make 
more substantial use of Baker’s idea of primary kinds. Pace Jones, events do not share a 
single primary kind. In our example, no-confidence, speech and vote fall under distinct 
primary kinds. The dependence needs of an event originate in the primary kind the event 
falls under. Second, as we have seen at various points, constitution is supposed to a relation 
between spatiotemporally coinciding entities. Hence, we should require speech and vote to 
jointly occupy the same spatiotemporal location as no-confidence. Note that we need not 
make the assumption that speech and vote have a fusion; all we need to assume is that the 
spatiotemporal regions they occupy have a fusion. While the former assumption may be 
problematic, the latter seems reasonable. Third, it may be a little pedantic to point out that 
an event may fail to exist even if its needs for immediate specific dependence are satisfied, 
but mentioning this point may help to guard against misinterpretations. For an event to exist, 
everything it depends on must exist, not just those it depends on immediately and 
specifically. While those entities on which an event does not immediately and specifically 
depend do not play a role in constituting the event, they do play a role in the existence of the 
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event. After all, if something on which an event mediately depends fails to exist, then 
presumably the entities on which the event immediately depends fail to exist.  
With these points made, I can officially state my version of hylomorphism, which I 
call dependence-based hylomorphism (henceforth DBH). My point of departure is Fine’s view that 
there is a class of occurrences without which no events could be constituted. Given this view, it 
makes sense to divide events into simple and complex ones, where simple events just are 
Fine’s occurrences.34 Fine doesn’t say much about the nature of occurrences, but I think it is 
plausible to identify them with tropes of a certain kind. By combining hylomorphism with a 
trope theory of events like Bennett’s,35 we get the best of both worlds: we are able to say 
something about the nature of simple events, which Fine doesn’t do, and we can explain 
how various simple events constitute a complex event, which Bennett fails to do. For this 
reason, I shall assume that the class of simple events consists of tropes, though I don’t have 
a criterion we can use to identify these tropes. Complex events are related to simple events 
by the constitution relation. A complex event is constituted by a number of simple events 
just in case that the dependence needs of the former are satisfied by the latter. The simple 
events are the matter of the complex event, but there is more to the complex event than its 
matter. It also has a form, which is derived from its primary kind. In our example, the form 
of no-confidence is the following property: being the kind under which all and only 
successful no-confidence motions fall.36 By identifying no-confidence with the composite 
                                                        
 
34 My distinction of simple and complex events is stipulative. I do not mean to suggest that this is the 
only way to draw the line between simple and complex events.  
35 See section 2.4.3.  
36 Baker uses the term primary-kind property to denote an entity’s property of falling under its primary 
kind; see Baker (2007, 33–34).  
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that has this property as its form and speech and vote as its matter, we are also able to 
define its existence and identity conditions: no-confidence exists if its dependence needs are 
satisfied, and it is numerically identical to any event that has the same form and matter.  
Putting everything together, we can formulate the five components of dependence-
based hylomorphism, DBH I-V, as follows:37  
(DBH I: The Satisfaction of Dependence Needs)  
Let x, y and z be events whose primary kinds are I, J and K. We say that x and y satisfy the 
dependence needs of z if and only if:  
(1) for any event k of primary kind K, there are events i and j of primary kinds I and J such 
that k specifically and immediately depends on i and j;  
(2) the fusion of the spatiotemporal regions occupied by x and y is numerically identical to 
the spatiotemporal region occupied by z.  
(DBH II: Direct and Indirect Constitution)  
Let x, y and z be events. Then x and y constitute z if and only if: 
(1) EITHER x and y directly constitute z, where this is the case if and only if:  
(a) x and y satisfy the dependence needs of z;  
(b) everything else z depends on also exists;  
(2) OR x and y indirectly constitute z, where this is the case if and only if there is a series of 
events such that:  
                                                        
 
37 To make the definitions readable, I focus on the cases in which two events jointly constitute 
another. But it should be clear that the definitions can be used to analyze the constitution of an event 
by an indefinite number of others.  
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(a) x and y directly constitute the first event in the series;  
(b) every event in the series directly constitutes the next;  
(c) the last event in the series directly constitutes z.  
(DBH III: Form and Matter)  
If events x and y constitute event z and z is of primary kind K, then we say that:  
(1) x and y are the matter of z;  
(2) the property of falling under K is the form of z.  
(DBH IV: Event Existence)  
Any event x is either simple or complex.  
(1) If x is simple, then x exists only if x is a trope.  
(2) If x is complex, then x exists if and only if there are some simple events that constitute 
x.  
(DBH V: Event Identity)  
Any event x is either simple or complex.  
(1) If x is simple, then for any simple event y, x is numerically identical to y if and only if x 
and y are the same trope.  
(2) If x is complex, then for any complex event y, x is numerically identical to y if and only 
if:  
(a) the primary kinds of x and y are the same;  
(b) x and y are constituted by the same events.  
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These summarize everything I have said in this section. To see how it works, let x and y be 
speech and vote and z no-confidence. By DBH I-II, speech and vote directly constitute 
no-confidence. By DBH III, the matter of no-confidence consists of speech and vote, 
and its form is the property of falling under the kind under which all and only successful 
motions of no-confidence fall. By DBH IV, no-confidence exists. By DBH V, no-
confidence is numerically identical to any successful motion of no-confidence that is 
constituted by speech and vote. DBH I-V therefore capture what I meant when I described 
speech and vote as affording what was needed for no-confidence to unfold.  
Dependence-based hylomorphism has several virtues. First, it is specifically designed 
as a response to the CP problem. Though Crowther, Evnine and Jones all acknowledge the 
possibility of constitution by a plurality, I have argued that none of their theories explains 
how exactly constitution by a plurality is possible. DBH solves this problem. In contrast with 
Crowther’s temporal sortals and Evnine’s intentions, what unify events in DBH are 
dependence relations based on primary kinds. The latter are much more flexible than the 
former. Furthermore, DBH is able to circumvent the thorny issue of defining favorable 
circumstances for random collections of events, which plagues Jones’ theory.  
Second, DBH fleshes out the details missing in Fine’s and Johnston’s accounts. We 
are told by Fine that properties function as forms that turn occurrences into events. 
Similarly, Johnston tells us that relational properties bind individuals and spatiotemporal 
regions together into events. But what kind of properties are we talking about, exactly? Why 
are such properties capable of functioning as forms? DBH suggests an answer to this 
question: the properties in question are those defined by primary kinds. They are capable of 
functioning as event-forms because the very persistence conditions of an event derive from 
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the event’s primary kind. The primary kind of an event thus determines what must happen 
for the event to run its course, which means that the primary kind of an event determines its 
matter.  
Third, DBH doesn’t rely on any analogies between events and physical artifacts. We 
don’t have to say that we work on bodily movements just as we work on physical matter; nor 
do we have to say that events are made of non-events just as physical artifacts are made of 
stuff. Since dependence-based hylomorphism does without these analogies, its strength and 
weakness can be evaluated in a more straightforward manner than Evnine’s and Crowther’s 
theories. This also means that DBH presupposes a simpler ontology. We don’t have to posit 
such entities as non-events that in some sense correspond to quantities of physical stuff; 
tropes and properties are all we need. If one is willing to reduce properties to classes of 
tropes, then DBH in effect supplies supporting evidence of how much a trope ontology can 
do. Given these considerations, we have good reasons to accept DBH. Before the chapter is 
concluded, however, I would like to address two potential objections to any constitution-
based view about events.  
3.6 Objections and Replies  
3.6.1 Realization, Not Constitution  
A concern one might have with any constitution-based view about events is that it 
seems forced. Consider again Fine’s example. Isn’t it more natural to describe the relation 
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between the bodily movement and the action as that of realization?38 Instead of saying that 
the bodily movement constitutes the action, we should say that the bodily movement realizes 
the intention to act in a certain way. Similarly, instead of saying that speech and vote 
constitute no-confidence, we should say that the successive occurrence of the former 
realizes the latter. Whether this alternative is preferable obviously depends on how the 
realization relation is construed. If one thinks that realization is a relation an entity bears to 
its matter, then the dispute may be a terminological one. We could speak of the London Eye 
as realized by the steel used to construct it; I have nothing against this manner of speaking.  
But the dispute may be more than terminological. One could say that there are 
actually no actions in the scenario described by Fine. What can be found there are the bodily 
movement and the agent’s intention. Since the bodily movement realizes the intention, we 
describe the movement as an action; such a description nevertheless picks out nothing but 
the bodily movement. Or take speech and vote. Since speech and vote jointly realize a 
political mechanism, we conceptualize what happens as the passage of a no-confidence 
motion. It is true that speech and vote exist; so does the political mechanism as an abstract 
entity. But everything else is in our head. On such a view, the relata of the realization relation 
are different from those of the constitution relation. The bodily movement either bears the 
constitution relation to an action or bears the realization relation to an intention. Since an 
action is not an intention and there are no reasons to posit unnecessary entities, the bodily 
movement does not bear the constitution relation to any action.  
                                                        
 
38 I thank Qiong Wu for discussing this issue with me.  
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There are at least three ways to respond to this view. First, one could argue that no-
confidence and the action in Fine’s example are not unnecessary entities. As we have 
emphasized, they have different modal properties than the events that are their matter. The 
modal phenomena would become mysterious if no-confidence and the action were simply 
nonexistent. Second, it makes little sense to say that all constituted events are just in our 
head. We could ask: what would happen if speech and vote were to take place without the 
political mechanism in place? The natural answer is: in that case, there wouldn’t be any 
successful motion of no-confidence. But on the view under consideration, that is the wrong 
answer. Instead, the answer should be: in that case, we have to understand the speech and 
the vote in a different way. The answer isn’t wrong, but it sounds like a non-answer. We 
could follow-up with the question, “what makes it the case that we have to understand the 
speech and the vote in a different way?” At this point, any compelling answer would have to 
invoke a constituted event rather than something in our head. Third, simply giving a name to 
the relation between the intention and the bodily movement is far from giving a theory of 
the relation. Before such a theory is fleshed out, it is premature to assume that it is capable 
of explaining everything that a constitution-based view about events is capable of explaining.  
It is true that there are richer conceptions of the realization relation on offer. As 
Karen Bennett points out, realization can be thought of as a relation between a causal role 
and an occupant of the role (2017, 10). Take the eye as an example. One could say that the 
eye is whatever causally mediates between light signals and neural activities in the optic 
nerves – any organ that plays this role realizes the eye. Hence, though an octopus eye is 
structurally different from a human eye, the former realizes the same role in an octopus as 
the latter does in a human being. The more we flesh out the idea of realization, however, the 
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less it seems the same as constitution. To say that an action is realized by a bodily 
movement, we have to identify the distinctive causal role played by the action. But in many 
cases of constitution, there doesn’t seem to be any such role. Suppose an agent has the 
intention to swim in the pool in front of her, so she begins to jump. But she is suffering 
from a hallucination, so there is actually no pool in front of her. What events are supposed 
to be causally mediated by her jump? There are too many possibilities here: she could be 
tripped by something on the floor, hurt herself or find the action embarrassing, to name a 
few. The sheer number of possibilities suggests that the action is not individuated by any 
single causal role. If so, nothing can stand in the realization relation to the action. The same 
argument can be made about a wide range of constituted events.  
The moral we should draw from these considerations, I submit, is that the 
constitution relation cannot be straightforwardly identified with the realization relation. 
While such identification remains a theoretical possibility, it needs to be supported by 
additional arguments. The arguments we have discussed so far do not threaten the 
theoretical usefulness of the constitution relation.  
3.6.2 Events Have No Contingent Properties  
I have suggested that in the aforementioned case of the no-confidence motion, no-
confidence can occur in a possible world where speech and vote are replaced by slightly 
different events. In some of the worlds where a proxy of the prime minister steps in to 
deliver the speech and the parliament members choose to vote by raising their hands instead 
of using more advanced technology, we can still identify the very same token of no-
confidence. Some might be unhappy with my claim. There are many ways to answer the 
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question: how many properties could an event have lost without turning into a different 
event? Some think that any change to an event gives rise to a distinct event. This is 
Crowther’s view: “events cannot change their properties; they possess all of their properties 
necessarily” (2011, 36). If we accept this view, there are no worlds in which no-confidence 
occurs but the very tokens of speech and vote do not. To defend DBH, I have to show that 
this view is problematic.  
An argument supporting my position can be found in Evnine’s work. Evnine notes 
that there are many ways in which a single action could be carried out; there is no reason to 
think that one would have failed to perform a given action if the action had not been 
performed exactly the way it was actually performed (2016, 244). Suppose I just pressed a 
key on my laptop. If I had pressed the key slightly further down or struck it with a little less 
force, I would still have carried out the same action. Cases like this suggest that an event 
could have some properties contingently. I agree with Evnine’s diagnosis. However, some 
might argue that we could also accommodate the cases by appealing to action types. We 
could hold that different ways to press the key amount to different actions, even though 
these actions belong to the same type. If we take this alternative, then we can stick to the 
view that all the properties of an event are necessary. Since intuitions about the modal nature 
of events are usually fuzzy, many might prefer this alternative. To defend the view that 
events have some properties contingently, I shall provide another argument.  
My argument is a simple reductio ad absurdum: if we assume that every property of 
which an event is an instance is necessary to the event, then the actual course of history is 
the only possible course of history. Since this makes much of our everyday discourse 
unintelligible, we should reject the assumption. It is not hard to see how this argument can 
  
107 
be fleshed out. Suppose events can only instantiate properties necessarily. For example, if e is 
an instance of the Olympics in 2016, then e is necessarily an instance of the Olympics in 
2016. It follows that everything that happened necessarily happened, everything that is 
happening now necessarily happens now, and everything that will happen will necessarily 
happen. Therefore, the course of history of the actual world is shared by every possible 
world. Some might think that this is too quick. They might argue that my reasoning is 
fallacious: even if e is necessarily the Olympics that occurred in 2016, it doesn’t follow that 
there is any time at which e necessarily exists. Take Victor Frankenstein. Though Victor 
Frankenstein is necessarily a human being who lived in the 18th century, there isn’t any time 
at which he necessarily exists. He has never existed and will never exist. Despite this, anyone 
who is not a human being living in the 18th century fails to fit the depiction in the novel, 
thereby failing to be Victor Frankenstein. Victor Frankenstein is thus a counterexample to 
my reasoning. It follows that even if the actual events could not possibly have been 
otherwise, many of them could still have failed to occur.  
My response to this objection is that it rests on confusion. Suppose Victor 
Frankenstein has never existed and will never exist. Then he has no properties whatsoever, 
necessary or contingent – there is nothing to which the name “Victor Frankenstein” bears 
the referential relation, let alone something that has properties.39 To make sense of the 
objection, we could instead take Victor Frankenstein to be a fictional character. A fictional 
character exists as an abstract object, but no human beings are abstract objects. It follows 
                                                        
 
39 I have no intention to rule out the possibility that the name is still meaningful or that many 
speakers intend to use it as a referential expression.  
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that Victor Frankenstein is not necessarily a human being. As a rejoinder, my critics could 
take the approach described by Fabrice Correia: “It is nowadays widely accepted that to say 
that an object is essentially so and so is to say that necessarily, the object is so and so, or 
alternatively, that necessarily, the object is so and so if it exists” (2007, 63; my italics). My 
critics could reinterpret the sentence “Victor Frankenstein is necessarily a human being who 
lived in the 18th century” as a conditional, which says that if Victor Frankenstein had existed, 
he would necessarily have been a human being in the 18th century. This, however, doesn’t 
show that Victor Frankenstein is necessarily an instance of humanity in the 18th century. The 
conditional is true even if there is a possible world in which there were no human beings in 
the 18th century, and Victor Frankenstein cannot be an instance of humanity in the 18th 
century in that world. The only necessary property we can attribute to Victor Frankenstein 
on the basis of the conditional is the property of being human whenever he exists. Hence, 
the objection at most shows that even if Victor Frankenstein is necessarily a human being 
whenever he exists, it doesn’t follow that there is a time at which Victor Frankenstein 
necessarily exists. This is a trivial claim. What the objection fails to show is that even if 
Victor Frankenstein is necessarily a human being living in the 18th century, it doesn’t follow that 
there is a time at which Victor Frankenstein necessarily exists. There is obviously such a 
time: the 18th century. As it turns out, the objection doesn’t threaten the soundness of my 
argument.  
This brings us back to the issue of the modal nature of events. The assumption in 
my reductio argument is that every property of which an event is an instance is necessary to 
the event. This includes such properties as being the Olympics in 2016 or being a 
congressional hearing today, which are evidently properties an event could instantiate. As my 
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response to the potential objection suggests, the assumption implies that all the events in the 
actual world necessarily occur; moreover, they necessarily occur at the times at which they 
actually do. The actual world is, as it were, the minimal possible world; every other possible 
world must contain every event in the actual world. The only way for the non-actual worlds 
to differ from the actual world is for them to include events that are numerically distinct to 
every actual event. Furthermore, these events have to be causally isolated from the actual 
events. If this were not the case, the actual events would acquire additional causes and 
effects, which could easily lead to the problem of overdetermination. The logical 
consequence of our assumption, therefore, is that there are only two kinds of possible 
worlds. In possible worlds of the first kind, the actual course of history is the only series of 
events. These worlds might somehow differ from the actual world with respect to 
individuals, facts and fictional entities, etc., but nothing that doesn’t happen in the actual 
world happens in these worlds. In possible worlds of the second kind, the actual course of 
history is one of the many series of events that are completely causally isolated from each 
other. A world of this kind is a weird one; perhaps it is constituted by spatiotemporal regions 
that are connected by wormholes.  
I take this to be an extremely undesirable result. If these are the only two kinds of 
possible worlds, then much of our modal discourse is nonsense. One might say “the theft 
could have been easily avoided” or “the pollution could have been worse”, but the premise 
of our reductio argument entails that these are all falsities. An equally troubling consequence is 
that we will have to regard a seemingly plausible kind of historical explanation as 
wrongheaded. As Daniel Nolan points out, certain questions in the discipline of history 
demand answers that are naturally given in terms of counterfactual claims: “When we want 
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to know whether one outcome was very likely, we would naturally consider what sorts of 
events would have prevented it if they had happened, and how likely they were” (2013, 330). 
A concrete example can be found in the terrific book by Kellee S. Tsai (2007). Many share 
the idea that a country that has seen enough economic growth will eventually become a 
democracy. But there are authoritarian countries that seem to defy such a regularity, so 
historians have to explain why democracy hasn’t emerged in those countries. They look for 
such explanations by asking: what historical developments would have turned those 
countries into democracies if they had taken place? One of the theories can be stated with a 
counterfactual: these countries would have become more democratic if their economic 
system had been different and the middle-class citizens’ pursuit of material well-being didn’t 
depend so much on government cooperation (Tsai 2007, 22–23). This is a very sensible 
theory. However, if there is no sense in which past events could have taken different turns, 
then all counterfactuals are false. And no true theory consists of a set of false claims. We are 
faced with two options here: to reject the kind of historical explanation just mentioned, or to 
deny the premise that any property an event has is one of the event’s necessary properties. 
The more reasonable move, I submit, is to choose the second option. We thus conclude that 
events must have some contingent properties.  
Does this mean that it is possible for an event to be radically different from the way 
it actually is? I don’t think so. To show that this other extreme is equally unattractive, it is 
useful to revisit Jones’ position. As we have seen, Jones maintains that an event could have 
been quite different. She claims that Brutus’ stabbing of Caesar, which killed Caesar, could 
have been a failed attempt to kill an immortal being (2013, 74). I disagree. I take it to be a 
tenable assumption that humanity was one of Caesar’s essential properties. Since humanity is 
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in part defined by mortality and Caesar was human, he couldn’t have been identical to an 
immortal being – whether the immortal being was also named “Caesar” is irrelevant. For 
Jones’ argument to work, therefore, she has to make the assumption that an action could 
remain the same one even if it were to have an utterly different target. But on this 
assumption, Brutus’ action would have been the same event token even if he had stabbed a 
wooden statue of Caesar instead of Caesar himself. After all, a wooden statue of Caesar is no 
more different from Caesar himself than an immortal being is. The problem is that I have 
difficulties seeing how Brutus’ assassination attempt could have been identical to a statue-
damaging action. While it may be possible for an actual event to have occurred with different 
causes and effects, it is very unlikely that the causes and effects of an event could have been 
drastically different. Needless to say, whatever the causes and effects of Brutus’ assassination 
attempt might have been, they would be radically unlike those possible events that could be 
the causes and effects of the statue-damaging action. This suggests that Jones’ position is too 
extreme: Brutus’ stabbing of Caesar couldn’t have been a failed assassination attempt aimed 
at an immortal being named “Caesar”.  
Where does Jones’ position go wrong? My preferred analysis is that her position fails 
to appreciate the extent to which the properties of an event are constrained by the event’s 
primary kind. It is impossible for an assassination attempt to have been a statue-damaging 
action because assassination attempts and statue-damaging actions fall under fairly different 
primary kinds. In light of our observations, I suggest that we use the following criteria to 
determine how different an event could have been:  
 
  
112 
(Contingent Properties of Events)  
Let e be an event whose spatiotemporal location is L.  
(1) For any event f, we say that e could have been f if and only if:  
(a) e and f are located in different possible worlds;  
(b) the spatiotemporal location of f is also L (or the location corresponding to L in the 
world f belongs to);  
(c) e and f fall under the same primary kind;  
(d) for any property P, if e exemplifies P in virtue of falling under its primary kind, then 
f also exemplifies P.  
(2) For any property P*, we say that P* is a contingent property of e if and only if there is an 
event g such that e could have been g but g does not exemplify P*.  
Consider again my claim that some worlds contain no-confidence but not speech and vote. 
According to my proposal, this is perfectly intelligible insofar as in those worlds no-
confidence is constituted by events whose primary kinds are identical to those of speech 
and vote. Any event that is so constituted is an event that no-confidence could have been; 
therefore, in any world where an event constituted this way occupies the location that is 
occupied by no-confidence in the actual world, the event can be plausibly identified as no-
confidence in that world. If this is correct, we should reject the view that all properties 
instantiated by an event are instantiated necessarily.  
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3.7 Conclusion  
I have tried to show that the existing versions of hylomorphism about events suffer 
from several difficulties, including the failure to respond to the CP problem. I have also 
suggested that the CP problem can be solved if we think of constitution as the satisfaction of 
immediate and specific dependence needs. These complete the metaphysics part of my 
dissertation. Due to the orientation of this chapter, however, I had to set aside a number of 
issues deserving detailed analysis. I shall mention one of them here. There is a debate about 
whether the constitution relation and the parthood relation can be understood in terms of 
each other. As Evnine points out, answers to this question range from the view that the two 
are the same relation to the view that they are mutually independent (2011, 212–13). 
Discussions of this issue have largely focused on the constitution relation between physical 
objects and quantities of matter, but we can also raise the issue when theorizing about 
events. Here the issue becomes even more complicated. As Eric Olson notes, thorny 
problems arise when we try to relate temporal parts to the more ordinary kind of parts, i.e. 
the kind of parts whose possession is relativized to times (2006, 739). Arguably, though 
material constitution is more closely related to the ordinary kind of parthood, event 
constitution is more intimately bound up with temporal parthood. If so, while accounts of 
the relation between parthood and material constitution may shed light on the relation 
between parthood and event constitution, the latter issue requires additional analysis and is 
therefore worth pursuing.  
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CHAPTER 4   
PERCEPTION: A HUSSERLIAN REPRESENTATIONAL VIEW  
I take the most important issue in the philosophy of perception to be the problem of 
perceptual intentionality: what is the relation between the perceiver and the world? 
According to the representational view, the answer is representation: the perceiver is related 
to the world by entering a mental state capable of receiving information from the world.40 In 
this chapter, I defend a Husserlian version of the representational view, which I call the 
Husserlian dual-component view (HDC). To situate HDC in the theoretical landscape of 
perception research in philosophy, I shall begin with a few words about the representational 
view in general.  
Suppose Albrecht is a tall person. If I see Albrecht, my experience tells me that 
Albrecht is tall. How should we describe my experience? We could say that Albrecht is the 
object of my experience or that my experience represents Albrecht. The question then becomes: 
how does my experience do that? A possible answer is that my experience represents 
Albrecht by exemplifying a proposition, which can be expressed by the sentence “Albrecht is 
tall”. The proposition is said to be the content of my experience, and my experience represents 
Albrecht by means of its content.41 This is a very rough sketch of a possible version of the 
representational view, but it gives some idea of how the representational view approaches 
                                                        
 
40 The claim that perception is representational is intensely debated in contemporary philosophy of 
mind. I follow Campbell in calling the view that affirms the claim the representational view and its main 
rival the relational view (Campbell 2002, 116). There are various ways to draw the distinction between 
the two views, and I will examine the distinction in greater detail in section 4.4.  
41 I will say more about the content-object distinction in section 4.1.  
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the problem of perceptual intentionality. The problem is understood as one about perceptual 
contents: what is the relation between the contents of a perceptual experience and the 
objects of the experience? To answer this question, at least two issues have to be addressed. 
First, how are perceptual contents structured? Are perceptual experiences similar enough to 
sentences such that they also express propositions, or is their structure rather different from 
anything linguistic? Second, what do perceptual contents represent? Do they represent 
nothing but clusters of properties, or do they in some sense represent the bearers of 
properties as well? Proponents of the representational view differ in both the relative 
importance they assign to these two issues and the responses they come up with.  
The goal of this chapter is to defend a Husserlian account capable of responding to 
both issues. The account is Husserlian, because it is inspired by Husserl’s ideas. But the 
account is not Husserl’s own; in fact, this chapter contains very little exegesis of Husserl’s 
texts, even though it could certainly use more. Instead, I draw heavily on the work done by 
three contemporary phenomenologists: A. D. Smith (2008), Walter Hopp (2010, 2011) and 
Michael Madary (2016), who depart from Husserl from time to time to address 
contemporary concerns. In addition, my view about how objects are related to perception is 
much indebted to John Campbell (2014), one the most prominent opponents of the 
representational view. While I take the resulting view to remain recognizably Husserlian, I 
would be willing to accept the charge that there are inconsistencies between my view and 
Husserl’s own. Roughly, HDC says that the representation of objects is the joint 
achievement of two kinds of contents: those representing what is strictly in view and those 
representing what is expected to come into view. Take a magic show in which the performer 
produces a flying pigeon from a piece of paper. Carl watched such a show and found the 
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experience bewildering. Why? The reason is that what was strictly seen by Carl, i.e. a pigeon 
figure drawn on paper, did not exhaust Carl’s experience. His experience was also 
constituted by the expectation that the figure would remain two-dimensional. A perceptual 
conflict thus arose when the figure suddenly became a real pigeon, and Carl felt baffled even 
before he could tell what made the experience baffling. According to HDC, the fact that the 
contents of perception have such dual components explains how a figure on paper, or a 
flying pigeon, can be perceptually represented.  
HDC is faced with strong contenders. Two other versions of the representational 
view are much more widely discussed than HDC: the views on which perceptual contents 
are, respectively, linguistically and pictorially structured. We might think that perception 
derives its representational capacity from the subject-predicate structure of its content, which 
mirrors the object-property structure of the things we encounter in perception. Alternatively, 
we might think that perception is representational because it is in some sense an internal 
image of the world. These versions of the representational view are intuitively appealing – 
arguably more so than HDC. But as I see it, the propositional and pictorial accounts of 
perception fail to appropriately describe the contents of perception. It is hard to both 
substantiate the claim that perpetual contents are sufficiently similar to propositions (or 
pictures) and explain away the dissimilarities between perceptual contents and propositions 
(or pictures). As a result, these relatively mainstream representational views bring with them 
presuppositions that make them untenable accounts of perception – or so I shall argue. 
However, the strongest challenge to HDC does not come from the other versions of the 
representational view. It comes from the main rival of the representational view: the 
relational view. According to the relational view, the very attempt to understand perception 
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in terms of representation is wrongheaded: any representational content an experience might 
have is derivative of a perceptual relation that is non-representational. The proponents of the 
relational view have mounted several objections against the representational view. I will 
argue that HDC is immune to them, and this makes HDC a promising version of the 
representational view.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 examines the idea of representation 
in more detail and distinguishes between its different aspects. Once the distinctions are in 
place, I argue against the proposition- and picture-based representational views in section 
4.2. HDC is then presented in section 4.3, which makes up the bulk of the chapter. Section 
4.4 briefly considers the relational view: I examine two objections raised by Campbell against 
the representational view and consider how HDC might respond to them. After that, section 
4.5 concludes the chapter.  
4.1 Vehicles, Contents and Objects  
As a preliminary to examining the representational view, let’s consider three 
important aspects of representation: the vehicle, content, and object of an experience.42,43 I 
follow Fred Dretske (1981) and characterize representation in terms of information, though 
my understanding of information differs substantially from Dretske’s own. I take a mental 
                                                        
 
42 Given my focus, I will use the terms “experience”, “perception” and “perceptual experience” to 
refer to conscious visual experiences had by human beings, unless otherwise noted. There is no denying that 
experiences of other sensory modalities and cases of animal consciousness are also philosophically 
significant. However, those issues are complicated and cannot be appropriately addressed here.  
43 I borrow the tripartite distinction from Hopp (2011, chap. 1). For additional discussions of the 
content-object distinction, see Husserl ([1913a] 1970, 1:199–200), Crane (2006) and Burge (2010, 
413).  
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event to be representational or contentful if it carries information about something other than itself. 
Such events are also said to have representational contents, or simply contents. For mental events 
to count as perceptual experiences, they typically have to carry information about entities 
that are not components of the perceiver. But what is it for a perceptual experience to carry 
information? Consider what Susanna Siegel says about conveyed contents. According to her, “a 
content is conveyed by experience if it would be a content of explicit beliefs that are natural 
to form on the basis of visual experience”, or “if it enables the experience to guide bodily 
actions”, or “if it is manifest to introspection that it is a content of experience” (2010, 51). 
On my view, a perceptual experience carries information if, roughly speaking, it bears 
conveyed contents in Siegel’s sense. That is, a perceptual experience carries information if it 
provides inputs to the perceiver’s other mental processes, such as beliefs, actions and cases 
of introspection. There are nevertheless two reasons that I shall not simply adopt Siegel’s 
criteria of conveyed contents. First, as Siegel herself notes, some think that perceptual 
experiences never have the same contents as beliefs (2010, 51 fn. 21). These people hold that 
Siegel’s first criterion is never satisfied by any experience, and I happen to be one of these 
people. Second, more generally, it is hard to figure out how the three criteria are related to 
each other. There may be something special about beliefs, actions and introspection, but 
Siegel doesn’t tell us what it is that makes them special. Why exactly must an experience be 
related to these states for it to bear conveyed contents? Without an answer to this question, 
the very idea of conveyed contents remains opaque.  
As an alternative, I propose the following criterion of information carrying: an 
experience carries information about an object if, possibly, the experience enables one to 
better carry out a bodily or mental task that involves the object. That is, the reason an 
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experience is said to carry information about the perceiver’s environment is that it enables 
the perceiver to interact with her environment in ways that are otherwise impossible. For 
example, suppose Edmund was shown an image for one second and then asked to 
determine the number of rectangles in the image. Edmund succeeded, but he obviously 
would have failed had him not seen the image. His visual experience thus enabled him to 
better carry out the task of counting rectangles. We can then say that Edmund’s experience 
carried information about, or represented, the triangles in the image. As another example, 
suppose Franz is a professional athlete that specializes in hurdling. He jumps over a hurdle 
whenever he sees one, but he simply cannot do that if he doesn’t undergo the right kind of 
visual experiences before jumping. His visual experiences thus enable him to better carry out 
the task of jumping over hurdles. On the present view, his experiences carry information 
about hurdles. Note that an experience can carry information about an object even if one 
doesn’t actually perform any task that involves the object. Insofar as it is possible to better 
perform a task with the help of an experience, the experience represents the objects 
involved. Take the experience I undergo when I look at the keyboard of my laptop. I am not 
typing, but if I were to type, I would know where to put my hands because of the 
experience. My experience thus carries information about the keyboard. Also note that I take 
this criterion to capture a sufficient condition for information carrying, but it doesn’t specify 
any necessary conditions. The criterion is compatible with the possibility that experiences are 
capable of carrying information in a different way, such as in the way described by Dretske.  
Why bother with an alternative criterion of information carrying instead of just using 
Dretske’s own? The reason is that the alternative criterion makes the intimate relation 
between consciousness and representation more salient. One can barely perform any mental 
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or bodily task without some form of consciousness. In contrast, given Dretske’s naturalistic 
project, consciousness is conspicuously absent in his definition of information carrying. 
Dretske defines informational content in terms of conditional probability: “A signal r carries the 
information that s is F = The conditional probability of s’s being F, given r (and k), is 1 (but, 
given k alone, less than 1)” (1981, 65). Here s is the source of information and k the 
background knowledge one has about the source (1981, 80–81). Suppose Franz’s fridge 
always starts beeping 30 seconds after its door is opened. Franz knows this, and he hears the 
beep now. In this case, the conditional probability of the fridge door’s being open is 1, given 
Franz’s background knowledge about the fridge and the occurrence of his auditory 
experience. By Dretske’s definition, Franz’s auditory experience carries the information that 
the fridge door is open.  
Dretske’s definition is precise, but it is unclear to me that it is suitable for the 
purpose of describing conscious experiences. Suppose I am looking at my laptop. One could 
build a complicated signal detector that enters a particular state only if its position relative to 
my laptop is the same as my present position relative to my laptop. Given the machine’s 
state, the conditional probability of my laptop’s presence is 1, so the machine’s state carries 
information about my laptop. When applied to the machine, this account of information 
makes perfect sense. But I doubt that my present experience carries information about my 
laptop in precisely the same way the machine’s state does – arguably the machine doesn’t 
exemplify any form of consciousness. It is thus unclear how consciousness fits into 
Dretske’s view about contents.  
To be sure, Dretske does have something to say about consciousness. He adopts the 
widely held distinction between creature and state consciousness and defines the latter in 
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terms of the former. Creature consciousness is attributed to “beings who can lose and regain 
consciousness and be conscious of things and that things are so” (1995, 98), so it serves as a 
mark that distinguishes entities with certain mental capacities from those without them. In 
contrast, state consciousness is attributed to a type of states conscious creatures are in, and 
such states are “the ones that make you conscious of things” (1995, 116). That is, a state is 
conscious if and only if it underlies some form of creature consciousness. To accommodate 
Siegel’s conveyed contents in Dretske’s framework, we could take a conscious experience to 
consist of two components: the first component carries information about the experience’s 
objects and the second component affords access to the information carried by the first 
component. Call the first the representational component and the second the experiential 
component. Now, since the experiential component merely functions to make information 
consciously available, it has no representational capacity. It follows that whatever contents 
an experience has, they are entirely derived from the representational component of the 
experience. If so, there is no need to invoke consciousness when we define contents. My 
concern about Dretske’s view is misguided.  
Such a response on behalf of Dretske’s view assumes that we can successfully 
differentiate between the representational and experiential components of an experience. We 
can only do this if consciousness merely makes hitherto unavailable information available, 
without changing the information at all; that is, we can only do this if consciousness 
contributes nothing to representation. It is unclear that this assumption is warranted. Even 
Dretske himself seems to hold that conscious states carry different information than 
unconscious ones: “The function of sense experience, the reason animals are conscious of 
objects and their properties is to enable them to do all those things that those who do not 
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have it cannot do” (1995, 121). For conscious states to have this function, it seems that their 
capacity to bring about creature consciousness must contribute to their information-carrying 
capacity. Otherwise, the animals that are conscious of objects and their properties would not 
be able to do anything that cannot be done by the animals that are not conscious of objects 
and properties. It is therefore premature to assume that perception has a representational 
component and an experiential component that are independent of each other. In any case, 
whether perceptual consciousness can be explained in terms of the information-carrying 
capacity of perception is a heatedly debated issue,44 and I prefer a view about contents that 
remains neutral about the issue. I will therefore stick to the alternative criterion of 
information carrying given earlier.  
Representational contents must be distinguished from represented objects. On my 
construal, whatever possibly exists is an entity, and an entity about which an experience 
carries information is an object of the experience. When I see a pumpkin, the feature of my 
experience that carries information about the pumpkin is the content of the experience, 
whereas the pumpkin itself is the object of the experience. So construed, being an object is a 
relational property an entity has in virtue of being represented, so there are no entities that 
are intrinsically objects. It follows that objects must be distinguished from individuals or 
substances like persons and mosques. The class of objects includes more than individuals: such 
entities as properties, events and quantities of matter can also be objects, so long as there are 
experiences that bear the representational relation to them.  
                                                        
 
44 For a discussion of some physical relations that often figure in reductionistic explanations of 
mental contents, see Pautz (2009, sec. 4).  
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I will not spend much time defending the content-object distinction, because I think 
Hopp (2011) has already made a very strong case that the distinction ought to be 
acknowledged.45 However, I would like to stress the relevance of the distinction to the issue 
of whether perceptual contents should be thought of as propositional, pictorial or neither. In 
his recent defense of a pictorial view, Mohan Matthen denies that the distinction between 
depictions and propositions is one between two kinds of contents: “The correct contrast is 
between sentential vehicles of meaning and imagistic vehicles. Both sentences and images express 
propositions, but they do so in different ways” (2014, 268). I disagree, and I believe the main 
problem of Matthen’s claim is that it lumps together the content and object of a 
representation. Though a detailed description of, say, Rembrandt’s The Night Watch might 
convey roughly the same information as the painting itself, this is not because they have the 
same content. The content of the description is determined partly by the meanings of the 
lexical items in the description and partly by the rules of deriving truth conditions from 
those meanings. However, whatever rules we are going to use to derive truth conditions 
from the meanings carried by the basic elements of the painting, they will differ from the 
rules applicable to any description of the painting. If so, the reason that the painting and the 
detailed description of it convey similar information is that they represent the same objects, 
not that they have the same propositional content. The painting and the description both 
represent the militia guards themselves, for example.  
But isn’t the content-object distinction just the vehicle-content distinction? Isn’t the 
difference merely terminological? The answer is “no”, and it is now time to make explicit the 
                                                        
 
45 See footnote 43.  
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reason that we need a tripartite distinction between vehicles, contents and objects. The 
reason is nicely illustrated by how semantics is typically done in the Montagovian tradition.46 
Take the sentence “the London Eye rotates slowly”. At the highest level of syntactic 
decomposition, the sentence has two components: “the London Eye”, a noun phrase, and 
“rotates slowly”, a verb phrase. Given the sentence’s syntax, the sentence’s meaning also has 
two components at the highest level of semantic decomposition: the meaning of “the 
London Eye” and that of “rotates slowly”. The sentence needs to be so decomposed 
semantically because of the way it is decomposed syntactically. Now, the meaning-components 
also have to be understood in a twofold way, in terms of Fregean Sinn and Bedeutung. The 
extension of “the London Eye” is an individual, the London Eye, while the extension of 
“rotates slowly” is a function from individuals to truth values. The function yields truth if 
and only if the individual it takes rotates slowly. The extensions are not intensions. The 
intension of “the London Eye” is a constant function that takes any world-time pair and 
yields the London Eye itself. In contrast, the intension of “rotates slowly” is a function that 
specifies, for any world-time pair, a set of individuals that rotate slowly. On this picture, 
there is a clear distinction between vehicles, contents and objects: it is just the distinction 
between written symbols (or uttered sounds), intensions and extensions.  
If we understand semantics this way, Matthen’s claim is problematic. To say that a 
picture expresses a proposition is to say that the picture can be decomposed into two 
syntactic parts. The first part carries a meaning that denotes an individual, whereas the 
second part carries a meaning that denotes a function from individuals to truth values. I 
                                                        
 
46 See, for example, Dowty et al. (1981).  
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don’t see how this way of decomposing a picture makes sense. Which syntactic part of The 
Night Watch denotes nothing but an individual? Since the syntax of pictures is radically 
different from that of sentences, pictures and sentences cannot have the same semantics. 
Rather, they differ with respect to both vehicles and contents: whereas imagistic vehicles 
carry depictive contents, sentential vehicles carry propositional contents. So construed, the 
vehicle-content distinction is obviously different from the content-object distinction, and 
both must be acknowledged. One doesn’t have to understand semantics in the Montagovian 
way, of course. Nevertheless, even if one adopts alternative accounts of syntactic 
expressions, intensions and extensions, the distinction itself is still very compelling. I will 
therefore assume the tripartite distinction throughout this chapter.  
Now that we have examined how contents are related to vehicles and objects, we can 
move on to some representative versions of the representational view. In particular, I will 
examine two views, which take representational contents to be propositional and pictorial, 
respectively. An analysis of the problematic features of these two views will set the stage for 
our discussion of a Husserlian view.  
4.2 Two Common Views  
4.2.1 Propositionalism  
Many influential theorists take the contents of perceptual experiences to be 
propositional. John McDowell offers the following analysis of a veridical experience: “That 
things are thus and so is the content of the experience, and it can also be the content of a 
judgment: it becomes the content of a judgment if the subject decides to take the experience 
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at face value. So it is conceptual content” (1996, 26). Alex Byrne also invokes propositions in 
defending intentionalism: “the propositional content of perceptual experiences in a particular 
modality (for example, vision) determines their phenomenal character” (2001, 204). His 
conception of a proposition is that of “an abstract object that is a truth-bearer, that is the 
object of some propositional attitude-like psychological states, and that determines a 
possible-worlds truth condition” (2001, 201 fn. 5). Susanna Siegel takes a similar approach: 
“there are a number of abstract objects that contents could be, corresponding to different 
kinds of propositions, and we can ask which such abstract objects are best for characterizing 
the contents of experience” (2010, 77). Following Madary, I will call such a view perceptual 
propositionalism (Madary 2016, 65).  
It is not easy to spell out what exactly perceptual propositionalism entails. Arguably, 
what a philosopher means by the term “proposition” has to be determined within the 
context of her theory, so there might not be a common core of the various views about 
propositions. Despite this, I think Byrne’s view is relatively uncontroversial.47 I shall 
therefore take propositionalism to be the view that perceptual contents are at least capable of 
assuming the roles Byrne attributes to propositions. Though this version of propositionalism 
is still quite abstract, it is by no means free of theoretical baggage. Consider Gareth Evans’ 
famous Generality Constraint:  
                                                        
 
47 Though Byrne’s view may be relatively uncontroversial, it is certainly not universally accepted. The 
term “object” in Byrne’s characterization of propositions is ambiguous. Consider my belief that 
Mount Fuji is in Japan. Which entity is the object of my belief, Mount Fuji or the proposition that 
Mount Fuji is in Japan? As I made clear in section 2.3, I would only accept the first answer. But this 
is not the place to press the issue.  
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…we cannot avoid thinking of a thought about an individual object x, to the effect that it 
is F, as the exercise of two separable capacities; one being the capacity to think of x, 
which could be equally exercised in thoughts about x to the effect that it is G or H; and 
the other being a conception of what it is to be F, which could be equally exercised in 
thoughts about other individuals, to the effect that they are F. (Evans 1982, 75)  
Take, for example, the belief that Germany is a member of the European Union and the 
belief that Germany is the country in which BMW is based. There is an important similarity 
between the beliefs: in both, one has to think about Germany. Since propositions are 
supposed to be what are believed when one acquires beliefs, the similarity must be 
specifiable in terms of propositions. There is also an important similarity between the belief 
that Germany is a member of the European Union and the belief that Austria is a member 
of the European Union: they both require a conception of what it takes to be a member of 
the European Union. Again, the similarity must be specifiable in terms of propositions. It is 
hard to see how the similarities just mentioned can be accommodated without assuming that 
propositions feature some kind of compositionality. From the Generality Constraint, 
therefore, it is a short step to the compositionality of propositions. In fact, we probably have 
to say that the compositional principles of propositions are those specified by first-order 
logic; otherwise, we would soon run into pairs of possible beliefs whose similarities are 
inexplicable.  
Such theoretical baggage makes perceptual propositionalism problematic. I take the 
main issue with propositionalism to be that it decomposes perceptual contents in the wrong 
way. A proposition consists of at least a constant and a predicate. Propositionalism thus 
entails that there are perceptual constants and perceptual predicates. In addition, it should be 
possible for any constant to combine with any predicate – this possibility goes to the very 
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heart of the standard semantics of propositions. It follows that the perceptual 
propositionalist has to take any combination of a perceptual constant and a perceptual 
predicate to be well-formed. That has unfortunate consequences, as Hopp has pointed out in 
arguing against conceptualism about perceptual contents. The propositionalist has to accept 
any well-formed “perceptual proposition” as a possible perceptual content, whether or not 
there is any experience capable of exemplifying the content. To use an example of Hopp’s, 
the sentence “The Hammerklavier Sonata is tall” is well-formed, but it is not a content that 
can be exemplified by any experience (2011, 128). This is the case even though the 
Hammerklavier Sonata and the property of being tall are both perceptible. And additional 
examples abound. For instance, insofar as I focus on the Hermann grid, I cannot fail to see 
the grid as containing grey blobs. The impossibility has nothing to do with the physical 
features of the Hermann grid; the grid contains no grey blobs. Rather, the impossibility 
results from the very way human perception works. Given the nature of human perception, 
a perceptual representation of the Hermann grid simply cannot be combined with a 
perceptual representation of the property containing uniformly white lines. According to 
propositionalism, however, that shouldn’t be impossible: “the Hermann grid contains 
uniformly white lines” is certainly well-formed.  
The unrestricted combination of perceptual constants and predicates is not the only 
problem facing propositionalism. In the standard semantics, a complex proposition is always 
equivalent to a conjunction of multiple atomic propositions. We have the former if and only 
if we have the latter. Take two experiences whose contents are expressed by the following 
sentences, respectively: “the London Eye is white” and “the London Eye is rotating”. 
Suppose the experiences occur successively without any gap. Propositionalism entails that 
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they have a fusion whose content is expressed by “the London Eye is white and rotating”. 
There is nothing surprising about this complex experience; it’s just the temporally extended 
whole formed by the successive experiences. So far, so good. But now consider the Necker 
cube diagram. Suppose I just began to see the cube as oriented in one of the two ways less 
than 500 milliseconds ago; it will be difficult for me to immediately “switch back” and see 
the cube as oriented in the other way. The difficulty has nothing to do with the physical 
features of the Necker cube diagram – the diagram itself is not even three-dimensional. The 
difficulty has its origin in human perception: what perceptual representations can be 
combined at a given moment partly depends on what representations were combined at the 
preceding moment. But propositionalism is unable to accommodate this. On 
propositionalism, undergoing an experience whose content can be expressed as “the Necker 
cube is oriented in direction D1 at t1” shouldn’t make it any less likely for one to undergo an 
experience whose content can be expressed as “the Necker cube is oriented in direction D2 at 
t2”. After all, if we combine the contents of the two experiences into a complex proposition, 
the resulting proposition doesn’t contain any kind of contradiction. As reflection on 
everyday life shows, however, what one experiences at a given moment puts substantial 
constraints on what one can experience at the next moment. Propositionalism easily gives 
rise to a discrete conception of experience, which gets perception wrong.  
Furthermore, there are many logical or inferential relations that may hold between 
propositions but not between perceptual contents. Note that I do not mean to suggest 
something as strong as Tim Crane’s view. He outright denies the existence of any logical 
relations between experiences: “Pictures do not imply one another; they cannot be negated 
or disjoined. In this way they are like experiences” (2011, 89; my italics). In my opinion, this is too 
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strong. Suppose my experience exemplifies content c, which represents a pumpkin in front 
of me. In virtue of c, my experience exemplifies content d, which represents the spatial region 
in front of me as occupied by an object. Can’t we say that c implies d? On the one hand, the 
relation between c and d is not contingent. It is necessary that d is instantiated if c is 
instantiated. On the other hand, c and d are both abstract entities. The fact that they always 
go hand-in-hand cannot be explained in terms of such relations as causation. It then emerges 
that the relation between c and d is very much like the entailment relation between 
propositions. To be sure, c and d are not propositions. But that shouldn’t prevent us from 
acknowledging how much the relation between c and d resembles entailment. As the 
impressive work of Jan Westerhoff (2005) shows, we can even define a logic that applies to 
depictive contents.  
That said, many logical relations still fail to hold between perceptual contents. This is 
not because perceptual contents never entail each other; they sometimes do. Rather, it is 
because any relation that may be called “perceptual entailment” is different from the relation 
of logical entailment. The rule of universal generalization guarantees that certain 
propositions about individuals entail universally quantified propositions, but the same 
pattern cannot be found in perception. Similarly, a contradictory proposition entails every 
other proposition, but no perceptual content entails every other perceptual content. The list 
goes on. By taking perceptual contents to be propositions, therefore, one is forced to 
attribute a set of laws to perceptual contents that are incompatible with perceptual contents. 
It is worth emphasizing that these consequences are not those of a very robust conception 
of propositions. Rather, from the idea that propositions are what we believe, it is a short step 
to the conclusion that perceptual propositionalism has the above consequences. We arrive 
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where we are simply by considering the range of possible beliefs and the compositionality of 
propositions needed to accommodate the variety of beliefs. The best response, I submit, is 
to abandon perceptual propositionalism. The cost of holding onto such a view is simply too 
high.  
4.2.2 Pictorialism  
For those dissatisfied with propositionalism, a natural alternative is the view that 
perceptual contents are in some sense pictorial, imagistic or depictive. Such a view is 
appealing especially in light of the similarities between vision and visual imagery. The 
psychologist Stephen Kosslyn has been working on mental imagery for decades. He says, in 
a recent co-authored book, “A fundamental assumption of the present approach is that 
visual imagery evokes many of the same processing mechanisms used in visual perception” 
(Kosslyn, Thompson, and Ganis 2006, 135). Such a view is not without proponents in 
philosophy. Commenting on Kosslyn’s earlier work, Michael Tye says, “Like Kosslyn, I 
believe that there is a medium shared by imagery and vision” (1991, 91). Similarly, Jerry 
Fodor argues that “it is (empirically) plausible that some perceptual representation is iconic” 
(2007, 107). These remarks suggest that images provide a fruitful way to understand vision.  
To say that vision shares a medium or processing mechanism with mental imagery is 
not yet to say that visual experiences have depictive contents, of course. It could be that the 
contents of visual experiences are still propositional; it’s just that the biological states that are 
the vehicles of such contents are depictive. But on the basis of the claim that the visual 
system makes use of depictive representations, it is tempting to make the case that visual 
experiences have depictive contents. After all, what representations the visual system 
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employs puts substantial constraints on what contents visual experiences have. There are 
indeed philosophers who explicitly endorse a more-or-less depictive account of perceptual 
contents, even though the reasons they give are diverse. According to Crane, “a view on 
which the content of perceptual experience is more like the content of a picture gives a 
better account of the fact that experiences can be accurate or inaccurate than the 
propositional-attitude theory does” (2011, 93). According to Mohan Matthen, “Perceptual 
experience has image content”, and this is because “Perceptual experience presents the 
subject with a spatiotemporally ordered array of sensory qualities” (2014, 266). In what 
follows, I will call the view that perceptual contents are depictive perceptual pictorialism.  
Just as in the case of perceptual propositionalism, it is not entirely clear whether 
there is a common core shared by all versions of perceptual pictorialism. The closest I can 
find is a thesis espoused by Fodor, which appears in somewhat similar forms in several 
accounts. Fodor calls the thesis the Picture Principle: “If P is a picture of X, then parts of P are 
pictures of parts of X” (2007, 108). In other words, a distinctive feature of depictive 
representations is that the meanings of their parts survive arbitrary decomposition. Consider 
the sentence “the outermost arc of a rainbow is red”. If one divides the sentence into “the 
outermost arc of” and “a rainbow is red”, neither can be regarded as a partial representation 
of the state of affairs described by the original sentence. In contrast, depictive 
representations can be arbitrarily decomposed. If I cut a painting of a rainbow into pieces, a 
red piece still represents a part of the outermost arc of the rainbow. Kosslyn proposes a 
similar semantics for depictions: “each part of the depiction must correspond to a visible 
part of the object such that the distance among the points on the object are preserved by the 
corresponding ‘distances’… among their representations” (1984, 107). This is a variant of 
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the picture principle, though the preservation 
requirement does put some additional 
constraints on decomposition. Tye interprets the 
preservation requirement as saying that 
depictions must represent greater apparent 
distance by a greater number of representation-
parts. If object a appears to be located farther 
from b than from c in my experience, then my 
experience must have more parts representing 
the region connecting a and b than parts representing the region connecting a and c (Tye 
1991, 36). If this requirement is met, nevertheless, Kosslyn and Tye seem to allow all kinds 
of decomposition. Suppose I am looking at the London Eye. It is not rotating now, and the 
way it looks to me is captured by Figure 1. Kosslyn and Tye seem to accept that the 
representation of region R is a part of the content of my experience in the same sense as the 
representation of car A is a part of the content. If so, their version of the picture principle is 
still very liberal with regard to decomposition.  
I find this analysis very puzzling, because the representation of region R is not a 
meaningful unit of the content of my experience – at least not in the sense that the 
representation of car A is. If I undergo a series of experiences of the London Eye, it is quite 
likely that I will be able to introspectively identify a representation of A in all these 
experiences. Moreover, while these representations would not be qualitatively identical to 
each other, their introspectively accessible features will be salient enough that they can be 
readily distinguished from the representations of, say, car Z or hub O. I doubt that the same 
Figure 1. The London Eye  
Adapted from Milas Bowman, London Eye. 
[CC BY-SA 2.0, https:// 
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0], 
via Wikimedia Commons.  
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can be said of my representation of region R. It would seem that the moment I blink, I 
would no longer be able to perceptually identify region R or introspectively identify the 
experiential representation thereof. Therefore, to produce an adequate description of my 
experience, we need to account for the difference between the experiences of A and R. 
According to the Picture Principle, however, there simply cannot be any structural difference 
between them.  
In fact, I am not even sure that the Picture Principle is applicable to physical 
pictures. Elaborating on the principle, Fodor says, “an icon is a homogeneous kind of 
symbol from both the syntactic and the semantic point of view. Each of its parts ipso facto 
gets a semantic interpretation according to the same rule of interpretation that applies to 
each of the others (viz. according to the Picture Principle)” (2007, 108–9). Hence, while in 
dividing up a sentence one needs to make sure that a word does not get cut in half, there are 
no pictorial parts that must be grouped together for them to play their representational roles. 
Every pictorial part plays the same representational role: to picture the part of the object to 
which it corresponds. Fodor’s claim seems quite untenable to me; there is an abundance of 
counterexamples he simply fails to take into consideration. Suppose I cut up a drawing of 
the brain according to brain areas. Then I find the parts corresponding to the parietal and 
occipital lobes and cut them into two piles of tiny pieces. According to the Picture Principle, 
if I pick up one piece from each pile, the two pieces of drawing represent different parts of 
the brain. This is the case even if the pieces are barely distinguishable from each other. Such 
an analysis strikes me as problematic; it seems that the two pieces lose their representational 
functions once they stop being parts of a pictorial system. If so, however, the relation a 
pictorial part bears to another may very well affect what the pictorial part represents. As a 
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matter of fact, there are all kinds of ways a pictorial part may be related to another part. 
Given that only some of the relations can be preserved by a certain manner of 
decomposition, a manner of decomposition is acceptable only if it preserves the syntactically 
and semantically relevant relations in a picture. Fodor is therefore wrong to claim that 
pictures can be arbitrarily decomposed.  
Additional considerations against the Picture Principle can be found in Westerhoff’s 
account of pictures. He distinguishes between different kinds of parthood relations that can 
be found in pictures, and two of them are subpictures and (mere) parts (2005, 607–9). 
Consider Rembrandt’s The Night Watch again. A part of the painting’s content that represents 
a militia guard is a subpicture, while the part of the content that corresponds to a diagonal of 
the painting is just a mere part. One of the reasons for drawing the distinction is that 
“collections of pixels from a picture can fail to be either a part [viz. a mere part] or a 
subpicture” (2005, 609). For example, one could cut out a cross from the black background 
in The Night Watch. The cross would seem to be a picture, but it would not have been one in 
the original context. We would not be able to make sense of this phenomenon if there were 
no distinctions between kinds of parts. Westerhoff’s analysis again shows that the Picture 
Principle is false. If subpictures and mere parts are different from each other, decomposition 
cannot proceed in an arbitrary manner. One would never get subpictures if one decomposes 
a picture pixel by pixel.  
If the reason to take perceptual pictorialism seriously in the first place is that we 
might be able to better understand perception by considering some of the important 
characteristics of physical pictures, then the Picture Principle is not helpful in this regard. 
The feature it attributes to physical pictures fails to do justice to their nature. To be sure, 
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proponents of perceptual pictorialism don’t have to be committed to the Picture Principle. 
Something like Westerhoff’s logic of pictures provides a much more solid foundation of 
pictorialism. However, it remains to be seen whether depiction and perception have enough 
in common to warrant a pictorial account of perception. For now, I will set pictorialism 
aside.  
4.3 The Husserlian Dual-Component View  
4.3.1 Husserl on Perception  
The goal of section 4.3 is to defend a Husserlian alternative to both perceptual 
propositionalism and pictorialism – the Husserlian dual-component view (HDC). Obviously, 
the central ideas in HDC go back to Husserl. I will therefore offer a brief overview of the 
Husserlian theoretical background before I formulate HDC in 4.3.2. Husserl’s view on 
perception was gradually developed throughout his career, so there is no single work that 
contains everything Husserl has to say about perception. However, the main ideas I am 
concerned with in this chapter can be found in Husserl ([1913a] 1970, [1913b] 1970, [1966] 
2001). Perception assumes a central role in Husserl’s theory of knowledge. Knowledge 
consists minimally of verified thoughts, so Husserl asks how thoughts can be verified. The 
mental states that verify thoughts are called intuitions. As Husserl puts it, thoughts are 
“‘illustrated’, or perhaps ‘confirmed’ or ‘fulfilled’… or rendered ‘evident’” by intuitions 
([1913a] 1970, 1:174). Perceptual experiences are intuitions of the most fundamental kind, 
because they play the role of confirming thoughts most successfully. Husserl describes 
perceptual experiences as self-giving, which means “that every perception within itself is not 
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only… a consciousness of its object, but that it gives its object to consciousness in a 
distinctive manner. Perception is that mode of consciousness that sees and has its object 
itself in the flesh” ([1966] 2001, 140). When perception works properly, it brings into view 
the objects we think about. Undergoing perceptual experiences of the appropriate kind thus 
puts one in a highly favorable position to determine whether one’s thoughts are true. If my 
friend and I disagree about whether Mount Fuji is in Japan, the way to settle the issue at the 
most fundamental level is to go to Japan and see for ourselves whether Mount Fuji is there. 
Notably, as the passage just quoted shows, Husserl thinks that perception is able to do so 
partly because of its distinctive first-person features. What it is like to undergo a perceptual 
experience is radically different from what it is like to entertain a thought, and this is 
supposed to explain, at least in part, why the epistemic functions of thoughts and perceptual 
experiences are so different.48  
We have seen that Husserl stresses the fact that perception brings objects into view. 
The idea should nevertheless not be interpreted as saying that the object of one’s experience 
is exhausted by what is clearly in one’s view. A distinctive feature of Husserl’s account of 
perception is that he takes expectations to be the very components of conscious experiences 
themselves. Husserl frequently uses the term “horizon” to describe expectations. A horizon 
represents what appears, as it were, on the horizon; it represents something that could be, 
                                                        
 
48 It should be noted that despite the importance assigned to perception, the class of intuitions 
includes more than perceptual experiences: “The essential homogeneity of the function of 
fulfilment… obliges us to give… to each fulfilling act whatever the name of an ‘intuition’…” 
(Husserl [1913b] 1970, 2:280). For example, memory is not perception, but it is often possible to 
justify one’s beliefs on the basis of memory. If I remember that I just bought some bananas five 
minutes ago, it is perfectly reasonable to believe that there are bananas in my backpack. Cases like 
this suggest that certain forms of memory should also count as intuitions.  
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but has not yet been, clearly seen. According to Husserl, a horizon “prescribes a rule for the 
transition to new actualizing appearances” ([1966] 2001, 42). To illustrate the idea, suppose I 
am looking at my car. While its windshield is visible from where I stand, its right wing mirror 
is obstructed from view by a parking meter. Despite this, my experience doesn’t represent 
my car as missing its wing mirror. If someone asks me what I see, my answer would be “a 
car whose right wing mirror is obstructed from view”, not “a car missing its right wing 
mirror”. The Husserlian explanation of this is that I expect to see the wing mirror when I 
move. Since the wing mirror is represented in my expectation and my expectation is a 
component of my experience, the car is not represented as missing the wing mirror.  
Horizons play a unifying role in perception. In the car example, my expectation 
indicates to me that the currently experienced appearance of a parking meter will be 
gradually replaced by the appearance of a wing mirror. Such an expectation explains why my 
experiences can cohere or conflict with each other. As Jeffrey Yoshimi summarizes Husserl’s 
view, “When things go as expected, our current experiences ‘fulfill’ (erfüllen) our previous 
expectations… Husserl also speaks of this in terms of ‘harmonious’ (einstimmig) perceptual 
processes. When things do not go as expected, our experiences ‘frustrate’ (enttäuschen) our 
previous ‘expectations’ (Erwartungen) or ‘intentions’ (Intentionen)…” (2009, 124). It has to be 
noted that Husserl’s notion of a horizon is quite broad. As Smith points out, the horizon of 
an experience has many components, and one of them is one’s present awareness of the past 
experiences that led to the present experience (2008, 324). Given that horizons are supposed 
to be features of conscious perception, Husserl’s view entails that perceptual contents are 
much richer than most contemporary philosophers would take them to be.  
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Husserl’s ideas can be developed in several directions, depending on how one 
chooses to answer certain key questions. Philosophers working in the phenomenological 
tradition have developed several versions of the representational view on the basis of 
Husserl’s ideas, and I will pay particular attention to their responses to two questions. First, 
granted that the content of an experience has an expectational component, how is the 
expectational component related to the other components? Second, on what conditions do 
two experiences have the same content? In particular, can two experiences that represent 
different objects have the same content? As mentioned earlier, I will focus on the work done 
by Smith, Hopp and Madary. However, my preferred responses to the issues aren’t quite the 
same as theirs. On the one hand, Madary appears to think that the content of an experience 
is completely derived from its expectational component. I disagree with his view and follow 
Hopp in holding that the content of an experience is not exhausted by its expectational 
component. On the other hand, Smith and Hopp argue that experiences of different objects 
cannot have the same content. I am inclined to think that this is not the case. These 
concerns will be spelled out in due course.  
4.3.2 HDC: A First Formulation  
Before I describe my departure from the views I draw on, I will first formulate a 
version of HDC by selecting and modifying elements of those views. In the sections that 
follow, I will justify my theoretical choices by raising some objections to the views. Our 
point of departure here is a distinction drawn by both Hopp and Madary, which divides 
perceptual contents into two kinds. Hopp holds that perceptual contents include both 
intuitive and horizonal ones (2011, 130). Similarly, Madary speaks of factual and AF contents, 
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where the name of the latter comes from the Husserlian ideas of anticipation and fulfillment 
(2016, 59–60). I will adopt Madary’s term of “factual content” for contents of the first kind. 
Since I prefer a term that wears its meaning on its sleeve, I will use the term “expectational 
content” for contents of the second kind. The two kinds of contents are posited to capture 
the Husserlian ideas mentioned in the previous section. When one sees an object, the factual 
contents of one’s experience represent the visible properties of the object, while the 
expectational contents represent the hidden properties. In the car example mentioned earlier, 
my representation of the windshield is the factual content of my experience, while my 
representation of the right wing mirror is the expectational content of my experience.  
As I conceive of it, HDC is just the view that the content of a perceptual experience 
has these two components:  
(The Husserlian Dual-Component View: A First Pass)  
The content of a perceptual experience consists of factual and expectational contents.49  
However, though the two kinds of contents have been characterized intuitively, they need to 
be more precisely defined. Let’s begin with factual contents. According to Madary, to say 
that a perceptual experience has factual contents is to say that it “represents factual 
properties” (2016, 44). Factual properties are distinguished from perspectival properties; while the 
former “are properties that can, in principle, be perceived from many perspectives”, the 
latter “are properties that can only be perceived from a particular perspective” (2016, 28). 
                                                        
 
49 My official formulation of HDC will be given in section 4.3.5. 
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Consider a corner of a rectangular figure I am looking at. While its property of being acute-
angled is perspectival, its property of being right-angled is factual.  
It is not enough to say that factual contents are representations of factual properties; 
we want to know more about the representations themselves. How are they individuated? 
The same object can obviously look different to one from different perspectives. Therefore, 
one’s spatial location must be taken into consideration when determining the factual 
contents of one’s experience. But this is not enough. We should also consult Madary’s 
insight that visual attention is significant in our attempt to understand visual experiences. 
Madary notes that one’s representations of the objects at the periphery of one’s visual field 
are very indeterminate. To illustrate this point, he cites a study by Freeman and Simoncelli 
(2011). The researchers created a pair of images and instructed the subjects to fixate on the 
center of each image. The periphery of one of the images was distorted, and the researchers 
aimed to measure how much distortion would make the two images appear different. 
Madary stresses the fact that “the periphery can be distorted quite a bit without losing the 
indistinguishability between the images” (2016, 37). The study clearly shows that one’s 
spatial location is far from sufficient to determine how an object looks to one; the same 
object can appear radically different before and after a saccade. It follows that the contents 
of experiences must be individuated in a very fine-grained way; there is no reason to assume 
that the content of one’s experience would remain identical after a saccade.  
My definition of factual contents respects Madary’s observations. It consists of two 
clauses:  
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(Factual Contents)  
Let e be an experience that whose subject is s and whose object is o. Then e has a factual 
content if and only if e has some content c such that:  
(1) c represents a factual property of o that is visible to s;  
(2) for any experience e* whose subject is s* and whose object is o*, e* has content c if and 
only if EITHER:  
(a) given the spatial location and visual fixation of s*, o* appears to s* in exactly the 
same way o appears to s; OR  
(b) e* is a nonveridical experience subjectively indistinguishable from e.50  
Condition (1) is straightforward. Take a slice of a watermelon. Both its property of having 
green skin and its property of having red flesh are factual properties. However, if I can only 
see the skin from where I stand, then only the property of having green skin can be 
represented by the factual contents of my experience. As another example, suppose I 
saccade to Carl’s nose after staring at his neck for a while. If his neck becomes barely visible 
                                                        
 
50 If two contents are subjectively indistinguishable, then they are introspectively indistinguishable. 
However, I take the notion of subjective indistinguishability to be broader than that of introspective 
indistinguishability – after all, introspection may not be the only method to determine the contents of 
an experience. There may be methods a subject can use to differentiate between two introspectively 
indistinguishable contents. For some candidates of such methods, see Hopp (2016, sec. 2).  
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after the saccade, his nose is now represented by the factual contents of my experience, but 
his neck is no longer so represented.51  
Condition (2) specifies the circumstances under which numerically distinct 
experiences can be said to have the same factual content. Condition (2)(a) deals with cases of 
veridical perception. It incorporates Madary’s insight and says that changes in spatial location 
and visual fixation give rise to changes in factual contents. By contrast, condition (2)(b) 
handles cases of hallucination. The object of a hallucination cannot be said to bear any 
spatial relation to the hallucinating subject. Hence, if condition (2)(a) were necessary for all 
factual contents, hallucinations would not have factual contents. That is not my preferred 
approach. I take it that factual contents, just like Hopp’s intuitive contents, are partly 
individuated by their first-person features. According to Hopp, if one examines different 
portions of a brown table, “The intuitive contents involved in grasping that portion which is 
basking in the sunlight over there are identical with those that would, in another context, 
present a tan object” (Hopp 2008, 220). What it is like to see a brown object in one context 
can be exactly the same as what it is like to see a tan object in another context. Given that 
our notion of a factual content is supposed to capture how experiences represent objects 
from the first-person perspective, we should acknowledge the possibility that an experience 
                                                        
 
51 Strictly speaking, Carl’s nose is not a factual property; the property of being Carl’s nose is. There is a 
metaphysical worry here: shouldn’t the parts and properties of an individual be distinguished from 
each other? While Franz’s brain is a part of Franz, Franz’s rationality is not a part but a property of 
him. Indeed, the distinction has to be made, but it shouldn’t be too difficult to translate talk of parts 
into talk of properties. After all, Franz has a heart as one of his parts if and only if he instantiates the 
property of having a heart. There is a related question worth asking about the case of seeing Carl’s 
nose: what exactly is visible to me in this case? Is it a universal, a trope, a quantity of matter, an 
individual, an event, a fact, a state of affairs, or something else? Unfortunately, this issue has to be 
pursued somewhere else.  
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of a brown object sometimes shares the same factual content as an experience of a tan 
object. By the same token, whenever we attribute factual contents to a veridical experience, 
we should also attribute factual contents to a subjectively indistinguishable hallucination. 
What condition (2)(b) does not require, however, is that subjectively indistinguishable 
experiences have the same object.52  
Before proceeding, two comments are in order. First, recall my terminological 
distinction between an entity and an object. An entity is whatever exists in some possible 
world, while an object is defined relationally: it is an entity that an information-carrier carries 
information about. Given that there many kinds of entities, there are also many kinds of 
objects; an object need not be an individual. When I speak of experiences of objects in 
(Factual Contents), therefore, those objects can be properties and events, etc. Second, 
condition (2)(b) may remind one of how hallucinations are described by disjunctivists. For 
example, here’s a remark by M. G. F. Martin: “some event is an experience of a street scene 
just in case it couldn’t be told apart through introspection from a veridical perception of the 
street as the street” (2004, 48). According to Martin, this way of individuating experience-
kinds carries the least theoretical burden, so such a conception of experience should be the 
starting point of our theorizing. I wholeheartedly agree with Martin’s claim. However, 
disjunctivists typically go on to say that experiences depend on a certain relation that is both 
non-representational and psychological (rather than merely physical or causal): Martin calls it 
“awareness” (2004, 39); Brewer calls it “acquaintance” (2011, 55). I am of the opinion that 
such a claim gets things backwards. My preferred view is that acquaintance is made possible 
                                                        
 
52 The issue of the way contents correlate with objects will be further explored in section 4.3.4.  
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by representation. As Hamid Taieb puts it in describing Brentano’s view, “a cognitive act 
whose object exists bears a specific relation to it in addition to intentionality” (2018, 3). We 
can take acquaintance to be this “specific relation”, but it would be problematic to explain 
intentionality in terms of it.53  
Now we can move on to expectational contents. The postulation of such contents is 
motivated by the Husserlian idea that an experience represents more than what is 
represented by the factual contents of the experience. As Madary put it, “The 
phenomenology of vision is best described as an ongoing process of anticipation and 
fulfillment” (2016, 26). But obviously, it is not the case that anticipations of any kind can be 
components of visual perception. According to Madary, the anticipations that can be such 
components are those of the following kind: “If the subject sees a factual property of the 
object from one perspective, she will anticipate self-generated movement that gives new 
perspectives on the object will reveal new perspectives on that factual property” (2016, 52). 
Suppose there is a slice of a watermelon lying on my table and I see it as having a red part. 
According to Madary’s thesis, by undergoing this very experience, I will acquire the 
expectation that I will continue to see the slice’s property of having a red part when I walk to 
the other side of the table; in addition, I will expect to gain new information about the 
property from the different perspective that I will occupy when I move there. Such 
anticipations may or may not conform to the actual properties of the object; if one finds out 
in subsequent experiences that an anticipation is correct, then one has a fulfilled anticipation. 
Again, one’s visual fixation partly determines what anticipations arise in one’s experience. 
                                                        
 
53 I will revisit this issue when I discuss the relational view in section 4.4.  
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For example, there is a huge difference between what one would expect before and after one 
saccades to the face of a friend that is about to walk past one. Madary thus holds that in 
most cases, two experiences differ in expectational contents if they result from different 
visual fixations (2016, 78).  
The expectational contents considered by Madary are limited to those about what 
one would see after one’s bodily movements. It may be that this restriction is imposed 
simply for argumentative purposes; I don’t see any reason that Madary would be against 
relaxing the restriction. Allowing a greater variety of expectations to count as the 
expectational contents of perception requires additional arguments, of course. As I will say 
more in section 5.5.1, the actions of professional athletes suggest that one may perceptually 
expect more than what results from one’s own movements. A professional tennis player acts 
differently than a novice player even if they are reacting to exactly the same move by the 
opponent. One could explain this by saying that experts and novices are motivated to carry 
out different actions by the same visual experience, but I take the better explanation to be 
that they have different visual experiences. Expert players are more capable of seeing their 
opponents’ bodily movements as initiating certain types of strokes; as a result, they can 
anticipate and counter the strokes more efficiently. If so, professional athletes undergo 
experiences whose expectational contents are not about the consequences of their own 
actions.  
Given these considerations, we can define expectational contents as follows:  
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(Expectational Contents)  
Let e be an experience that s undergoes at t. Then e has an expectational content if and only 
if e has some content d such that:  
(1) d represents a factual property s expects to see at the moment succeeding t;  
(2) what d represents partially depends on what the factual contents of e represent.  
Note that condition (2) is indispensable. Suppose I have never heard of durians or jackfruits, 
but a friend of mine, Anton, just told me that he was about to show me two jackfruits. After 
he put a fruit on the table, I asked him whether that was a so-called jackfruit. He answered in 
the positive. Given his answer and what he told me earlier, I now expect to see another 
jackfruit at the succeeding moment. In this case, my expectation that I will see a second 
jackfruit is not an expectational content of my experience of the first jackfruit. It is a belief. If 
Anton had shown me a durian, I would still expect to see a jackfruit. The expectation is thus 
independent of the factual content of my experience, which violates condition (2).  
4.3.3 How Many Kinds of Contents Are There?  
We have now covered the central ideas of HDC.54 It is time to revisit the two 
questions raised at the end of section 4.3.1; this will clarify how my formulation of HDC 
differs from the Husserlian theories I draw on. Let’s begin with the first question: what is the 
relation between the factual and expectational contents of perception? Is one of them in 
                                                        
 
54 HDC may not be intuitively appealing to some: they might find it hard to accept the claim that 
expectations can be genuinely perceptual. As I see it, the issue is best discussed in connection with 
event perception, so I will wait until the next chapter to examine the related arguments. For now, I 
will simply assume that the claim is true.  
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some sense derivative of the other? Madary seems to think that factual contents are 
expectational contents of a kind. Madary does have a notion of factual contents: they are 
one’s representations of factual properties (2016, 44). However, Madary goes on to suggest 
that the factual content of an experience reduces to its expectational or AF content: “We 
represent factual properties through visual anticipation of the way those properties will 
appear within the context of a particular perceptual episode” (2016, 61). If AF contents are 
the only means by which we represent factual properties, then factual contents reduce to AF 
contents. To be sure, such a reading may be too strong. Madary explicitly says that he has no 
business in such reduction: “Visual anticipations depend on there being a representation of a 
factual property, not the other way around” (2016, 61). But in a later passage, he argues 
against the claim that “there must be something more to visual content than AF content” 
(2016, 65). It seems that the only way to reconcile Madary’s various claims is to adopt the 
following view. Some representations of factual properties are perceptual contents but the 
others are not. The latter are what AF contents depend, while the former just are AF 
contents. The consequence is that the content of an experience is exhausted by its AF 
content, which “is the content of the visual anticipations themselves” (2016, 60). In other words, the 
content of an experience consists entirely of anticipations about factual properties. Whatever 
is not an anticipation has no role to play in conscious experiences.  
I am not sure that this is Madary’s considered view. But if it is, I am worried that it 
doesn’t do justice to phenomenological data. There seem to be many experiences whose 
contents are not exhausted by expectations, and Madary himself has discussed one such case. 
Consider the first visual experience one has upon waking up. According to Madary, while 
some might think that this case is a counterexample to his view, it is not. He argues that one 
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would have visual expectations of what one would see the moment one opens her eyes. Such 
expectations constitute the content of one’s experience upon waking (2016, 40). 
Unfortunately, Madary’s response is inadequate. Suppose I open my eyes and feel shocked 
by the bewildering and rapidly changing scene I see. Since what I see completely goes 
beyond my expectations, it doesn’t make much sense to describe what I see in terms of 
expectations.  
Madary could try to relate the weird experience to expectations. He could describe 
the experience as the frustration of my expectations. But while fulfilled expectations may be 
sufficient for representing factual properties, frustrated expectations alone are certainly not. 
While an expectation can only be fulfilled in limited ways, it can be frustrated in indefinitely 
many ways. If I slice a watermelon in half and expect to see red flesh inside, my expectation 
will be frustrated if I see yellow flesh inside, see nothing inside or see a bag of diamonds 
inside. If so, the very fact that my expectation to see red flesh is frustrated doesn’t carry 
much information about what my environment is like – the fact hardly tells me anything 
about the factual properties instantiated by the objects in view. Are there other expectations 
in my experience that might account for the representation of factual properties? I might 
have the vague expectation that some unfamiliar objects will soon show up in front of me. 
However, given how rapidly the environment is changing, I don’t really have much idea 
about what to expect. As a result, my expectations of what are about to happen are too 
impoverished to capture my present environment. Hence, if Madary’s view is that one’s 
environment is entirely represented by perceptually based expectations, he would have to say 
that in the case at hand, my present environment is barely represented by my experience. 
That is not the right description of my experience. An even trickier issue is that taking 
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perceptual contents to be exhausted by expectations leads to conceptual difficulties. For we 
could ask: what is it that fulfills the visual expectations that arose at the moment just past? 
The answer cannot be present expectations, as our example shows. If Madary is unwilling to 
accept contents that are not expectations, the only remaining candidate seems to be certain 
present representations that are not components of conscious experiences. Maybe these are 
representations employed by the perceptual system but not available to consciousness, or 
maybe they are automatic associations of a kind more similar to stereotypes. This last resort 
implies that there are no fulfilling experiences – all fulfilling representations are unavailable to 
consciousness.  
The last resort is quite unattractive. The awareness that one’s expectations have been 
fulfilled by one’s present experience is an important phenomenon, and it is not a rare 
phenomenon.55 The last resort would entail that such awareness is an illusion. I am not ready 
to accept such a radical view. After all, there is an easy way out of the predicament: we can 
simply accept the claim that “there must be something more to visual content than AF 
content” (Madary 2016, 65). The “something more”, I submit, is the factual content of an 
experience. Therefore, though my formulation of HDC draws heavily on Madary’s work, 
there are two claims that I endorse but Madary probably would not. First, whereas Madary 
seems to think that factual contents are a species of expectational contents, I take these 
contents to differ in kind. Second, while I give a disjunctive definition of factual contents, it 
is unclear that Madary would be willing to do so. If Madary takes factual contents to be 
                                                        
 
55 For additional discussion of such awareness, see section 4.3.4, where Husserl’s notion of continuous 
synthesis is examined.  
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expectational in nature, then he would have to adopt a disjunctive conception of 
expectations to accommodate a disjunctive definition of contents. I am not sure how this 
should be done or whether he would want to do so at all.56  
4.3.4 Are Experiences Object-Involving?  
Let’s turn to the second question raised in section 4.3.1: on what conditions do two 
experiences have the same contents? More specifically, can experiences of different objects 
have the same contents? This issue is a central concern of the Husserlian view held by Smith, 
which is further developed by Hopp. Their view on this issue is quite straightforward: if two 
experiences represent different objects, it is impossible for them to have the same contents. 
Smith gives a Husserlian defense of what he calls de re externalism: “the particular object of a 
perceptual experience is essential to that experience in virtue of that experience’s content” (2008, 
315; see also 314). Similarly, Hopp endorses a thesis that he calls object determination (OD): 
“Necessarily, if two experiences have the same content, then they (re)present the same 
                                                        
 
56 Hopp also has an argument for counting factual or intuitive contents among the contents of 
perception. However, his argument doesn’t aim to establish that intuitive contents differ in kind from 
expectational contents; rather, its goal is to show that the factual components of perception should 
be regarded as sufficient for contents. The argument highlights the epistemic role of perception. 
According to Hopp, “perceptual and other intuitive acts, including hallucinations, imaginings, 
dreams, and pictorial memories, have a distinctive sort of phenomenological character that mere 
thoughts, as such, do not possess” (2010, 7). Hopp calls what distinguishes intuitive states from mere 
thoughts their intuitive character, and the intuitive content of an experience just is the content the 
experience has in virtue of its intuitive character. Here Hopp takes as his point of departure the 
Husserlian idea that intuitive states are those capable of verifying thoughts on the basis of their first-
person features. The stronger claim Hopp is making is that these first-person features constitute 
contents of a kind, because “only states with intentional content, and, specifically, a kind of 
intentional content that represents how things are, can be reason-giving” (2010, 10). Since perception is 
indeed reason-giving, it should be regarded as having contents that represent the way things are.  
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object” (2011, 173).57 Let’s say that an experience has object-involving contents if and only if it 
satisfies OD.58 I am inclined to think that perceptual contents are not object-involving, and 
this is where I depart from the Smith-Hopp account. To clarify what is being contested, we 
need to discuss a Husserlian idea central to their account.  
We have been working with the Husserlian idea that the expectational or horizonal 
content of an experience can be fulfilled by the experience that follows. As our discussion of 
Madary’s view suggests, what fulfill expectational contents are not more expectational 
contents; rather, the expectational content of an experience is fulfilled by the factual or 
intuitive content of a later experience. Smith notes that for Husserl, such fulfillment enables 
the subject to undergo a distinctive kind of experience. Husserl calls the experience “the 
synthesis continually joining the manifold perceptions” or “continuous synthesis” (Husserl 
[1973] 1997, 132); Smith describes it as “an experience of identity” (A. D. Smith 2008, 326). 
Suppose I see my wallet at t1 and want to make sure that there is cash inside, so I open it and 
                                                        
 
57 There are different ways to read OD. For my purposes, I will assume the following reading. 
Suppose:  
 E is a set of experiences;  
 C is a set of contents;  
 O is a set of entities;  
 For any experience x and content y, Bear(x, y) holds if and only if x is the bearer of y;  
 For any experience x and object y, Rep(x, y) holds if and only if x represents y.  
I take OD to be the following conditional:  
(∀e ∈ E)(∀c ∈ C)(∀o ∈ O)(Bear(e, c) ∧ Rep(e, o) → □(Bear(e, c) → Rep(e, o))).  
In other words, if e bears the content c that represents o in world w, then in every world accessible 
from w, e represents o insofar as e bears c.  
58 The term “object-involving content” has been used in the literature, but I am not entirely satisfied 
with the way it is typically defined. For example, Susanna Siegel characterizes the object-involving 
content of an experience as such that “the object seen… is itself part of the content” (2006, 364). I 
don’t think that objects are ever part of contents.  
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see dollar bills inside at t2. In this case, the expectational content of my experience at t1 
represents the wallet as containing cash, which is then represented again by the factual 
content of my experience at t2. The later factual content thereby fulfills the earlier 
expectational content. When this happens, one experience seamlessly transitions to another, 
and my experiences appear to me as jointly belonging to a single coherent course of 
experience. In this sense, my experiences undergo “synthesis”: they combine with each other 
into a more complicated representation. Such a representation not only makes the wallet 
perceptually available to me at both t1 and t2; it also makes me aware that the wallet I now see 
at t2 is the same one as the wallet I saw at t1. For this reason, the complex representation is 
an experience of the identity of the wallet: it represents the wallet as remaining identical 
across different times.  
Since the term “synthesis” may have misleading connotations, I will use the term 
“experience of continuity” in place of Husserl’s “continuous synthesis”.59 Hopp cites 
considerations about experiences of continuity to defend the claim that perceptual 
experiences have object-involving contents. In his example, one sees a steel ball, A, which is 
qualitatively identical to ball B. What does it take for my visual experience to represent A, 
rather than B or any other qualitatively identical ball? Hopp’s proposed answer utilizes the 
                                                        
 
59 Some might think that the term “synthesis” carries the connotation that the experiences in 
question are deliberately combined by the subject. That makes the idea of continuous synthesis 
dubious: it is certainly not the case that one becomes aware of multiple experiences and decides to 
put them together. This is not what Husserl has in mind. As noted by Smith, Husserl allows some 
kinds of synthesis to be passive, including those involved in perception. To use the term “synthesis” 
in this context is just to emphasize that perception requires more than “a mere succession of data” 
(A. D. Smith 2003, 128). Without contributions from the perceiver, objects cannot appear in 
perception the way they do.  
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notion of path connection. Consider arbitrary experiences e and f and a possible perceiver 
that undergoes e exactly when and where e occurs. If there is a spatiotemporal path such that 
the possible perceiver could move along that path and come to undergo f at the endpoint of 
that path, then that path is a connecting path between e and f. Two experiences are path-connected 
if and only if there is a connecting path between them.60  
According to Hopp, for two experiences to represent the same object, they have to 
satisfy one of the following conditions, depending on whether they are path-connected 
(2011, 182). First, if e and f are path-connected, then they must be synthesizable. That is, if a 
perceiver moves along a connecting path between e and f, thereby undergoing a series of 
perceptual experiences, then an experience of continuity must co-occur with every 
experience in the series except the first one. For example, suppose that at t1, I expect to see 
the right wing mirror of my car when I walk past the parking meter occluding it. If I do see it 
at t2, then there is an experience of continuity co-occurring with my experience at t2. Further 
suppose that my experience at t2 has the expectational content that if I stay where I am, I will 
continue to see the wing mirror. If this is indeed the case at t3, then there is another 
experience of continuity co-occurring with my experience at t3. It follows that my 
experiences at t1, t2 and t3 are synthesizable with each other. Second, if e and f are not path-
connected, then they must be harmonious with each other. This means that the judgments e 
and f are capable of justifying must have the same objects as their subject matter. For 
example, take my judgments that the London Eye is white and that the River Thames is 
flowing. Suppose my judgments are justified by two perceptual experiences that successively 
                                                        
 
60 The terms “path connection”, “connecting path” and “path-connected” are mine.  
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occur. Despite their temporal proximity, these experiences are not harmonious with each 
other; the judgments they justify have numerically distinct objects.  
Now we can answer what it is that makes my present experience an experience of A 
rather than an experience of some other qualitatively identical ball. Take all the possible 
experiences synthesizable or harmonious with my present experience; call it the perceptual 
manifold of A. According to Hopp, if an experience represents a ball that is qualitatively but 
not numerically identical to A, then the experience cannot possibly belong to the manifold 
of A (2011, 182–83). Consider B, a ball qualitatively identical to A. Hopp argues by 
contradiction that no possible experience belongs to both A’s and B’s manifolds at once. 
Assume to the contrary that there is such an experience; call it e. It follows that for any a and 
b in the manifolds of A and B, there are connecting paths between e and a, on the one hand, 
and between e and b, on the other. In addition, in both series of experiences, every 
experience except the first one is accompanied by an experience of continuity.  
There are two scenarios in which these are true (Hopp 2011, 184). First, the 
perceiver simultaneously sees A and B and constantly keeps them in view. In that case, while 
the experiences are indeed synthesizable, they are not internally harmonious. Any experience 
in the series is capable of justifying two kinds of judgments: those about A and those about 
B. It thus makes more sense to regard each of the experiences as a fusion of two experiences 
that respectively represent A and B. This means that e is harmonious with experiences of A 
if and only if it is not harmonious with experiences of B. We have to conclude that e simply 
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doesn’t exist.61 Second, the perceiver keeps A in view until she sees B, at which point she 
disregards A and attends to B. Call this moment t. Now, the perceiver’s expectation at t is 
presumably that A will remain in sight. Since the perceiver shifts her attention to B 
immediately after t, her earlier expectation is not fulfilled. As a consequence, no experiences 
of continuity occur. Since t is the only moment at which e could possibly occur in this 
scenario, we have to again conclude that e doesn’t exist. On the assumption that these two 
scenarios are exhaustive, any possible experience in the perceptual manifold of A fails to 
belong to the perceptual manifold of B.  
The observation that perceptual manifolds are mutually exclusive suggests a 
reasonable criterion of object-involving contents: an experience has object-involving 
contents about A if and only if the experience belongs to the perceptual manifold of A. As 
noted by Hopp, “manifolds exist whether any actual consciousness of the relevant object is 
carried out; an unexplored cave, for instance, has its perceptual manifold. For this reason, we 
can understand manifolds as belonging to objects themselves” (2011, 180). My experience 
represents the cave if and only if it is a member of the cave’s manifold. Given the criterion, 
the inference to OD is straightforward. According to Smith, whether undergoing two 
successive experiences is sufficient for undergoing an experience of continuity is a matter of 
the contents the experiences have (2008, 325). The joint sufficiency for experiences of 
continuity, or the lack thereof, determines whether the experiences are members of the same 
                                                        
 
61 My reasoning here doesn’t quite follow Hopp’s own. Hopp appeals to “difference-consciousness” 
in this part of his argument (Hopp 2011, 184). Though the idea is straightforward, I am not sure how 
undergoing difference-consciousness violates the conditions of synthesizability and harmoniousness. 
Insofar as one keeps both A and B in view, one’s earlier and later experiences are synthesizable with 
each other. This is the case whether or not one undergoes difference-consciousness.  
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perceptual manifold, which in turn determines their objects. Together with the criterion of 
object-involving contents, Smith’s claim entails OD. It follows that the contents of 
perception are object-involving; in addition, they would not be so without the joint 
contributions of both factual and expectational contents.  
As noted by Hopp himself, however, the conditions of synthesizability and 
harmoniousness may not be sufficient for object-involving contents. Hopp discusses this 
worry by presenting a somewhat complicated thought experiment about an eccentric 
neuroscientist (2011, 186). It seems to me that the worry can be highlighted with simpler 
cases: those involving a switcheroo.62 Suppose Anton was showing me a magic trick. After 
laying several playing cards on the table, he asked me to take a look at one of them without 
telling him what card it was. I picked a card, identified it as the five of spades and put it back. 
Then I followed his instruction to stare at the card while he pulled off some seemingly 
irrelevant tricks. When I was asked to take a look at the card again, I realized that 
unbeknownst to me, the card had been replaced by the ten of clubs. Now consider the 
perceptual experience I underwent just before the ten of clubs was revealed; call it e10C. This 
experience was synthesizable with e5S, which was my initial experience of the five of spades. 
Given that my expectation to see the five of spades was frustrated only after I underwent 
e10C, every experience I had between e5S and e10C co-occurred with an experience of continuity. 
Moreover, e5S was harmonious with e10C, because for all I knew, I had been tracking one and 
the same card. If, by undergoing e5S, I was justified in making the judgment that the card was 
the five of spades, then I was no less justified in doing so by undergoing e10C. Despite the fact 
                                                        
 
62 Hopp himself appeals to such cases in arguing against rival views. See Hopp (2011, 180).  
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that e5S and e10C were synthesizable and harmonious with each other, they were about 
different objects. We are then forced to conclude that the contents of e5S and e10C were not 
object-involving.  
Hopp does have a solution to this problem. He argues that it is not enough for an 
experience to be synthesizable and harmonious with the actual experiences that precede and 
succeed the experience. It is also required that the experience “belong to a ‘stable system’ of 
experiences”, where this means that “in situations not too remote from the actual one, had 
things been different, my experiences would have been correspondingly different as well” 
(2011, 186). Imagine that a UFO appeared after a playing card I was looking at disappeared. 
If my perceptual system had functioned in such a way that I continued to see nothing but a 
playing card after the UFO appeared, then my perceptual system would have failed to be 
functional. In that case, I couldn’t be said to have seen the playing card in the first place, 
whether or not the playing card was later replaced by a UFO. My experience of the playing 
card thus failed to meet Hopp’s stability requirement. Despite the plausibility of the 
requirement, however, I am afraid that it doesn’t really address the case of Anton’s show. In 
situations that were largely similar to the actual one, my experience of the two face-down 
cards would have remained identical to my actual experience. I would not have become 
aware that one of them had been replaced by the other. Moreover, if my perceptual system 
was functioning normally, what happened was precisely what was supposed to happen; 
Anton’s tricks were designed specifically to trick people with normal vision. For Hopp’s 
solution to work, an argument must be made that there are reasons to take the apparent 
synthesizability and harmoniousness in the case under consideration to be deceptive. I am 
not sure that there are such reasons.  
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As I see it, even if the stability requirement could somehow resolve the difficulties 
involved in the case of Anton, there are still reasons to think that perceptual contents are not 
object-involving. Consider again Hopp’s example of the qualitatively identical steel balls A 
and B. Suppose that there are no possible worlds in which they appear in the same spatial 
region. It follows that no one ever sees A and B together, so no one is able to tell A from B. 
As a consequence, whether or not one’s perception is stable, one’s perceptual experiences 
cannot enable one to respond to A and B differently. To highlight the issue, we could even 
allow that in some worlds, some people undergo successive experiences of A and B that are 
only separated by a blink. This presumably happens when A and B are quickly switched with 
each other; let’s assume that they are switched by a machine. Since A and B are qualitatively 
identical, even the people in question fail to notice the switch. As a result, experiences of 
continuity always co-occur with those people’s experiences of A and B. I take this case to be 
a counterexample to the claim that perceptual contents are object-involving. In this case, 
one’s experiences of A and B are synthesizable, harmonious and stable; yet nothing in these 
experiences provides any clue about which of A and B one is seeing. It thus makes more 
sense to say that in this case, one’s experiences of A and B do not have object-involving 
contents.  
There is a radical response to my argument: one could argue that the experiences in 
question fail to have contents. If so, OD is still true for any experience that does have 
contents. I don’t think this response works. There is nothing unusual about the experiences 
under consideration; their similarity to everyday experiences justifies the claim that they have 
contents. Another response is that the scenario just described is metaphysically impossible. 
In other words, the sentence “necessarily, steel balls A and B do not show up in the same 
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spatiotemporal region” is a contradiction. But is it? If we translate the sentence into first-
order modal logic, it is quite easy to come up with a model that satisfies the sentence. Define 
a two-place predicate CLxy such that CLxy is satisfied at world w if and only if there is a 
spatiotemporal region in w such that x and y are co-located at the region. We simply define 
the extension of CL to be such that in every world, the ordered pairs A, B and B, A are 
not in the extension of CL. This would yield a model that satisfies the sentence, which 
means that the sentence is not a contradiction. One could still argue that this model doesn’t 
correspond to anything in reality, and the debate would then become one about the criteria 
of metaphysical possibility. I don’t have anything useful to say about that issue. I can only 
point out that if my observations are correct, OD is a very strong thesis about metaphysics: 
it imposes substantial constraints on what kinds of worlds are possible. While there might be 
considerations in favor of such constraints, I am not ready to accept OD before those 
considerations become clear.  
4.3.5 HDC: A Second Formulation  
I have argued that perceptual experiences do not feature object-involving contents. 
My argument is essentially that some perceptual experiences of individuals may be 
counterexamples to OD. Does this mean that perceptual experiences never represent any 
individuals? I don’t think such a conclusion is warranted. Perceptual experiences do 
represent individuals; it’s just that even if two experiences represent different individuals, 
their contents might still be the same. The best way to flesh out this view, I submit, is to 
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consult Campbell’s recent analysis of perceptual selection.63 As we will see, doing so supplies 
the missing piece to my formulation of HDC.  
In a recent book co-authored with Quassim Cassam, Campbell argues that the 
perceptual relation holds “between a thinker and an array of visible properties at various 
locations, available for use in the selection of objects as figure from ground” (2014, 64–65). 
This view can be illustrated with an example. Suppose Anton is presented with a photo taken 
in Egypt, which shows the Sphinx with several pyramids on the horizon. He is asked to 
determine whether there are pyramids in the image. There will be a very brief phase in 
Anton’s experience in which well-individuated objects have not yet appeared. Over the first 
few hundred milliseconds, Anton might be aware of nothing but various environmental 
features located at different locations: some brown color patches, triangles and irregular 
shapes here and there, etc. After that, given that Anton’s task is to find pyramids, Anton 
might be able to visually attend to the triangles in the image. The important point here is that 
to attend to triangles is not yet to attend to triangular individuals – in this case, the pyramids. To 
attend to triangles is to become aware that the property of triangularity is instantiated in the 
environment, but to attend to triangular individuals is to perform figure-ground segregation 
and to single out the objects that are the bearers of triangularity. Though attending to the 
                                                        
 
63 This may seem a strange choice. Campbell is one of the most prominent proponents of the 
relational view, but from the very beginning, I have stressed that HDC is a representational view. 
Despite Campbell’s stance, however, I don’t think his analysis of visual selection presupposes the 
relational view. I will therefore integrate his analysis into a representationalist framework. Campbell 
would not like this; he argues that visual selection is best understood in a relationalist framework. I 
don’t think his arguments succeed, so I will raise objections to his arguments in section 4.4. For now, 
I will set this issue aside.  
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triangles in the image enables Anton to attend to the triangular individuals there, the former 
could occur without the latter.  
So far we have only considered Anton’s awareness of environmental features. How 
does the awareness of individuals emerge? To answer the question, Campbell draws the 
distinction between selection and access: “Grabbing the thing out from its background 
(selection) is one thing, and characterizing it (access) is another” (2014, 54). Once Anton 
becomes aware that the environment depicted by the image contains triangles, he could then 
fixate on one of the triangles and examine the individual bounded by it. In doing so, he selects 
the individual bounded by the triangle on the basis of the triangle. This nevertheless doesn’t 
tell us which properties of the individual Anton will access. When examining the individual, he 
could become attracted to the texture of the individual and direct his attention accordingly; 
in that case, only the texture of the individual is accessed. But it is also possible for him to 
access the color alone or to access both the color and the texture. Most importantly, Anton 
need not even access the triangular shape of the individual despite the fact that the individual 
is selected on the basis of its triangular shape. After all, after singling out the individual to be 
examined, Anton could focus on any feature he is interested in; if he is asked to determine, 
say, whether any text is superposed on the triangles in the image, there is no need for him to 
examine the shapes of the targets once the targets have been selected.  
Campbell argues that there is a close connection between the experience of an 
individual and the experience of the property in virtue of which one can visually select the 
individual. According to Campbell, in cases where “experience of object O is causally made 
possible by experience of property F”, it makes sense to infer that “property F will constitute 
the visual ‘mode of presentation’ of the object O” (2014, 53; also see 67). Suppose that one 
  
163 
second after the image is shown, Anton is able to complete the task and identify a pyramid 
in the image. Campbell’s analysis would be that Anton sees the pyramid under the mode of 
presentation of a triangular object. The reason is that Anton visually selects the pyramid on 
the basis of triangularity; the experience of the latter thus causally makes possible the 
experience of the former. Note that the relation of “causally making possible” is supposed to 
disambiguate certain experiences similar to each other. Consider two cases in which I see a 
watermelon. In the first case, I select it on the basis of its color and then access its shape; 
here what I see can be described as “the green object is round”. In the second case, I select 
the watermelon on the basis of its shape and then access its color; what I see in this case can 
be described “the round object is green”. Can we say that I undergo the same experience in 
these two scenarios? Campbell would give a negative answer (2014, 64). In the first case, my 
experience of the watermelon is causally made possible by my experience of its green color. 
My visual selection of the watermelon is caused by my awareness of its green color, and such 
a causal fact distinguishes my experience in the first case from that in the second case.  
Couched in representational terms, Campbell’s analysis of visual selection suggests a 
way to make sense of my earlier claim: perceptual contents that are not object-involving may 
nonetheless represent individuals. On the representationalist reading of Campbell’s analysis, 
when we look for linguistic expressions that describe perceptual representations of 
individuals, the best candidates are definite descriptions. We may describe Anton’s 
experience as representing the pyramid under the mode of presentation “the triangular 
object located at location x”, where x could be specified either in an egocentric coordinate 
system, i.e. relative to one’s own body, or in an allocentric one, i.e. relative to external 
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objects.64 Obviously, different objects could be represented under the same mode of 
presentation. Suppose there are multiple pyramids in the image Anton is looking at, and two 
of the pyramids, A and B, are at roughly the same distance from the Sphinx. Anton visually 
fixates on A and perceives it as a triangular object a few hundred yards away from the 
Sphinx. Franz is also looking at the image, but he focuses on B and sees it as a triangular 
object a few hundred yards away from the Sphinx. Here Anton’s and Franz’s experiences 
feature the same mode of presentation, but their experiences represent different individuals. 
If so, though their experiences lack object-involving contents, the experiences still represent 
individuals.  
Note that on this representationalist reading of Campbell’s analysis, it is not the case 
that an experience has some indexical component responsible for picking out its object in a 
given context. Definite descriptions are not indexicals; saying “the pub on Beacon Street” is 
quite different from saying “that”. As a result, the present view is immune from the various 
objections Hopp raises against explaining the perceptual representations of individuals in 
terms of indexicals. Hopp is worried that an indexical account not only gets things 
backwards but also fails to provide any real explanation. On the one hand, the referent of an 
indexical is fixed by one’s perception of an object, not the other way around (2011, 124–25). 
On the other hand, an indexical like “that” can be appropriately used no matter what one is 
seeing, but no content of perception should have that kind of flexibility (2011, 120–23). 
Explaining the latter in terms of the former thus amounts to a failure of explanation. The 
present view is susceptible to neither objection. If an experience represents an object under 
                                                        
 
64 For a discussion of the two kinds of coordinate system, see Gramann et al. (2006).  
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the mode of presentation “the triangular object a few hundred yards away from the Sphinx”, 
this very fact is capable of explaining how one can utter “that is a pyramid!” and achieve 
referential success with the indexical “that”. Furthermore, while one can appropriately refer 
to an object with “that” regardless of the experience one is undergoing, one cannot do so 
with a definite description. If one only sees a blackboard, it makes no sense for one to think 
“the triangular thing over there is huge”.  
Two caveats are in order. First, while the individual-representing contents of 
perception may be described by using definite descriptions, the relevant definite descriptions 
are not Russellian ones.65 In Russell’s theory, a definite description fixes its referent by 
specifying certain conditions that are uniquely satisfied by something in the domain of 
quantification. That is not the means by which Anton’s experience is directed at its object. 
Though Anton’s experience represents a pyramid under the mode of presentation of a 
triangle, the mode of presentation doesn’t function to relate Anton to any uniquely 
instantiated property in the environment; there are many triangles in the image. Indeed, if 
the relevant modes of presentation were Russellian definite descriptions, it would be hard to 
see how Anton and Franz could represent different pyramids in the image under the same 
mode of presentation. Second, it is worth emphasizing that the definite descriptions we have 
been using are linguistic descriptions of perceptual contents and nothing more than that. The 
very contents of perception are not structured linguistically, so they cannot literally be 
definite descriptions. They could be Fregean senses, as suggested by, for example, Brad 
                                                        
 
65 For some difficulties facing an account of perception inspired by Russell’s theory of definite 
descriptions, see Pylyshyn (2007, 15 fn. 4).  
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Thompson (2009), but only if we understand Fregean senses in a somewhat non-Fregean 
way: perceptual senses could still be modes of presentation of a kind, but their compositional 
semantics will be quite different from that of linguistic senses. In particular, perceptual 
senses should not be allowed to compose propositions, as discussed in section 4.2.1.  
We have emphasized that the representation of a triangular individual cannot be 
identified with the simpler representation of the triangular shape of the individual. But how 
exactly should we describe the phenomenological difference between the two experiences? 
Other than that there are causal relations between the two, Campbell doesn’t tell us much. 
This may make one suspicious of the distinction between the representation of a triangle and 
that of a triangular individual; there is surely a verbal distinction, but does the distinction 
make any sense from the first-person perspective? My proposal is that while the former is a 
representation that aims at a trope, the latter is a representation that aims at a foundational 
system, to put it in a term of Peter Simons’. A foundational system is a bundle of tropes that 
“can in principle exist alone except for its dependence on its constituent trope parts, and on 
any larger wholes of which it is a dependent part” (P. Simons 2000b, 148).66 Take a black key 
of a piano; call it k. Since k cannot exist without having a color and a shape, it depends on 
the color and shape tropes that are constitutive of it.67 There is a sense in which k also 
depends on the piano: it could not be what it is, i.e. a key of the piano, if the piano didn’t 
exist. But k’s dependence on the piano isn’t quite the same as its dependence on the tropes. 
                                                        
 
66 Actually, the definition of a foundational system is more complicated than that; it is defined in 
terms of a relation Simons calls foundational relatedness (1994, 562). The definition cited here is a 
simplified one, which, for my purposes, is sufficient.  
67 In Simons’ account, such dependence is specific, not individual. For a discussion of the distinction, 
see section 3.5.2 of this dissertation.  
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If k is detached from the piano, it continues to exist, but there is no way to detach the color 
and shape tropes from k without destroying it. Therefore, while k is a dependent part of the 
piano, it could in principle exist alone insofar as its constituent trope parts exist. It follows 
that the key of the piano is a foundational system. Needless to say, the piano itself is another 
foundational system.  
On my proposal, a perceptual experience picks out an individual by picking out a 
foundational system to which the basis of selection belongs. For example, when Anton sees 
the triangular shape of the pyramid, he sees a triangle trope. On the basis of this visual 
experience, he is able to visually select a foundational system of which the triangle trope is a 
member – here the foundational system is of course the pyramid. There is a 
phenomenological difference between the experience of a triangle and that of a triangular 
individual because what is experienced in the former is only a member of what is 
experienced in the latter. Now, to represent a foundational system, Anton’s experience has 
to represent some members of the system other than the triangle trope. His experience has 
to represent some tropes with which the triangle trope must co-exist. How are those tropes 
represented? I suggest that they are represented by the expectational contents of Anton’s 
experience. Upon seeing a triangle, Anton comes to expect the existence of other 
environmental features. For example, he expects that as the experience unfolds, he will be 
able to tell whether the triangle is actually a three-dimensional tetrahedron rather than a two-
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dimensional figure.68 To describe Anton’s expectation, we could say that he expects the 
triangle to be an entity that has a volume; he thus expects a volume trope to co-exist with the 
triangle trope.69 Once such an expectation is fulfilled by the factual contents of his 
experience at the succeeding moment, he acquires new expectations. He expects that, with 
more time passing, the surface texture of the tetrahedron will be more clearly seen. In other 
words, he expects a texture trope to co-exist with the triangle and volume tropes. Such 
expectations differentiate Anton’s experience of the pyramid from his experience of the 
triangle. When one undergoes experiences in a less familiar environment, the expectational 
contents of one’s experience could be more impoverished. Even in those cases, however, 
one represents an individual in addition to an environmental feature only if one represents 
certain tropes that bear dependence relations to the environmental feature.  
The present proposal entails that, without perceptually based expectations, Anton’s 
initial experience of the pyramid would be exactly the same as his experience of the triangle. 
The experience of an individual occurs when one imposes one’s expectations on a perceived 
trope.70 Does it follow that the individuals represented in perception are nothing but our 
projections? By no means. There is indeed a sense in which one’s experience is subjective 
                                                        
 
68 I do not mean to suggest that Anton must possess the concept of a tetrahedron. While the 
opponents of nonconceptual contents might take such a concept to be necessary for any experience 
of a tetrahedron, I am of the opinion that one can tell a tetrahedron apart from a two-dimensional 
figure even if one has had no exposure whatsoever to the idea of a tetrahedron.  
69 This doesn’t mean that Anton himself would describe his experience this way. Very few people 
would ever use the words “entity” and “trope” to describe what they are seeing. Even so, when we 
theorize about Anton’s experience, there is nothing objectionable about such a description. In 
everyday life, few would describe what they see as “sense-data” or “surface reflectance properties”, 
but this doesn’t prevent philosophers from using these terms to describe what is experienced in 
ordinary life.  
70 Of course, “impose” is just a figure of speech. What expectational contents an experience has is in 
general beyond the perceiver’s control.  
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when one perceives an object with the help of perceptually based expectations. But such 
expectations can be entirely veridical. If Anton expects to see stone-like texture when he 
examines the surface of the individual bounded by the triangle, his expectations carry 
accurate information about the pyramid. In fact, on the present proposal, we can specify the 
veridicality conditions of an individual-representing experience in a straightforward manner. 
Upon visually selecting a pyramid on the basis of a triangle, Anton undergoes an experience 
of the pyramid that is caused by an experience of the triangle. I suggest the following 
veridicality conditions of the former: it is veridical if and only if Anton expects to see a 
foundational system that is a pyramid, on the one hand, and the triangle used to select the 
foundational system is indeed a member of a pyramid, on the other. How do we determine 
whether the foundational system Anton expects to see is a pyramid? We do so by 
considering the tropes Anton expects to see upon seeing the triangle trope. If those tropes 
are indeed capable of jointly composing a pyramid with the triangle trope, then the 
foundational system Anton expects to see is a pyramid. Otherwise, it is not. However, even 
if Anton’s expectations are indeed about the components of a pyramid, the triangle used by 
Anton to visually select the pyramid could turn out to be a member of another foundational 
system, say, a triangular flag that looks somewhat like a pyramid from afar. In that case, 
Anton’s experience of the pyramid fails to be veridical.  
To be sure, the claim that perceptual experiences represent foundational systems is 
far from self-evident. Why think that, in perception, we ever expect any trope to co-exist 
with a perceived trope? While I don’t have any knockdown argument, I think my claim is 
supported by a variety of everyday experiences. For example, if Albrecht suddenly notices 
something moving towards him, he will try to dodge even before he can tell what it is. What 
  
170 
contents should we attribute to Albrecht’s visual experience to make sense of his action? It 
won’t do to say that his experience represents nothing but an instance of motion. What is 
moving could be a plastic bag blowing in the wind, which wouldn’t hurt Albrecht even if he 
is hit. Motion itself doesn’t pose any threats. The better explanation is to say that Albrecht’s 
experience represents a foundational system that, in addition to a motion trope, may very 
well contain a solidity trope. The motion trope is perceived to depend on the solidity trope – 
the motion is perceived as the motion of something solid. For this reason, the perception of 
the motion trope prompts Albrecht’s attempt to dodge. Or consider a wooden book box 
that looks exactly like a real book. Edmund sees it and mistakes it for a real copy of a science 
fiction that he wants to read, so he reaches for it. While the factual contents of Edmund’s 
experience may represent nothing more than the cover-looking surface of the book box, he 
expects there to be text inside. His experience thus represents both a cover trope and a text 
trope, which are tropes that depend on each other to constitute a book (together with several 
other tropes). In this case, Edmund’s experience represents a foundational system whose 
members include the two tropes, among others. It then emerges that such examples are not 
hard to come by. The abundance of such examples in everyday life suggests that the idea of 
perceptually representing a foundational system is a reasonable one.  
I have said that the primary concern of this chapter is the content-object relation in 
perception. Now that I have given my argument that foundational systems are among the 
objects of perception, it is time to make my official formulation of HDC explicit:  
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(The Husserlian Dual-Component View)  
A perceptual experience represents an individual if and only if it represents a foundational 
system by means of its factual and expectational contents.  
There are several potential objections to this view. The most serious ones will be those 
facing all versions of the representational view, i.e. the objections from the relational view. 
But even if one remains within the representationalist framework, there are at least two 
phenomenological reasons to criticize my proposal, which incorporates a representationalist 
reading of Campbell’s analysis. First, one could object to the idea that at least some visual 
experiences feature successive experiential phases such as the mere awareness of 
environmental features, the selection of an object and the access of the object’s properties. 
One could argue that we always see well-individuated objects whose rich meanings are 
immediately available to us. There are at least two ways to respond to this objection. First, it 
is worth noting that the successive phases are supposed to take place over just a few 
hundred milliseconds. While it is not easy to become aware of these phases in introspection, 
an abundance of studies in empirical psychology testifies to the fact that the perceptual 
individuation of objects takes time (see, for example, the papers in Ö gmen and Breitmeyer 
2006). Or consider the Gurwitschean theory of consciousness proposed by Jeff Yoshimi and 
David Vinson (2015). Commenting on the famous gorilla experiment conducted by Daniel J. 
Simons and Christopher F. Chabris (1999), they argue that when one is preoccupied with a 
given task and fails to notice a gorilla in front of one, one’s consciousness of the gorilla may 
be “a fragmentary qualitative structure which could allow for some sense of a patchy black 
surface, even when that experience has not been bound into a focal awareness of a gorilla” 
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(Yoshimi and Vinson 2015, 114). While such experiences may still be representational, they 
are not representations of individuals as subjects of properties. Second, I think Madary’s 
point about the periphery of the visual field definitively shows that the objection is 
misguided. What’s so powerful about the indeterminacy phenomena is that they can be easily 
observed in everyday life. If a familiar face appears on the periphery of one’s visual field, one 
simply cannot tell whose face it is if one doesn’t saccade to the face. There is no reason to 
think that such faces are individuated the moment they appear. As such indeterminacy 
phenomena again confirm, it is often the case that meaningful objects emerge only at the end 
of an initial experiential process, even if the process is very brief.  
One might feel the need to resist the present proposal for another phenomenological 
reason. Husserl puts much emphasis on what he calls “identity-consciousness”: given two 
perceptual experiences, a state of identity-consciousness “unites the two perceptions and 
thereby brings about the consciousness of their object as one and the same” (Husserl [1973] 
1997, 23). One enters a state of identity-consciousness by undergoing an experience of 
continuity. As we have seen, this is why Smith describes experiences of continuity as those 
of identity. One could object to my proposal by appealing to this Husserlian idea: one could 
argue that there is no need to invoke the representations of unseen tropes in a foundational 
system. What distinguishes Anton’s initial experience of the pyramid from his experience of 
the triangle trope is an experience of identity. Suppose Anton sees the triangle trope at t1 and 
visually selects the pyramid on the basis of the triangle at t2. The latter happens because 
Anton becomes aware that the object experienced at t2 is precisely the same as the one 
experienced at t1; in this experience of identity, Anton comes to represent a triangular 
individual that is more than a triangle trope. I have the suspicion that such an alternative 
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explanation goes in a circle. If Anton undergoes an experience of identity at t2, it must be the 
case that his experience at t1 had expectational contents about a triangular individual. These 
expectational contents are fulfilled at t2, so Anton experiences the triangular individual as 
remaining identical through time. But isn’t the question precisely how Anton is able to 
represent a triangular individual? If we assume that Anton’s experience at t1 already 
represented a triangular individual by its expectational contents, we have failed to provide an 
explanation. To put it differently, such a “solution” presupposes that Anton’s experience at 
t1 already represented more than a triangle trope, but that is precisely what is being contested 
by Campbell’s analysis.  
Even if we set aside the circularity of the alternative proposal, it is unclear to me that 
experiences of continuity are really properly described as those of identity. I would think that 
experiences of continuity come in many varieties and that experiences of identity are just one 
of them. But as mentioned above, Smith seems to identify the two. Here’s Smith’s account:  
As I walk round an object while keeping my eye on it, formerly hidden aspects come into 
view. Their sensory presence ‘fills’ or ‘covers’ the earlier empty intentions that were, as 
implicit elements in the perception’s intentionality, emptily directed to those parts. The 
present fulfilled phase of perception is synthesised with the earlier, partially empty phases 
in a continuing, unbroken sense of the persisting identity of the object. (2008, 326)  
Smith’s words seem to suggest that we experience identity whenever certain expectational 
contents are fulfilled by later factual contents. But an experience of continuity just is an 
experience that occurs when certain expectational contents are fulfilled by later factual 
contents. If so, it follows that any experience of continuity represents objects as remaining 
identical through time. That cannot be right. Experiences of continuity occur even when we 
perceive events, but we often perceive events without tracking any particular individual. 
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Suppose I see a bowling ball hitting the pins. At t1, I expect the pins to fall, and they indeed 
fall at t2. The expectational contents of my experience at t1 are fulfilled by the factual 
contents of my experience at t2, so an experience of continuity co-occurs with my experience 
at t2. But from the first-person perspective, it doesn’t appear to me that I am tracking any 
particular object and experience its identity across times. I am not paying attention to any 
particular pin; I might not even focus on the bowling ball. Or suppose I am watching snow 
fall. I see countless snowflakes, and my expectation that there will be even more keeps 
getting fulfilled. Despite this, I do not experience the transtemporal identity of any particular 
snowflake. This is not to deny that I could try to track the trajectory of a snowflake; the 
point is that the expectational contents of my experience can be fulfilled even if I don’t make 
any such attempts. If so, there are experiences of continuity that do not represent the 
transtemporal identity of any individual.  
The moral, I submit, is that experiences of continuity constitute a genus that has 
many species. While the perception of individuals and the perception of events may both 
involve experiences of continuity, they do so in different ways. On my proposal, one 
undergoes an experience with expectational contents the moment one sees an entity, 
whether the entity is an individual or an event. The role played by the expectational contents 
of one’s experience nevertheless depends on the nature of the experience. In a perceptual 
experience of an individual, expectational contents function to represent tropes that co-exist 
with the tropes presently represented by factual contents. This allows one to represent a 
foundational system, some of whose members already exist but are not yet in view. By 
contrast, in a perceptual experience of an event, expectational contents function to represent 
a future phase of the event that might succeed the phase presently represented by factual 
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contents. One thereby represents an ongoing event, some of whose temporal parts have not 
yet come into existence. Hence, when Anton saccades to a pyramid, which is an individual, 
his expectation may be that he will soon see a texture trope that is already there but not yet 
clearly seen. In contrast, when Anton sees a school of flying fish jumping out of the water, 
which is an event, his expectation may be that he will soon see several splash tropes, which 
constitute a phase of the presently perceived event that has not yet occurred but is about to. 
It then emerges that the expectational contents of one’s experience enable one to perceive 
entities of different kinds by assuming different roles in different contexts. Since there are 
several such roles, there are also several forms experiences of continuity may take. If so, not 
every experience of continuity is an experiences of identity.  
We have now seen how my proposal could help to make sense of individual-
representing perception. In the next chapter, I will apply the proposal to the case of event-
representing perception. But before that, let’s consider how HDC might fare in responding 
to the main rival of the representational view: the relational view.  
4.4 Challenges from the Relational View  
One of the most heatedly debated topics in contemporary philosophy of mind is 
whether perception should be understood in representational or relational terms. As I see it, 
the best way to frame the debate is found in the work of Matthew Soteriou. According to 
him, the debate focuses on those conscious perceptual experiences that are veridical. What 
the relational view denies is that the nature of such an experience “is simply determined by 
the obtaining of a mental state which has an intentional content with veridicality conditions” 
(Soteriou 2010, 225). In contrast, what the relational view affirms is that “there are 
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phenomenally conscious states whose obtaining requires the obtaining of a relation of 
‘awareness of’, but which cannot be specified independently of that relation” (2010, 234). 
Suppose I am undergoing a veridical experience in which I see a bowl of ramen. On the 
representational view, I am aware of the bowl of ramen when undergoing the experience 
because the experience has a content that represents the bowl of ramen. The relational view 
takes the opposite route: if my experience has any content at all, it does so because the 
awareness relation holds between me and the bowl of ramen. The debate between the two 
views is therefore one about which of representation and awareness is more basic. 
Obviously, for the debate to be a substantive one, the proponents of the representational 
view must come up with a way to define representation independently of awareness; 
similarly, the proponents of the relational view must show us how to understand awareness 
in non-representational terms.  
There is no way to address the large literature that results from the debate in a single 
section, so my goal here is much more modest than that: I only intend to defend the 
representational view against two objections raised by Campbell. I focus on these two 
objections because of their potential relevance to HDC. There are myriad other objections 
that can be found in the literature on the debate, but they have to be addressed elsewhere as 
they do not have this much direct bearing on HDC.  
Campbell’s first objection aims to show that the representational view gets things 
backwards. The objection consists of three main claims. The first claim is that in our visual 
experiences, selection is more fundamental than access (2014, 51). The second claim 
correlates representation with access: “what the subject is visually representing has to do 
with the level of visual access, not the level of selection” (2014, 69). The third claim 
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correlates selection with the awareness relation: “we should be thinking of the visible 
characteristics of the scene as being there in experience, in the sense that they are available 
for use as the basis on which we select objects or regions whose characteristics we can go on 
to access visually” (2014, 72). Here I interpret Campbell as referring to the awareness 
relation when he speaks of environmental features as “being there in experience”. Together, 
the three claims entail that the awareness relation is more fundamental than perceptual 
representation. If so, it is wrong to account for the former in terms of the latter.  
The objection fails to refute the representational view because the second claim is 
rather unmotivated. I think there is a coherent way to think of visual selection as 
representational as well, which has already been laid out in my presentation of HDC. When I 
see an environmental feature, my experience represents a trope. Visual selection happens 
when my experience comes to represent a foundational system that contains the trope. But 
the representation of a foundational system can be understood in purely representational 
terms: it is the joint achievement of the factual and expectational contents of my experience. 
Since nothing in Campbell’s argument rules out this possibility, his conclusion is too hasty.  
The second objection from Campbell is directed to a version of the representational 
view defended by Martin Davies (1997), which Campbell summarizes as saying that 
“consulting perception will only provide you with a number of existential propositions” 
(Campbell 2002, 124). Take two qualitatively identical laser pointers, PT1 and PT2. 
According to the view, the same content is exemplified by both my experience of PT1 and 
my experience of PT2 – the content that can be expressed by the existentially quantified 
sentence “there is a black laser pointer in front of me”. Campbell argues that this implies a 
problematic idea, i.e. the idea that “perception could not provide you with knowledge of 
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which particular thing you are talking about” (2002, 124). Suppose I look at PT1 and say, 
“that laser pointer looks like a pen”. I presumably know that the laser pointer I am talking 
about is the one I am looking at, which just is PT1. However, such knowledge would 
become inexplicable if the content of my experience can be fully expressed by the sentence 
“there is a black laser pointer in front of me”. The sentence is true whether the laser pointer 
in front of me is PT1 or PT2, so it is mysterious how undergoing a mental state whose 
content is expressed by the sentence enables me to know the referent of “that laser pointer”.  
Campbell’s argument is effective against the kind of representational view that 
conceptualizes perceptual contents as existentially quantified propositions, but a proponent 
of the representational view need not accept such a conception of contents. As Hopp points 
out, even if two qualitatively identical objects are presented to me in turn and I cannot tell 
which object I am seeing now, it doesn’t follow that I do not see the object in front of me 
(Hopp 2011, 179–80). If so, there is no reason to think of perceptual contents as existentially 
quantified propositions in the first place – they are more akin to propositions that contain 
only individual constants. To be sure, the idea that perceptual contents are existentially 
quantified propositions is intuitively appealing. Its intuitive appeal is nonetheless derived 
from the problematic assumption that seeing shareable properties and seeing individuals are 
somehow mutually exclusive. The assumption can be stated more precisely: if (a) one sees an 
individual and (b) the properties represented by one’s experience is exhausted by the 
properties the individual shares with some other individual, then one’s experience fails to 
represent the individual. But this assumption cannot be right. If PT1 and PT2 are of the 
same color, then one of the things a PT1-representing experience is supposed to do is to 
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represent the color that PT1 shares with PT2. Representing the color of PT1 enables one to 
see PT1 instead of preventing one from doing so.  
As I see it, the right thing to say about the perceptual experience one undergoes 
when seeing PT1 is that it represents PT1 but fails to supply one with optimal access to PT1 
– one’s perceptual experience cannot represent many of the properties that set PT1 apart 
from PT2, such as its historical property of being made earlier than PT2. The access to this 
historical property may be gained if one’s perception is augmented by the instruments in a 
chemical lab, but one’s bare eyes fail to afford one such access. Regardless, it is simply not 
true that one’s perceptual experience doesn’t represent PT1 – it is just that one’s experience 
doesn’t represent everything about PT1 that can be represented. Our observations thus suggest 
that the representation of an individual is not an all-or-nothing matter but a matter of 
degree. The more properties of an individual one has access to, the better one represents the 
individual.  
This point is well accommodated by HDC. Even if I see nothing but the color trope 
that partly makes up PT1, I can still visually represent a foundational system whose members 
include the color trope, thereby representing PT1 itself. However, my perceptual access to 
PT1 will be improved if I continue to look at PT1 and come to represent more members of 
the foundational system. Whether or not this happens, I enjoy access to PT1 itself insofar as 
one of the tropes that PT1 consists of is represented by my experience. If I say, during this 
process, “that laser pointer looks like a pen”, there is no mystery of how I come to know the 
referent of “that laser pointer” – my knowledge is acquired via the access to PT1 that is 
supplied by my experience. HDC is thus immune to Campbell’s second objection.  
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4.5 Conclusion  
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, my goal in this chapter has been to defend 
a version of the representational view that satisfactorily accounts for both the contents and 
objects of conscious perception. I have argued that that the Husserlian dual-component view 
does exactly this. The Husserlian notions employed by HDC, i.e. those of factual and 
expectational contents, are not only phenomenologically tenable but also theoretically 
flexible. By combining these notions with Simons’ idea of a foundational system, HDC 
suggests a way to make sense of our perceptual experiences of individuals. It is therefore a 
theory of perception that is worth considering alongside the more mainstream alternatives, 
such as perceptual propositionalism, perceptual pictorialism and the relational view. In an 
important sense, however, this chapter is only the first part of my two-part defense of HDC. 
It is my belief that one of the most valuable features of HDC is its potential to illuminate the 
nature of event perception – it is to this topic that I will now turn.  
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CHAPTER 5   
PERCEPTION: THE EXPERIENCE OF EVENTS  
The concluding chapter of my dissertation expands on the Husserlian dual-
component view proposed earlier and develops a theory of event perception. I argue that 
our perceptual experiences of events are structurally different from those of individuals and 
time in that the experiences of events require a specific kind of awareness: the awareness of 
temporal boundaries of the kind that individuates an event in accordance with its normal 
course. My analysis of such awareness makes heavy use of the idea of expectational contents. 
If the analysis turns out to be sensible, therefore, it gives us additional reasons to think that 
the Husserlian dual-component view is worth serious consideration.  
It may seem unclear why we need a theory of event perception. Don’t we all have a 
decent grasp of such perceptual experiences? A perceptual experience of an event just is one 
caused by an event; the nature of such an experience is completely determined by the event 
that causes the experience. What else needs to be said? It is not hard to show that this way of 
understanding event perception is overly simplistic. A moment’s reflection indicates that the 
nature of an event-representing experience may not be completely determined by its cause. 
Suppose Mortiz just put his right hand into his pocket. Both Herbert and Wilhelm witnessed 
Mortiz’s action. Herbert is a police officer, and Mortiz’s appearance struck Herbert as quite 
similar to a criminal wanted for firearms trafficking. Wilhelm is an ordinary civilian and 
didn’t notice anything special about Mortiz. Hence, though Mortiz’s action could appear to 
Herbert as the action of reaching for a gun, the action certainly didn’t appear that way to 
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Wilhelm. In this case, Herbert’s and Wilhelm’s visual experiences were caused by the same 
event, but it is questionable to say that they had the same visual experience.  
To be sure, there are alternative ways to analyze the case just mentioned. One could 
argue that the difference between what Herbert and Wilhelm experienced was not a perceptual 
one; it is a difference between the judgments made, the beliefs entertained or the concepts 
applied. To highlight the disagreement between these views and my own, consider an 
experiment conducted by the psychologist Darren Newtson (1973).71 The subjects in the 
experiment were shown a video clip and asked to individuate the events in it. According to 
the instructions, the subjects had to press a button whenever they perceived the ending of an 
event and the beginning of another. As it turns out, the subjects broke the recorded process 
into more events if the recorded process unfolded in a more unexpected way. The 
experiment thus suggests that there is no straightforward correlation between what events 
cause one’s experience and how one individuates events in one’s experience. Newtson’s 
work enables us to devise a thought experiment that brings into sharp focus the 
phenomenological disagreement between two competing ways to think about event 
perception:  
(The Central Thought Experiment)  
Imagine that Alexius and Kasimir are watching the same event unfold in a Newtson-style 
experiment. Since Kasimir is less familiar with what they are watching, the turns of events 
                                                        
 
71 The experiment will be examined in greater detail in section 5.3.  
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are more surprising to him. As a consequence, Kasimir presses the button more frequently 
than Alexius does. Now we ask: is Kasimir’s perceptual experience different from Alexius’?  
As can be expected, my answer is that their perceptual experiences are indeed different. My 
answer entails that the nature of an event-representing experience is not simply determined 
by the event causing the experience – a more complicated account must be given to 
appropriately describe the way event-representing experiences appear within the first-person 
perspective. By contrast, my opponents will give a negative answer to the question posed in 
the Central Thought Experiment. Their answer entails that it is wrong to characterize the 
phenomenon highlighted by Newtson’s experiment as a perceptual one. Whatever 
differences there are between the ways Kasimir and Alexius represent the events shown to 
them, the differences are cognitive.  
The goal of this chapter is to defend my response to the Central Thought 
Experiment. I will supply the theoretical details needed to substantiate my answer to the 
question posed in the thought experiment and defend my theory against potential objections. 
I will argue that Kasimir’s perceptual experience differs from Alexius’ because the 
expectational contents of Alexius’ experience better represent the structure of the recorded 
events than those of Kasimir’s. As a consequence, whereas Kasimir often presses the button 
prematurely, Alexius is less inclined to do so. Before I flesh these out, however, I need to 
explain how my concerns are related to broader considerations. I believe that the kind of 
awareness highlighted by the Central Thought Experiment is a critical feature of event 
perception – it is the feature that makes event perception phenomenologically distinctive. 
But I have not shown this; to do so, I need to contrast our experiences of events with two 
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related forms of experience, i.e. the experiences of individuals and time. And I have not told 
the reader why the issue of event perception metis the attention of philosophers. Before I 
delve into the various forms of perception, therefore, I will say a few words about the 
significance of event perception for the philosophical study of perception in general.  
This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 5.1 makes a case that the neglect of 
event perception in contemporary philosophy of mind is unjustified. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 
examine our experiences of individuals and time. I will argue that our experiences of events 
have features that are not shared by these experiences, so the former are not reducible to the 
latter. Section 5.4 presents my own view on event perception, while Section 5.5 makes 
explicit my response to the Central Thought Experiment. A conclusion then follows, in 
which I make a brief suggestion on further research.  
5.1 Why Care about Event Perception?  
Event perception has never been the topic of any major debate in philosophy. I 
believe this is a mistake. After all, we see events all the time in our everyday life: sports 
competitions, concerts, summer storms and ocean waves are anything but rare. This fact is 
acknowledged by philosophers of quite different persuasions – it is often mentioned in 
passing that we not only perceive objects or individuals but also perceive events. According 
to M. G. F. Martin, “Some of the objects of perception – the concrete individuals, their 
properties, the events these partake in – are constituents of the experience” (2004, 39). 
Similarly, Tim Crane says, “what is represented in experience are objects, properties and 
events, in what might loosely be called a ‘manifold’, but which does not have the structure of 
judgeable content” (2011, 96). Despite philosophers’ willingness to list events among the 
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entities we perceive, however, individuals or objects have been the predominant focus of 
theorizing in the philosophy of perception. Casey O’Callaghan reports such a common 
attitude in his paper: “Given the prominence of objects in visual perception, it is tempting to 
think that all perceiving concerns objects, their features, and their arrangement” (2008, 803–
4).  
One might think that there are good methodological reasons to uphold the primacy 
of individuals in the philosophical study of perception, but such primacy is rarely explicitly 
defended; it is more like a guiding assumption that is tacitly and widely accepted. An example 
of this attitude can be found in the work of Barry Stroud. According to him, many 
conditions must be satisfied for subjects to be “perceptually aware of a fact of the objective 
world that they thereby know to be so” (2015, 392). The necessary conditions for such 
perceptual knowledge include the abilities “to be aware of an object and single it out 
perceptually, to discriminate it from its background or surroundings, to have our attention 
drawn to it, perhaps to track it if it is moving”, among others (2015, 392). But suppose I 
look out of the window while on an airplane. Since the plane is flying through clouds, I see 
nothing but moving clouds. Isn’t my experience sufficient for me to acquire perceptual 
awareness, or even perceptual knowledge, of an objective fact about the world? There is 
certainly such a fact: that there are clouds outside the window. However, it is completely 
unclear that I have singled out anything, segregated any perceived scene into a figure and a 
background, or tracked the movement of anything. All I see are clouds that are more or less 
homogeneous. Though I do see motion, I am unable to identify any sharp spatial boundary 
that separates two clouds, let alone track the movement of one particular cloud. It then 
becomes clear that Stroud’s argument is based on an implicit assumption: to perceive is to 
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perceive an individual. Such an assumption seems so natural that it barely requires to be 
made explicit; there is even less need to defend it. Nevertheless, unless we are ready to 
reduce all forms of perception to the perception of individuals, such an assumption cannot 
be made without arguments.  
But maybe I am exaggerating things. There has been growing interest in time 
perception, and perhaps this trend is effective in remedying the lack of attention to event 
perception. That is unfortunately not true, as philosophers working on the topic of temporal 
awareness typically attempt to capture something that is common to the perception of 
events and the perception of individuals. According to Ian Phillips, the datum to be 
explained by a theory of time perception is that “there are cases… in which one hears or 
perceives in such a way that one is able to attend to a structure of notes, events or event 
parts which occupy a temporal interval” (2008, 178). This remark may be read as saying that 
the main issue about time perception is how we can experience events. But presumably 
Phillips wouldn’t deny that his theory also applies to cases in which a pumpkin is perceived 
to remain identical over a short duration of time or a traffic light simply stays red – here 
pumpkins and traffic lights are obviously individuals. How we can experience these is no less 
an issue about time perception than, say, how I can experience a laser show, in which no 
individuals whatsoever are perceived. If a theory of temporal awareness aims to account for 
both kinds of cases, it cannot tell us what is special about one of them.  
It is therefore my contention that philosophers have neglected to give the issue of 
event perception the attention it deserves. Two notable exceptions are Matthew Soteriou 
(2010) and Thomas Crowther (2014). Despite their interest in the issue, however, their main 
concerns are different from mine. On the one hand, Soteriou’s goal is to motivate the 
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relational view by way of arguing against the representational view. According to him, the 
representational view has difficulties explaining how one can experience two different phases 
of an event in a single experience that exemplifies a single content, but the relational view 
faces no such difficulties (Soteriou 2010, 231–32; 234–36). On the other hand, Crowther’s 
paper aims to explain how one can see an event, instead of a fragment of the event, even if 
one is not acquainted with every temporal part of the event (Crowther 2014, 443–45). If I 
see a layup in a basketball game now, I do not see every temporal part of the basketball game 
at this moment. Regardless of this, Crowther intends to show that I can still be said to 
perceive the game itself, not just the fragment of the game that contains the layup. The 
issues discussed by Soteriou and Crowther are intriguing and important. But their concerns 
are different from mine, as is demonstrated by my emphasis on the Central Thought 
Experiment. The questions raised by the thought experiment remain to be addressed, and 
the theory I am going to propose does exactly that.  
5.2 Contrast Case 1: The Experience of Individuals  
I claim that the perception of events can be distinguished from the perception of 
individuals on phenomenological grounds. To defend this claim, let’s now consider the way 
objects are represented in a perceptual experience of individuals. Roberto Casati (2015) 
discusses various theories of the conditions on which an entity appears as an object of 
vision, and two of the theories are particularly relevant in the present context. The first 
theory is based on the work of Palmer and Rock (1994). According to them, an entity is 
perceived as a basic unit in one’s perceptual environment if it has connected and uniform parts, 
and Casati further argues that the connection must be maximal (Casati 2015, 394–96). For 
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example, whereas any of the individual stars and stripes on the U.S. flag meets all three 
conditions, the total white region on the flag fails to satisfy the condition of maximal 
connection. The region is indeed uniformly white, and many of its parts are connected; 
despite these, not every pair of qualitatively uniform parts are connected – the stars and the 
white stripes are not connected, say. The total white region thus fails to appear as a basic 
unit. In Casati’s terminology, the entities that are perceptually singled out as basic units are 
called “individuals” or “entry objects” (2015, 396). Given my terminological choice to use 
the term “object” to denote any perceptually represented entity, I shall call Casati’s entry 
objects “entry individuals”. Objects that are composed of entry individuals will be called 
“complex individuals”.  
Another theory discussed by Casati, which is proposed by Elizabeth Spelke (1990), is 
also of interest here. According to Spelke, the computational process correlated with object 
perception proceeds in a few stages. First, given a surface and a time interval, the visual 
system keeps track of the location of each surface point over the entire time interval (Spelke 
1990, 48). The resulting representations of surfaces provide the materials for further 
processing. Second, the visual system carves the represented surfaces into physical bodies 
according to two principles: two surface points are represented as belonging to distinct 
bodies if they are not connected by any continuous path (the cohesion principle), and only if so 
(the boundedness principle) (1990, 49). Third, if a cohesive and bounded body is moving, its 
motion is represented according to two additional principles. Whenever possible, the visual 
system represents the motion as rigid (the principle of rigidity) and independent of the 
motion of any other body (the principle of no action at a distance) (1990, 50). For example, 
consider two basketballs moving away from me in the same direction and at the same speed. 
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My visual system will not represent the basketballs as shrinking, which is a kind of non-rigid 
motion; in addition, my visual system will not represent the basketballs as connected by an 
invisible thread, which would mean that the motion of each basketball is constrained by that 
of the other.  
These two theories suggest that an entry individual is an entity whose parts appear to 
be qualitatively uniform, maximally connected, disconnected from any other visible surface, 
and moving in a coordinated way that is characteristic of rigid bodies and independent of 
any other visible instances of motion. It is clear that perceived events typically fail to 
exemplify these features. Suppose I am standing by the sea, watching waves break and water 
wash up on the beach. What I see appears to be a continuous event. However, though parts 
of the event can be identified, those parts are hardly uniform. I may at once see swash on the 
beach and the crest of a wave, for example. If the wave is breaking, its crest may appear 
white; if not, it may appear blue. The swash on the beach, by contrast, appears to have mixed 
colors. Some portions of it may look transparent; others appear to have the color of sand 
because of the sand submerged in water; still others may look gold if the water is reflecting 
sunlight. Not only does the event violate the condition of qualitative uniformity; it also 
violates the condition of rigid motion. However the parts of the event are individuated, 
shrinking and expanding are among their common features. The situation is aggravated by 
the fact that there is no straightforward way to perceptually identify the spatial boundary 
between the event and the other visible surfaces. The location of the swash is constantly 
changing, and waves break after they are formed. As a result, no part of the event appears as 
a cohesive and bounded body capable of undergoing rigid motion.  
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The experience just described is by no means rare. Consider what happens when one 
sees the moving fog in a forest, the shadows of leaves in the wind, changes in the lighting 
conditions of a room, and the great wildebeest migration in Africa (when seen from afar). All 
these experiences fail to represent an object that features an easily noticeable spatial 
boundary and apparently independent motion. However, the reason is not necessarily that 
the kinds of entities perceived in these experiences cannot be represented that way. The 
shadow left by a moving tennis ball appears to have an easily noticeable boundary. If one 
sees the shadow but not the ball, then the motion of the shadow also appears unaffected by 
any other moving entity in the perceived scene. The observation suggests that the distinction 
between the experiences of individuals and events is primarily a distinction between 
representational contents. One may represent a motion event of which a shadow is a 
participant or a shadow-looking individual whose properties include motion. Whether the 
objects of these experiences are the same entity is a partially metaphysical issue that cannot be 
settled on phenomenological grounds alone. I will set aside this issue for now and focus on a 
more urgent question: what exactly is the distinctive phenomenological feature that sets the 
perception of events apart from the perception of individuals?  
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Here’s my proposal: while the 
perception of events partly consists of the 
awareness of temporal boundaries, the 
perception of individuals is not.72 Though 
this answer is not particularly striking, I 
think it makes good phenomenological 
sense. One way to highlight the difference 
is to consider point-light displays. Point-
light displays are images of the kind shown in Figure 2, taken from Miller et al. (2018). The 
two images here depict tennis players about to serve. Now imagine that you are shown a 
video clip consisting of such images and then given two different tasks. In Task 1, you have 
to determine what kind of organism is depicted by the video. In Task 2, you have to 
determine what kind of activity is depicted by the video. What would you look out for in 
carrying out each task, and how would your experience in one of the scenarios differ from 
your experience in the other?  
I think the following is likely to happen. In carrying out Task 2, one would pay 
particular attention to the moment when the depicted activity is finished. One would focus 
on identifying the point at which a seemingly complete pattern of activity has been observed 
                                                        
 
72 Here the term “temporal boundary” is to be understood intuitively; it refers to anything that 
intervenes between two temporal phenomena. Thus noon is the temporal boundary between the 
morning and the afternoon; similarly, Barack Obama’s presidential inauguration was the temporal 
boundary between his state of being the president-elect and his presidency. This intuitive notion of a 
temporal boundary is much broader than Crowther’s technical notion of a temporal boundary, 
discussed in section 3.2. To refer to the kind of temporal boundary Crowther has in mind, I shall use 
the term “completing boundary”; see Section 5.3 below.  
Figure 2. Point-light displays: an example  
Louisa Miller, Hannah C. Agnew, and Karin S. 
Pilz., Fig. 1. From Miller et al. (2018).  
doi: 10.1016/j.visres.2017.08.004  
[CC BY 4.0, 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/] 
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and the same pattern begins to be repeated. In short, one would look out for the boundary 
of the event in time. This piece of information is essential to the successful completion of 
Task 2. While the images in Figure 2 could be followed by images that depict different 
phases of a tennis serve, they could also be followed by images that depict a baseball pitch. If 
an observer mistakenly attributes a temporal boundary to the event at a moment when the 
event is still unfolding, she could misrepresent the event, thereby failing Task 2. But none of 
these matters for Task 1. In carrying out Task 1, one would be attentive to the way the 
points are spatially configured at each moment – whether the figure formed by the points 
looks like a whale, a monkey or a human being, etc. One would also track the displacement 
of the points over time and observe whether the spatial configuration of the points is 
changing. However, one would not try to discern the temporal parts of the depicted object, 
nor would one deploy one’s attention in such a way as to make oneself alert to any repeated 
pattern. One simply wouldn’t attempt to identify the point in time at which the object 
appears to “terminate” in any sense.73 To be sure, one could go about identifying the 
organism by first observing the type of activity that is taking place. In that case, one’s 
experience in Task 1 would be much more similar to one’s experience in Task 2. What 
follows from such a possibility, however, is that the perception of events may facilitate the 
perception of individuals. My point still stands: the awareness of temporal boundaries is the 
                                                        
 
73 Casati and Varzi have made a related point about the metaphysical difference between individuals 
and events: whereas individuals feature easily discernible spatial properties, events are characterized 
by salient temporal properties (Casati and Varzi 1999, 169–70). My concern here is the implications 
such a contrast has for our experiences of individuals and events.  
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main phenomenological feature that distinguishes the perception of events from the 
perception of individuals.  
The question that then arises is how exactly such awareness should be understood. Is 
it really perceptual? Can the Husserlian dual-component view defended in the previous 
chapter accommodate such awareness? These questions will be addressed in the following 
sections. For now, I would like to emphasize that the awareness of temporal boundaries isn’t 
anything mysterious. Though I am not aware of existing work that explicitly takes such 
awareness to be the phenomenological criterion that sets the perception of events apart from 
the perception of individuals, such awareness has been extensively studied in the psychology 
of event individuation. As noted by the psychologists Tanya Sharon and Karen Wynn, event 
individuation is a pervasive phenomenon crucial to many everyday activities. They argue that 
one must be able to parse an event into units if one is to learn the steps necessary for 
carrying out an action, separate the cause and effect in a represented causal chain, identify 
the meaningful units of others’ actions, and refer to the events others refer to (1998, 357). 
Even if one is reluctant to accept the view that we can differentiate between the experiences 
of events and individuals by appealing to the kind of awareness that makes event 
individuation possible, there is nothing controversial about the claim that there is such 
awareness.  
5.3 Contrast Case 2: The Experience of Time  
It is my contention that the significance of event perception is underappreciated in 
philosophy; too much theorizing rests on the implicit assumption that individuals are the 
paradigm of perceptual objects. One may think that this is an overstatement, however. The 
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experience of time has always been a central concern of philosophers. Since the experience 
of time obviously involves the awareness of temporal boundaries, it is tempting to think that 
all the phenomenological features of event perception are derivative of those of time 
perception. A potential point of departure for such a view is the common observation that 
the temporal location of a perceived event typically appears to extend beyond the now. For 
example, Joel Smith claims that to perceive an event, we must be aware of what has just 
happened: “For us to have an experience of an event as an event… there must be, at any one 
moment, some sort of awareness of the just past phases of the event simultaneous with the 
awareness of the present phase” (2016, 93). This suggests a way to conceptualize event 
perception, which I shall call the theory of event perception as time perception (EAT):  
(EAT, First Pass)  
Let v be a visual experience and o the object of v. Then v counts as an instance of event 
perception if and only if:  
(1) in undergoing v, the subject is aware of the temporal boundary between the past and the 
present;  
(2) the temporal location of o appears to overlap both the past and the present.  
EAT appears to capture Smith’s idea quite well. However, Smith is prudent in refraining 
from taking his idea to give us a sufficient condition of event perception. The present 
formulation of EAT leaves much to be desired. In what follows, I will refine EAT in an 
attempt to turn it into a plausible account of event perception. As can be expected, however, 
the conclusion reached in this section will be that EAT alone cannot satisfactorily account 
for event perception.  
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The first issue is how exactly the present should be understood in the framework of 
EAT. Should it be equated with a particular instant? That cannot be right. When I point to a 
bus and say, “there is a bus moving towards me now”, the referent of the indexical “now” 
encompasses more than a single instant. No moving can possibly occur within a single 
instant. What “now” refers to is presumably what William James famously describes as the 
specious present: “the original paragon and prototype of all conceived times is the specious 
present, the short duration of which we are immediately and incessantly sensible” (1890, 
1:631, emphasis omitted). The “now” in the sentence under consideration does not denote 
an instant that can be singled out with some physical measure independently of my mental 
states; rather, it denotes an interval. An instant belongs to the interval insofar as it is the 
temporal location of an object that appears to be in the present. But what would it mean to say 
that an object appears to be in the present? Does it simply mean that the object figures in the 
experience that one is undergoing? Barry Dainton’s view could be interpreted this way. 
According to him, “An experience of succession involves a temporal spread of contents 
being presented together in consciousness, albeit in the form of a perceived succession rather 
than simultaneously”; moreover, “Contents which are apprehended as unified in this way 
belong to a single specious present” (2018, sec. 1.2, para. 3). Take Edith’s experience of a 
stone being thrown into water. Since Edith doesn’t perceive the resulting ripple as emerging 
out of the blue, it must be the case that she is still aware of the falling of the stone. It follows 
that the ripple and the falling are “presented together in consciousness”, so they both appear 
to be in the present.  
Such a view is equivocal at best and phenomenologically untenable at worst. Suppose 
that after undergoing a visual experience of a green cantaloupe over interval I1, I keep my 
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eyes closed over I2 and imagine the way the cantaloupe would look if it were to be painted 
black. To do so, I must continue to represent the green cantaloupe over I2, or at least over 
the earliest portion of I2. In fact, on the assumption that I2 immediately succeeds I1, the green 
cantaloupe is putatively represented over the initial portion of I2 no matter what I end up 
doing over I2 – this is the case insofar as my short-term memory is functioning normally. We 
can then conclude that according to the view under consideration, there is a time at which 
the green cantaloupe and the black cantaloupe both appear to be in the specious present. 
Since they are not experienced as simultaneous, we are compelled to say that I thereby 
undergo an experience of succession. This is nonetheless a weird conclusion. Even if both 
my experience of the cantaloupe and Edith’s experience of the stone can be regarded as 
experiences of succession, they are obviously quite different. Whereas the successive 
contents of Edith’s experience represent the temporal relation between the objects themselves, it is 
unclear that the same can be said of the successive contents of my experience. My 
experience tells me very little about how the green cantaloupe is temporally related to the 
black cantaloupe. The view is thus equivocal between two ways of understanding the 
phenomenon of co-occurrence in the specious present: such co-occurrence can be construed 
as a relation between the contents of experiences and the objects of experiences, but the view 
fails to distinguish the two.  
Recall that our goal is to describe the way the temporal boundaries between events 
are perceptually represented. To do so, we should focus on the temporal relations between 
perceptual objects, not those between perceptual contents. This should be reflected in our 
conception of the specious present: even if an object is represented by the experience one is 
undergoing, it doesn’t follow that the object appears to be in the specious present. Here’s a 
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reasonable additional requirement: the object also has to be represented as simultaneous with 
the experience one is undergoing. Since the green cantaloupe is hardly represented as 
existing simultaneously with the black cantaloupe, the additional requirement rules out the 
content-based understanding of the specious present. But how should we accommodate 
experiences of succession? We could divide the experience one is undergoing into different 
temporal parts:  
(Experience of Succession)  
Let v be a visual experience a subject is undergoing and o its object. Then v is an experience 
of succession if and only if there are v1, v2, o1 and o2 such that:  
(1) v1 and v2 are among the temporal parts of v;  
(2) o1 and o2 are among the temporal parts of o;  
(3) both o1 and o2 are represented by v2;  
(4) v2 represents o2 as simultaneous with v2; 
(5) v2 represents o1 as simultaneous with v1;  
(6) the subject undergoes v2 immediately after she undergoes v1.  
Whenever condition (3) is satisfied, I shall also say that o is represented as occurring in the 
specious present.  
This criterion tells us that Edith’s experience is an experience of succession insofar as the 
later part of her experience represents the falling of the stone as simultaneous with the 
earlier part of her experience, on the one hand, and represents the ripple as simultaneous 
with the later part of her experience, on the other. If this is the case, then the entire event 
appears to Edith as occurring in the specious present.  
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Note that if we are asked to give an example of an ordinary experience of an event, 
Edith’s experience would work perfectly well. This suggests that cases of event perception 
just are experiences of succession:  
(EAT, Second Pass)  
Let v be a visual experience and o the object of v. Then v counts as an instance of event 
perception if and only if it is an experience of succession.  
Any experience that meets the condition features “some sort of awareness of the just past 
phases of the event simultaneous with the awareness of the present phase” (J. Smith 2016, 
93). Does this version of EAT give us what we want? No, it doesn’t, unfortunately. Consider 
what happens when I change TV channels. I had been watching the live broadcast of a 
concert featuring many musicians until Krystian Zimerman finished his performance. Then I 
immediately switched to the live broadcast of a tennis game and saw Roger Federer serving. 
In this scenario, Federer’s serve was perceived to succeed Zimerman’s performance, so they 
were both perceived to occur in the specious present. However, the two events were not 
thereby perceived to constitute a single unified event. Contrast this case with one in which I 
saw Novak Djokovic return the ball after Federer’s serve – in the latter case, the two events 
were perceived to form a single unified event. The difference between these two cases, I 
submit, is a phenomenological one. This suggests that perceiving an event involves 
perceiving a kind of unity that holds the temporal parts of the event together, and such unity 
cannot be simply equated with co-occurrence in the specious present. If so, the newer 
version of EAT still fails to capture the phenomenon I am interested in.  
  
199 
 
Here’s another example of the kind of perceived unity characteristic of events (see 
Figure 3). Anton is watching the landing of an airplane. After the plane lands, it decelerates 
and then makes a sudden left turn. Let’s focus on two of Anton’s visual experiences, v1 and 
v2. In v1, the final part of the landing event appears to be succeeded by the initial part of the 
deceleration event, where such succession appears to occur in the specious present. In v2, the 
final part of the deceleration event appears to be succeeded by the initial part of the sudden 
left turn, where such succession again appears to occur in the specious present. I maintain 
that there is an important phenomenological difference between v1 and v2, a difference 
similar to the one described in the TV watching scenarios. The events that are the objects of 
v1, i.e. the landing and the deceleration, are perceived to form a single unit. By contrast, the 
events that are the objects of v2, i.e. the deceleration and the left turn, are not so perceived. 
The specious 
present experienced 
in v2  
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------| 
Landing Deceleration  Sudden left turn 
An experienced unit  
An experienced unit  An experienced unit  
The specious 
present experienced 
in v1  
Figure 3. The experienced instances of the specious present and the experienced units 
of the perceived event.  
While parts of the landing and the deceleration are experienced as making up a single subevent, 
parts of the deceleration and the sudden left turn are experienced as distinct subevents. Note 
that this diagram is an abstraction; there could be more experiences intervening between v1 and 
v2.  
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There is an intuitive explanation of the difference: in typical cases, a landing event is 
followed by a deceleration event, but the connection between a deceleration event and a 
sudden left turn is much more arbitrary. After deceleration, a plane may turn right, turn left, 
go straight, stop, or accelerate and take off again. While a deceleration event may be 
perceived as the continuation of a landing event, a sudden left turn would appear as a new 
subevent that jointly makes up a larger event with the earlier subevent of landing but is not a 
phase of the latter. If so, however, it would seem that EAT doesn’t have the resources to 
account for the phenomenological difference between v1 and v2. Insofar as the events 
represented by v1 can be said to co-occur in the specious present, the same can be said of the 
events represented by v2; this is the case despite the fact that the events represented by v2 are 
experienced as distinct subevents. To put it differently, insofar as v1 can be said to represent 
the temporal parts of its object as simultaneous with its own temporal parts, the same can be 
said of v2. Since such simultaneity is the sole concern of EAT, EAT gives us little to go on if 
our goal is to understand how the experienced event appears differently in v1 and in v2.  
This point can be reinforced by considering the work done by Newtson (1973), 
briefly mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. He conducted a series of experiments to 
show that the number of temporal boundaries a subject perceives in an event is affected by 
the degree to which the subject perceives the event to unfold in a predictable manner. In one 
experiment, subjects were divided into two groups and shown slightly different video clips. 
The video clip viewed by the control group depicted the process in which an actor 
assembled the model of a molecule. The video clip viewed by the experimental group was 
identical except that an additional sequence of actions was inserted. After spending two 
minutes assembling the model, “the actor turned to his right, removed his right shoe and 
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sock, put the sock in the shoe and placed them on the table to his left, bent down again, and 
rolled his left pants leg up to his knee” (Newtson 1973, 35). This weird series of actions took 
place over 30 seconds. After that, the actor resumed assembling the model in exactly the 
same way he continued to assemble the model in the video watched by the control group. 
The subjects in both groups were asked to record the instants at which a new event was 
perceived to occur. The result was that the subjects in the experimental group began to 
identify more units in the depicted event after seeing the inserted sequence; in Newtson’s 
terminology, their average rate of unitization was 3.37 units per minute, as contrasted with 
the control group’s rate of 2.67 units per minute (1973, 35). This result suggests that the 
participants perceive more temporal boundaries that separate subevents when an unfamiliar 
event is perceived.  
Now consider the experience that a subject in the experimental group underwent 
after she had seen the unexpected of turn of events in the video. We ask: how exactly did her 
experience differ from the corresponding experience had by a subject in the control group, 
such that she perceived more temporal boundaries between subevents in the same depicted 
event? The difference cannot be that she began to perceive time differently; it is not the case 
that she somehow began to experience a shorter specious present. If the subject had always 
been able to perceptually represent two 500-msec events as successively happening in the 
specious present, it is implausible to assume that such an ability was mysteriously lost after 
she saw the weird series of actions. Hence, though the subject’s experience of time remained 
the same, her experience of events had changed. As things stand, nothing in EAT captures 
the difference between the experiences had by the subjects in the experimental and control 
groups.  
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What emerges from these cases is that insofar as our goal is to describe the 
distinctive phenomenological features of event perception, the central issue shouldn’t be 
whether an experienced event is perceived to occur in the specious present. What really 
matters is how a subject perceptually identifies the subevents or units of the perceived event. 
Consider again Anton’s experience of the aircraft. Let’s say that at t, the aircraft had just 
begun to make the sudden left turn. While we could ask whether the left turn and the 
deceleration event preceding it were perceptually represented as successively occurring in the 
specious present, the more important question given our concern is whether they were 
represented as jointly constituting a single event. If the two events were perceived as two 
different phases of one unified event – call this unified event “Taxiing” – then Anton’s 
experience at t represented Taxiing as ongoing. If, by contrast, Anton perceived little 
continuity between the deceleration and the left turn, then his experience at t represented the 
deceleration as having ended and being succeeded by a new event, i.e. the left turn. In such a 
scenario, Taxiing played no role in Anton’s experience. Taking this approach to the issue of 
event perception, we can formulate the key phenomenological questions to be addressed in 
this chapter as follows:  
(Central Questions)  
(1) What is it like to see an event as ongoing?  
(2) What is it like to see an event as ending?  
To defend the idea that event perception is a species of time perception, we have to show 
that this pair of questions can be answered by invoking nothing but the phenomenological 
features of our temporal awareness. I have argued that the two versions of EAT examined 
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above are inadequate theories of event perception. Now that we have a clearer sense of the 
kind of answers we are looking for, however, maybe we can formulate yet another version of 
EAT that better addresses the Central Questions:  
(EAT, Third Pass)  
Let v be a visual experience and o the object of v. Then v counts as an instance of event 
perception if and only if:  
(1) EITHER v represents o as ongoing, which is the case if and only if: for any x, insofar as 
x is a temporal part of o that appears to be located in the specious present, x doesn’t 
appear as the final temporal part of o;  
(2) OR v represents o as ending, which is the case if and only if: there is some y such that y 
is a temporal part of o that appears to be located in the specious present and y appears as 
the final temporal part of o.  
To analyze Anton’s experience at t in terms of this version of EAT, we have to determine 
whether Anton’s experience represented any of its objects as the final temporal part of some 
event. If, for example, Taxiing was an object of Anton’s experience but nothing represented 
by the experience was represented as the final temporal part of Taxiing, then EAT entails 
that Anton perceived Taxiing as ongoing.  
This version of EAT is an improvement over the first two versions, but it has a 
major flaw. It doesn’t tell us what it takes for an experience to represent an object as the final 
temporal part of an event. Given an event, the experiences of the event can be divided into 
two classes: those that represent the event as the final temporal part of some other event and 
those that do not. How exactly do the experiences in the first class differ from those in the 
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second? I don’t see how we can answer this question by focusing exclusively on the features 
of temporal awareness. Therefore, while this last version of EAT may be useful in clarifying 
the way time perception interacts with event perception, it is not in itself an appropriate 
account of the latter. Though time perception and event perception both require some sort 
of awareness of temporal boundaries, they represent different kinds of temporal boundaries. 
In our awareness of time, we experience the boundaries of the specious present. In our 
awareness of events, by contrast, we experience what I call the completing boundaries of events. 
Before we turn to the idea of a completing boundary, however, it is worth emphasizing that 
I have no intention to claim that event perception can occur independently of time 
perception. The only thing I insist on is that the latter isn’t sufficient for the former.  
The notion of a completing boundary is derived from Crowther’s technical notion of 
a temporal boundary. According to the theory proposed by Crowther (2011),74 no event can 
occur without being completed by the kind of temporal boundary appropriate to its nature. 
A watering of plants cannot occur without some plant’s being watered; a plant’s being 
watered is thus the temporal boundary that is required by, and completes, a watering of 
plants. Crowther holds that such temporal boundaries should be understood in terms of 
temporal stuff: a moment in time is the location of a temporal boundary if certain temporal 
stuff comes into being or ceases to be at that moment. I do not subscribe to Crowther’s 
distinction between temporal stuff and temporal particulars, but I find the idea of event 
completion compelling. Hence, instead of adopting the definition of a completing boundary 
based on temporal stuff, I will take the idea to be simply a generalization of what Vendler 
                                                        
 
74 The theory is discussed in section 3.2 of this dissertation.  
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calls the climax of an action, i.e. a point that “has to be reached if the action is to be what it 
is claimed to be” (Vendler 1957, 145).75 Vendler’s idea is now widely accepted, and it is 
customary for linguists to draw the distinction between telic and atelic events. Here’s how 
Kate Kearns draws the distinction: “The property of telicity… is the property of having a 
natural finishing point… Any event which does not have a natural finishing point is atelic” 
(Kearns 2011, 157). But as Crowther notes, an atelic event just is an event that can be 
completed by any kind of ending point (Crowther 2011, 24). Meditating is an atelic event, 
and one can stop meditating by standing up, turning on the TV or beginning to eat. Doing 
any of these completes the meditating event, even though the event doesn’t have a climax. I 
will therefore take the idea of a completing boundary to be applicable to both telic and atelic 
events: something is a completing boundary of an event insofar as it is capable of 
individuating the event in a way compatible with the event’s nature. That is, given events e 
and f, f is a completing boundary of e if and only if ending with f counts as a natural course of 
e. Note that I speak of a completing boundary instead of the completing boundary of an 
event, because there may be multiple final phases an event could reach when it runs its 
normal course. This is especially the case for atelic events. Of course, any event that has 
already occurred in the actual world has no more than one completing boundary.  
So construed, the notion of a completing boundary is closely related to the notion of 
an event boundary that is widely adopted in the psychology of event individuation. However, 
the term “event boundary” is often used by psychologists in such a way as to make its 
metaphysical import obscure. This happens because psychologists do not typically work with 
                                                        
 
75 Again, see section 3.2 for discussion.  
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a metaphysically nuanced conception of events. For example, in one of their studies, Jeffrey 
Zacks and Barbara Tversky claim to focus on “the following archetype for an event: a 
segment of time at a given location that is conceived by an observer to have a beginning and 
an end” (2001, 3). Such a definition of events lumps together the boundaries of a time 
interval and those of an event; moreover, it seems to suggest that the boundaries of an event 
are what an observer takes them to be. These ambiguities make the definition inadequate for 
the present task, i.e. to describe how the way events are represented in perception differs 
from the way other entities, including time, are represented in perception. Hence, though I 
will draw on the psychology of event individuation to defend my view, I will work with a 
view that takes completing boundaries to be integral to events, which has a more explicit 
realist character than a view like Zacks and Tversky’s. The experiences of events are 
phenomenologically distinguishable from those of individuals and time precisely because 
they have contents that represent completing boundaries. In what follows, I will clarify and 
defend this claim.  
5.4 The Experience of Events  
5.4.1 Experiencing Completing Boundaries  
If focusing on our awareness of the specious present alone isn’t enough for us to 
understand the way the completing boundaries of events are experienced in conscious visual 
perception, what else should we consider? The first step, I submit, is to invoke the 
expectational contents described by the Husserlian dual-component view (HDC). The 
reason is that whether the completing boundary of an event appears to have occurred 
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typically depends on what one expects to happen at the following moment. Suppose there is 
water in front of Franz and Franz has just dropped his phone. At this point, does the 
submergence of the phone in water appear to Franz as a completing boundary of the 
phone’s falling? Not if Franz perceives the water to be just a puddle. In that case, Franz 
expects the phone to remain visible at the following moment; the possibility that the phone 
becomes submerged in water wouldn’t even strike Franz, let alone figure in the content of 
Franz’s experience. Hence, what would appear as a completing boundary of the phone’s 
falling depends on what Franz expects to happen when the phone actually touches the 
ground. To adequately characterize Franz’s visual experience of the phone’s falling, we must 
pay attention to the events represented by the experience’s expectational contents.  
Expectational contents carry information about what is likely to occur in the 
immediate future. Likelihood is a modal notion. Therefore, if we are to describe the 
expectational contents of event-representing experiences, a convenient framework is that of 
possible world semantics. It is nonetheless important to note that I am not committed to the 
idea that possible worlds are the contents of experiences.76 The only kinds of contents relevant 
to my analysis here are those posited by HDC, i.e. factual and expectational contents. 
Possible worlds are only invoked to specify the objects of experiences; the framework serves 
the sole purpose of pinpointing the future event that is represented as what will probably 
succeed the currently perceived event. It follows that I will have little to add to what has 
                                                        
 
76 According to Michael Tye, “a natural suggestion is that the content of a visual experience is simply 
a set of possible worlds, namely the set of worlds at which the experience is accurate” (2014, 300). I 
do not endorse such a view. For my take on the relation between possible worlds, perceptual 
contents and perceptual objects, see section 5.4.5.  
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already been said in the previous chapter about the nature of expectational contents 
themselves – the proposal presented here won’t shed further light on, say, whether such 
contents have a compositional semantics or what their atomic components are. The analysis 
developed here presupposes HDC rather than alters it. To be sure, I will supply additional 
details as we go to turn HDC into an appropriate account of event perception, but those 
details should be compatible with everything I said in the previous chapter.  
Here’s how I think we should use possible worlds to capture the expectational 
contents of event-representing experiences.77 I call my proposal the boundary representation view 
about event perception (BRV):  
(BRV, First Pass)  
Let v be a visual experience whose subject is s and whose object is event e.  
(1) v represents e as ongoing if and only if in every possible world expectable for s, there is 
an event f of which the following are true:  
(a) f occurs immediately after e;  
(b) f jointly makes up a larger event with e.  
                                                        
 
77 The idea that some features of perceptual contents can be captured with possible worlds is not 
new. An early attempt to do so is Hintikka (1969). Within the phenomenological tradition, Smith and 
McIntyre (1982) and Banick (2017) have responded to Hintikka’s work. Outside the 
phenomenological tradition, possible worlds appear in the theory of perception proposed by Egan 
(2010). What makes my focus different from all these scholars’ is that the possible worlds invoked in 
my account are future possibilities: they are what the present actual world might become in the 
immediate future. By contrast, the possible worlds that figure in the above accounts are either 
alternatives to the present actual world or worlds defined independently of times. The cases that my 
proposal is designed to address are therefore somewhat different from those that the above accounts 
focus on.  
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(2) v represents e as ending if and only if in every possible world expectable for s, there isn’t 
any event that satisfies both (1)(a) and (1)(b).  
If (1) is the case, s experiences the completing boundary of e as yet to occur. If (2) is the case, 
the currently perceived temporal part of e appears as the completing boundary of e.78, 79  
Let’s analyze the aforementioned case of Anton’s experience in terms of BRV. Recall that 
Anton perceived the successive occurrence of an aircraft’s landing and deceleration. What 
must have been the case for Anton to see the landing as ongoing? Obviously, the factual 
contents of Anton’s experience had to represent the landing. According to BRV, it was also 
necessary for the expectational contents of his experience to represent an event that would 
happen immediately after the landing and jointly make up a complex event with the landing. 
This condition was presumably satisfied because Anton had seen enough aircraft landings in 
                                                        
 
78 An alternative is to say that the latest temporal part in the specious present appears as the 
completing boundary of e.  
79 At this point, the reader might begin to think that there is something weird about the way the 
Central Questions and BRV are formulated. Why focus on the ending of an event rather than both 
the ending and beginning of an event? There are two reasons for this. First, in many cases, the 
perception of an event’s beginning simply consists in the fulfillment of one’s prior expectation that 
the earlier event is ending. Suppose I saw an accelerating aircraft at t and expected the acceleration to 
end momentarily with the takeoff of the aircraft. My expectation was fulfilled at the moment 
immediately after t. This seems sufficient for me to experience the beginning of another event, i.e. 
the aircraft’s ascent – given that the takeoff was perceived as the ending of an event, what appeared 
immediately after it was perceived as the initial phase of a new event. Second, in those cases where 
one perceives the beginning of an event without having expected it, one’s experience can be analyzed 
in a way largely analogous to the analysis given in BRV. The main difference is that instead of 
expectations, we need to invoke one’s awareness of the events in the immediate past. Suppose the 
aircraft in our example took off earlier than I expected, so I had not formed the expectation that the 
acceleration process was about to end. However, when I saw the takeoff, I was aware (1) that the 
aircraft had been accelerating, and (2) that the takeoff was not a part of the acceleration process. I 
thus perceived the takeoff as initiating an event different from the one that just happened. In short, if 
my analysis here is correct, then it shouldn’t be too difficult to accommodate our experiences of 
event beginnings within the framework of BRV. To simplify the arguments, therefore, I will focus on 
how we perceive the endings of events.  
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the past. Given Anton’s past experience, upon seeing the aircraft land, Anton automatically 
expected to see a process of deceleration – such a process appeared to Anton as the only 
natural way for the event to continue. As a result, any possible world in which such a process 
failed to occur would defy Anton’s expectation, so both conditions (1)(a) and (1)(b) were 
met. BRV then tells us that Anton perceived the completing boundary of the landing as yet 
to occur, so the landing was perceived as ongoing.80  
As things stand, the conditions specified by BRV are not precise enough. An issue 
that has to be addressed immediately is the criterion of an expectable world. What 
conditions must be met for a world to belong to the set of expectable worlds? It cannot be 
right to say that the set includes every world in which I undergo an experience that is 
possible for me to undergo after experiencing what I am experiencing now. After seeing a 
landing event, Anton could see a deceleration event, a police chase or the eruption of a 
nearby volcano. The last two events are rather unlikely, but they are certainly metaphysically 
possible – or even epistemically possible. Despite this, for the purpose of singling out the 
objects represented by the expectational contents of Anton’s experience, it would be wrong 
to include those worlds. As I will try to show, choosing the expectable worlds appropriately 
is no easy task. One of the complications results from the fact that there may be substantial 
                                                        
 
80 To make the claim more precise, we should say that what was perceived as ongoing was the 
complex event jointly made up by the landing and the deceleration. This requires us to change 
condition (1) in BRV: the phrase “v represents e as ongoing” should be replaced by “v represents an 
event of which e is a temporal part as ongoing”. Since the former is simpler and more easily readable, 
I will stick to the former. It should nevertheless be understood that the simpler phrase is just a 
convenient expression that abbreviates the more precise version of condition (1) in BRV.  
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interpersonal differences in the way the same event is experienced – this will be our topic in 
the upcoming section.  
5.4.2 An Excursion into Natural Language Semantics  
Given any event, the way the event unfolds would be familiar to some people but 
not to the others. If we want a theory capable of accommodating all these people’s 
experiences, we run into a tricky issue: how should such familiarity be reflected in our choice 
of the relevant possible worlds? On the one hand, the worlds expectable for an expert vastly 
outnumber the worlds expectable for an amateur. Suppose I am invited to watch a sumo 
competition for the first time. When the competition is about to begin, I see two men in 
unusual clothing crouching in a ring. I do have some expectations about what will happen: in 
light of my past experience with other forms of sports, I expect the men to stay in the ring 
and keep their distance from the referee. But these pretty much exhaust all my expectations. 
Since I have never watched a sumo competition, I have no expectations whatsoever about 
how the men will interact with each other. This is not the case for Johannes, who is a 
Japanese culture enthusiast that regularly attends such competitions. For Johannes, the very 
way a sumo wrestler crouches already conveys a lot of information about what the sumo 
wrestler is about to do. Therefore, in specifying the expectational contents of Johannes’ and 
my perceptual experiences of seeing the beginning of a sumo competition, we have to use 
different sets of possible worlds. Some worlds contain events that Johannes’ experience 
would, but mine would not, represent as likely to occur at the following moment; those 
worlds should be excluded when we try to describe the expectational contents of my 
experience.  
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On the other hand, there is a sense in which we need to take into consideration more 
possible worlds when specifying the expectational contents of an amateur’s experience. 
Suppose I woke up in a venue for sumo competitions with no idea how I got there. I saw 
two men standing in a ring, but I didn’t realize that they were about to start wrestling. 
Depending on what’s going on in my mind, I might expect the men to start dancing as part 
of a religious ritual or to both charge at the referee. These possibilities would not even come 
across Johannes’ mind if he were in my position. It follows that many course of events might 
appear possible to me but not to Johannes. The possible worlds in which the perceived 
event unfolds in those ways should be excluded when we try to pin down the events likely to 
be represented by the expectational contents of Johannes’ experience.  
If the above reasoning is correct, then the set of worlds expectable for an expert is 
both larger and smaller than the set of worlds expectable for an amateur that is perceiving 
the same event. How can that be? 81 The way out of this thorny situation, I submit, is to use 
more than one set of possible worlds. The work of the linguist Paul Portner provides a good 
model of how this can be done. Portner defends a semantics of the progressive aspect that 
builds on an earlier theory proposed by David Dowty (1977, 1979). Portner uses the 
sentence “John was building a house” to illustrate Dowty’s theory, which maintains that the 
sentence “is true iff something was going on that, if it had proceeded normally, would have 
been a complete house-building by John” (Portner 1998, 762). Portner’s semantics has two 
                                                        
 
81 This question is to some extent rhetorical. Strictly speaking, when compared with the set of worlds 
expectable for the amateur, the set of worlds expectable for the expert is not both larger and smaller; 
it is larger in one sense but smaller in another. Still, the question of how these are to be reconciled 
remains.   
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major theoretical constructs, which aims to flesh out the idea of a complete event, on the 
one hand, and that of normal progression, on the other.  
Take the sentence “At noon, Drone No.89 was making a delivery to Roman”. How 
do we identify the truth conditions of this sentence? According to Portner, we have to 
consider the modal base, which is a set of facts that collectively specify the nature of the event 
described by the verb predicate in the progressive form. As Portner puts it, the modal base is 
“the set of circumstances relevant to whether e is completed” (1998, 774).82 In our example, 
the facts in the modal base collectively guarantee that the ongoing event described by the 
predicate “was making a delivery to Roman” would turn into a complete event of Drone 
No.89’s delivery of ordered merchandise to Roman, provided that the event was free from 
interruption. The modal base is therefore made up of facts concerning Drone No.89 and its 
activities around noon, such as that the drone was perfectly functional, that it indeed carried 
some ordered merchandise, and that the drone had already left the storage facility, etc.  
In addition to the modal base, we also have to consider the ordering source, which 
“provides a definition of what it is for a given event not to be interrupted” (1998, 777). In 
our example, the definition would be a conjunction of such conditions as that Drone No.89 
wouldn’t get attacked by aggressive birds, that there wouldn’t be malicious attempts to hack 
into the drone, and that the drone wouldn’t get hit by a car, etc. Once we have singled out 
the modal base and the ordering source, we follow a two-step process to determine the truth 
conditions of the sentence. First, we identify the set of worlds compatible with the modal 
                                                        
 
82 The idea of a modal base is originally proposed by Angelika Kratzer ([1981] 2002). Similarly for the 
idea of an ordering source, to be discussed shortly.  
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base. Second, we examine the subsets of the set and choose the subset that best satisfies the 
ordering source. Then we say that the sentence is true if and only if in all the worlds chosen 
in the second step, there is an event e such that Drone No.89’s activity at noon was a 
temporal part of e, on the one hand, and e ends up being a successful delivery of ordered 
merchandise to Roman, on the other (1998, 782).83 This is how Portner fleshes out Dowty’s 
idea: the modal base captures what an event is and what it will end up being in those worlds 
where it is allowed to run its course, while the ordering source captures what it takes for the 
event to actually run its course.  
In a sense, what I propose to do is to formulate a theory of event perception 
analogous to Portner’s theory of progressive sentences. More specifically, we could say that 
the perceptual analogues of the modal base and the ordering source jointly determine the set 
of expectable worlds relevant for determining the expectational contents of a perceptual 
experience. Since the set of expectable worlds associated with an experience is changed if 
either the modal base or the ordering source is changed, we can make sense of the seemingly 
contradictory claim that the set of worlds expectable for an expert at once contains more 
worlds and less worlds than the set corresponding to the experience of an amateur watching 
the same event unfold. Unfortunately, there are at least two obstacles to pursuing such a 
suggestion literally.  
                                                        
 
83 This is a simplification; Portner’s actual semantics features many subtleties left out here. For 
example, the ordering source doesn’t simply function as a set of necessary conditions; it is supposed 
to yield an ordering of the worlds compatible with the modal base. However, the main reason 
Portner’s theory is brought up here is that it illustrates the distinction between the modal base and 
the ordering source; the fine details about the truth conditions of progressive sentences need not 
concern us here.  
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First, Portner’s semantic theory is concerned with the truth conditions of progressive 
sentences, but I am interested in the objects of expectational contents. While some may be 
inclined to assimilate objects to truth conditions, I have no intention of doing so. On my 
view, even if an experience is completely veridical with respect to an environment, it doesn’t 
follow that everything in the environment is an object of the experience. The distinction is 
even more important in the case of possible worlds – even if an experience is, say, 
completely veridical at the actual world at 5 p.m., it doesn’t follow that the experience 
represents everything in the actual world at 5 p.m. It is thus unclear how Portner’s account 
of truth conditions can be translated into an account of perceptual representations. Second, 
the situation is even direr if we want our theory of event perception to be 
phenomenologically adequate. We could try to turn Portner’s semantic theory into a 
psychological theory of beliefs and say something like the following: a person’s belief about 
an ongoing event is accurate if and only if the person’s beliefs about the modal base and the 
ordering source associated with the event are accurate. Whether or not a plausible 
conception of beliefs can be developed along these lines, it seems unlikely for us to come up 
with a reasonable theory of event perception by taking this route. After all, what would be 
the perception of a modal base or an ordering source? The idea that we can perceive the latter 
is especially unintelligible. In the case of Drone No.89, what would it even mean to say that 
one perceives the absence of any hackers trying to derail the delivery attempt or the absence 
of strong electromagnetic fields that would eventually disable the drone?  
Despite these difficulties, it is my belief that the notions of the modal base and the 
ordering source can be fruitfully put to use in a theory of event perception. It still seems 
reasonable to say that when an expert and an amateur perceive the same event, the sets of 
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worlds expectable for them are different; it’s just that these worlds cannot be singled out the 
way the worlds compatible with the modal base of a sentence are singled out. Insofar as we 
take these worlds to play a role in determining the objects of the experiences without 
functioning as the objects themselves, the above difficulties can be circumvented.84 Let’s say 
that an expert’s experience of an event has a wider expectational base than the experience of an 
amateur watching the same event unfold. This explains why, in the aforementioned sumo 
case, the worlds expectable for Johannes are greater in number than the worlds expectable 
for me. An expectational base is a set of possible worlds; roughly, it is the theoretical 
counterpart of a set of worlds compatible with a modal base. Besides the difference in the 
expectational base, there is also the difference between the salience constraints imposed by 
Johannes’ experience and mine, where a salience constraint is basically the theoretical 
counterpart of an ordering source. A salience constraint separates the relevant worlds in the 
expectational base from the irrelevant ones. The worlds that meet the salience constraint are 
called expectationally relevant worlds. In the sumo case, the worlds that are expectationally 
relevant for me are greater in number than the worlds expectationally relevant for Johannes, 
even though the expectational base of Johannes’ experience is wider than the expectational 
base of mine. This explains why my expectations about what the sumo wrestlers are about to 
do are more indeterminate than Johannes’; many possibilities that appear relevant to me 
simply fail to appear this way to Johannes.  
                                                        
 
84 If one takes this route, it is imperative for one to say something about the exact role the worlds 
play in determining the objects of the experiences. I will return to this issue in section 5.4.5.  
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With these concepts in hand, we can give a more precise characterization of the 
aforementioned issue about BRV: given the expectational contents of an event-representing 
experience, what criteria should we use to identify the set of possible worlds relevant for 
specifying the objects of these contents? We can now take the issue to be: given an 
experience of an event, how should we identify the worlds that are expectationally relevant 
for the person undergoing the experience? The answer is: we should look for the 
expectational base of the experience and the salience constraint imposed by the experience. 
Obviously, both concepts must be defined more precisely; that will be the topic of the next 
two sections. A good way to conceptualize the expectational base, I suggest, is to appeal to 
what Jeff Yoshimi calls “expectation gradients”. I will therefore turn to Yoshimi’s work now.  
5.4.3 Specifying Expectational Contents: The Expectational Base  
In an attempt to make Husserl’s view on the experience-expectation relation formally 
precise, Yoshimi proposes what he calls the expectation rule, which has the following form:  
𝑓: 𝐾 × 𝑉 × 𝐵 → [0, 1]𝑉  (Yoshimi 2016, 18) 
The meanings of the symbols are as follows:  
 K is the set that includes exactly those possible states that could function as a person’s 
background knowledge: “A state of background knowledge corresponds to all of a 
person’s unconscious beliefs, attitudes, tendencies, and understandings at a time. These 
states persist while we sleep and have an impact on what we do when we are awake” 
(2016, 16).  
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 V is the set of all sensory impressions that are possible for human vision.85 Yoshimi 
illustrates the idea of a sensory impression by comparing the experience of a house and 
the experience of a façade of the house in a movie set. The component shared by these 
two experiences is the sensory impression of a house-looking entity (2016, 13–14).  
 B is the set of all kinesthetic experiences that could be had when a person moves her 
body.  
 [0, 1]𝑉 is the set of all functions from the set V to the interval [0, 1], i.e. the set of all 
numbers between 0 and 1. The interval represents degrees of fulfillment or “degrees to 
which what we see confirms or disconfirms prior expectations” (2016, 15).  
As a whole, the expectation rule says that the degree to which a person’s sensory impression 
at t would confirm her earlier expectations depends on three aspects of her mind at the 
moment just before t: her background knowledge, sensory impression and awareness of her 
own bodily movement.  
As an example, suppose I am inspecting my guitar to see whether it got damaged 
during the process of moving my stuff to a new apartment – that seems unlikely to me, 
because it was carefully packaged. I just finished examining the front side of the guitar, and I 
am about to turn it around to take a look at its backside. According to the expectation rule, 
to predict the degree to which my expectations at this moment will be confirmed by the 
experience I am about to undergo, we have to consider the following members of K, V and 
B. The relevant member of K is my knowledge that my guitar was carefully packaged (and all 
                                                        
 
85 Yoshimi’s preferred term for the members of V is “visual images”, though he uses the term “visual 
sensory impressions” as well (2016, 13). It seems to me that the term “visual images” carries some 
unwanted connotations, so I prefer to avoid it here.  
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the related information I have). The relevant member of V is my sensory impression of the 
front side of the guitar. As for B, we should focus on my awareness that I am turning the 
guitar around with my hands. The expectation rule takes these inputs and yields a function 
whose argument is v, the visual experience I am about to undergo, and whose output is the 
degree to which v would fulfill my present expectations. Yoshimi calls any such function an 
expectation gradient (2016, 17–18). In the case under consideration, if I see a dent on the 
backside of my guitar in v, the expectation gradient would yield a low number, which means 
that my expectations are not very well fulfilled. In contrast, if the backside of my guitar 
appears intact in v, the expectation gradient would yield a number close to 1.  
In my terminology, a sensory impression just is a factual content.86 The expectation 
rule thus says that the factual contents of my present visual experience, together with my 
background knowledge and the kinesthetic experience I am undergoing, determine the 
extent to which the expectational contents of my present visual experience would be fulfilled 
by each of the possible visual experiences I might undergo at the following moment. As 
Yoshimi points out, given an expectation gradient, we can define “the set of all visual 
experiences above some threshold τ, which can be taken to distinguish subsequent images 
that are expected (that would not surprise us) from those that would surprise us” (2016, 
21).87 Take the sumo case. Suppose Johannes and I just saw the referee’s gesture telling the 
wrestlers to start the match. Given the vast difference in background knowledge between 
                                                        
 
86 A potential point of divergence is the following. While I take factual contents to be 
representational, Yoshimi doesn’t explicitly say whether the same can be said of what he calls sensory 
impressions. In a conversation I had with him in 2017, I was told that he would prefer to remain 
neutral on the issue.  
87 See footnote 85 for what Yoshimi means by “images” in this context.  
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Johannes and me, Johannes’ experience and mine should be associated with different 
expectation gradients. Hence, though a subsequent experience of seeing a sumo wrestler 
charging at his opponent would not surprise Johannes, it might surprise me. It follows that 
such a visual experience would belong to the set of above-threshold experiences only if the 
set is defined by the expectation gradient associated with Johannes and not defined by the 
one associated with me.  
Yoshimi’s idea enables us to characterize the expectational base in a straightforward 
way. I propose to simply define the expectational base as the set that contains any possible 
world one would encounter in one of the above-threshold visual experiences:  
(Expectational Base)  
Let g be the expectation gradient determined by the background knowledge k, visual 
experience v and kinesthetic experience b of subject s at time t. Then for any possible world 
w, w is in the expectational base of v just in case that the following is true given g: in w, there 
is a visual experience v* such that v is succeeded by v* at the moment just after t and s isn’t 
surprised by v*.  
In the scenario just described, the world in which a sumo wrestler charges at his opponent 
belongs to the expectational base of Johannes’ experience of seeing the referee’s gesture at 
the start of the match, but the same world doesn’t belong to the expectational base of my 
experience had at the same time.  
As suggested in the previous section, however, the expectational base alone is 
insufficient for determining the worlds that are expectationally relevant for the person 
undergoing the experience. Now that we have given a more precise definition of the 
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expectational base by appealing to Yoshimi’s expectation gradient, we are in a better position 
to see why an additional theoretical construct is needed. There are two main reasons for this.  
First, the worlds in the expectational base are defined to be those in which one is not 
surprised, and what motivates the definition is the putative link between what is not 
surprising and what is expected. However, the link may not be as self-evident as it might 
seem at first. For even though the occurrence of surprise is a good indicator of violated 
expectations, the lack of surprise could fail to indicate the fulfillment of expectations. This 
means that the expectational base fails to single out exactly those worlds that are represented 
by the expectational contents of one’s experience.  
Here’s an example of a possible world that seems neither surprising nor expected. 
Suppose I pulled back the curtains and saw that it was snowing outside. I was not surprised. 
But why not? Was surprise absent because I had expected to see a possible world in which it 
was snowing? If we answer in the positive, we would be hard-pressed to justify our answer. I 
had no idea that it was going to snow today, and I drew back the curtains precisely to find 
out what the weather was like outside. If this is a case in which snow was expected, then it is 
no less a case in which many other weather phenomena, such as sunlight and rain, were 
expected. But it is hard to make sense of the claim that I expected all these mutually 
incompatible weather phenomena at once. The opposite claim may thus appear more 
plausible: I was not surprised when I saw snow because when I drew back the curtains, I had 
no expectations about the weather whatsoever.  
The claim that I didn’t expect any kind of weather may seem more attractive, but it is 
no less problematic. Imagine a case in which I pulled back the curtains and saw nothing but 
a tornado outside – I was extremely surprised by what I saw. However, as just mentioned, 
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whether or not the absence of surprise presupposes the fulfillment of expectations, the 
occurrence of surprise presupposes the violation of expectations. In the tornado case, I 
would not have been surprised if I had not expected something other than a tornado. What 
would be the relevant expectation? The answer is probably the expectation to see some 
weather phenomenon of a normal type. It is the expectation that on an ordinary day, I would 
see snow, rain or the like, not a tornado or a tsunami.  
We are then faced with a dilemma when analyzing the expectations I had upon 
pulling back the curtains. In one sense, I didn’t have weather-related expectations, because I 
would be no more surprised to see snow than to see, say, sunlight. In another sense, 
nonetheless, I did have weather-related expectations, because I expected to see an ordinary 
weather phenomenon instead of a rare one. How should we avoid the dilemma? A natural 
suggestion is to say that we are actually talking about two kinds of expectations here. To 
flesh out the suggestion, let’s distinguish between generic expectations and situational 
expectations.88  
On the one hand, generic expectations can be triggered by a wide variety of contexts. 
One might have the generic expectations that tornados are unlikely to occur, that physical 
entities don’t vanish into thin air, that plants don’t walk, that four-legged animals don’t fly, 
and that two solid entities collide with, rather than pass through, each other upon contact. In 
fact, many generic expectations are nearly always operative. Take the expectation that 
physical entities are generally incapable of sudden disappearance. Unless one is in a very 
                                                        
 
88 I thank Jeff Yoshimi for suggesting the terms “generic” and “situational”. I considered using the 
terms “non-situation-specific” and “situation-specific”, but they were rather clumsy.  
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unusual environment, it is difficult not to have such an expectation – no matter what physical 
entity I see, I will be surprised if it simply vanishes in front of my eyes.  
On the other hand, situational expectations are highly context-dependent. In the 
sumo case, if Johannes sees one of the wrestlers grab the other’s belt, he might expect a belt-
throw. Such an expectation depends on the factual contents of Johannes’ experience: 
Johannes wouldn’t have the expectation if he weren’t observing the sumo wrestler’s action. 
This makes the expectation radically different from generic expectations – the generic 
expectation that physical objects don’t suddenly vanish can be held even when one is not 
undergoing any visual experience. Furthermore, Johannes’ expectation can only be triggered 
by the particular kind of situation Johannes is in. Unlike the generic expectation that plants 
don’t walk, which is at work when one sees a chestnut tree, a maple tree, a bush or a flower, 
Johannes’ expectation about the belt-throw is operative only when he sees a belt-grabbing 
action performed in a very specific way.  
It is therefore sensible to distinguish between generic and situational expectations. 
With the distinction in hand, we can make sense of the case of pulling back the curtains. 
When I drew back the curtains, I had the generic expectation that I would see an ordinary 
weather phenomenon, such as snow or rain. What I didn’t have was the situational 
expectation that my visual experience of the curtains would be followed by the visual 
experience of snow. It then emerges that only situational expectations are capable of 
functioning as the expectational contents of an experience – only situational expectations 
depend on the factual contents of an experience. Since our definition of the expectational 
base doesn’t enable us to separate the worlds compatible with one’s generic expectations 
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from those compatible with one’s situational expectations, the expectational base fails to 
specify the expectational contents of one’s experience on its own.  
The second reason that we need additional theoretical constructs is that some worlds 
are included in the expectational base of one’s experience not because they contain events 
that are possible continuations of the event currently perceived by one. Suppose I am 
watching an award ceremony. My eyeglasses are dirty, so I move my hands to take them off 
and wipe them clean. Given my visual experience, kinesthetic experience and background 
knowledge at this point, I expect to see nothing but blurry patches at the next moment. 
According to our definition above, a world in which only blurry patches appear is in the 
expectational base of my current visual experience. Such a world obviously contributes 
nothing to my awareness of the completing boundaries featured by the subevents of the 
ceremony, but the very reason we hope to identify the expectationally relevant worlds is to 
account for such awareness. Or consider a less extreme case: bored by the ceremony, I turn 
my head to talk to my friend, who sits behind me. Our definition above would say that a 
world in which my friend’s face is located at the center of my visual field is in the 
expectational base of my current visual experience. Such a world tells us nothing about the 
way I perceive the subevents of the ceremony.  
The expectational base often contains such irrelevant worlds because one of its main 
functions is to capture what appears possible given one’s background knowledge. One’s 
background knowledge doesn’t just carry information about the kind of event one is 
perceiving – it also carries information about the kind of place one finds oneself in, the kind 
of people around one and the non-event entities currently perceived by one, etc. As a 
consequence, many possible worlds unrelated to the event unfolding in front of one count as 
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members of the expectational base. This again prevents the expectational base from 
independently fixing the expectational contents.  
To sum up, there are three possible scenarios in which one would not be surprised 
by what one sees: the absence of surprise indicates the fulfillment of either (1) a generic 
expectation, (2) a situational expectation unrelated to the currently perceived event, or (3) a 
situational expectation related to the currently perceived event. In trying to identify the 
expectational contents of event-representing experiences, we should focus only on the 
possible worlds in which expectations of the third kind are fulfilled. To single out those 
possible worlds, we must combine the expectational base with the salience constraint. In the 
following section, we will turn to the latter.  
5.4.4 Specifying Expectational Contents: The Salience Constraint  
We have given an intuitive characterization of the way the salience constraint works, 
but the idea obviously needs to be further developed. The best way to proceed is to work 
with an example. And it would be helpful to consult some empirical work here – doing so 
could make our example more realistic. According to several studies, expert tennis players 
can visually anticipate many types of shot.89 A study conducted by Jaeho Shim, Les Carlton 
and Young-Hoo Kwon even suggests that there could be a specific visual cue used by expert 
players to differentiate between lobs and groundstrokes: the pattern of relative motion 
featured by the opponent’s forearm and racket (Shim, Carlton, and Kwon 2006, 338; also see 
332 fig. 3). The pattern was measured roughly as follows (2006, 328). First, the researchers 
                                                        
 
89 For example, see Shim et al. (2005) and Ward et al. (2002).  
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recorded the way a skilled player swung the racket and then broke the video into frames. 
Second, for each frame, they measured how much the player’s forearm and racket were 
tilted, respectively. Third, for each frame, they calculated the ratio between these two tilt 
angles; on the basis of the results, they identified the pattern in which this ratio changed 
throughout the video. It turns out that there were considerable differences between the 
pattern of change in a lob and the pattern of change in a groundstroke, which suggests that 
these two types of stroke involve different ways of moving one’s forearm relative to the 
racket (2006, 330).  
In view of the research done by Shim and his colleagues, let’s imagine the following 
scenario. Hannah and Edith, both experienced tennis players, were playing tennis against 
each other. Over time interval I1, Edith swung her racket, and the pattern of relative motion 
exemplified by her forearm and racket was characteristic of a lob. Over I2, Edith successfully 
hit the ball, which then moved past the net in a flight path characteristic of a lob. Let 
“Swing” and “Flight” denote the events that unfolded, respectively, over I1 and I2. Call the 
whole event that consisted of Swing and Flight “Lob”; Lob unfolded over I, the 
mereological fusion of I1 and I2. Now consider Hannah’s visual experience during I1. Hannah 
was skilled in tennis, so compared with novice players, she was more capable of predicting 
the type of stroke her opponent was going to perform on the basis her opponent’s bodily 
movements. When Hannah saw the pattern of relative motion in Edith’s swing, she expected 
Edith’s stroke to be a lob.  
I claim that Hannah’s perceptual experience during I1 represented Lob as ongoing: in 
every world that was expectationally relevant for Hannah, the event perceived during I1 
(Swing) would be succeeded by another event (Flight) that was capable of jointly making up 
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a complex event (Lob) with Swing.90 For this reason, it appeared to Hannah that Lob had 
not run its course and its completing boundary was not about to occur. But why was it the 
case that Swing would be followed by Flight in every expectationally relevant world? That 
could not have been guaranteed by the expectational base of Hannah’s experience during I1. 
Despite Hannah’s kinesthetic experience, background knowledge, and the factual contents of 
Hannah’s perceptual experience that represented Swing, it wouldn’t be too surprising for 
Hannah to see something other than Flight during I2. Given how experienced Hannah was, 
she must have seen all kinds of happenings on the tennis court: what appeared to be a lob 
turned out to be a groundstroke, a swing that looked perfect ended up missing the ball, and 
the opponent tripped when she wasn’t supposed to, etc. Arguably the worlds where these 
would happen to Edith all belonged to the expectational base of Hannah’s experience.  
The solution to this problem, as suggested above, is to invoke the salience constraint. 
The following notion will come in handy in our attempt to give a more precise definition of 
the salience constraint:  
(Salient Type)  
Suppose K is an event-kind and v a visual experience whose subject is s and whose object is 
event e. Then K is the perceptually salient type, or simply salient type, of e in v if and only if:  
                                                        
 
90 For the reason that Lob, instead of Swing, is said to have been represented as ongoing, see 
footnote 80.  
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(1) when undergoing v, it looks to s as if K is one of the event-kinds under which e falls;91  
(2) in carrying out the task at hand when undergoing v, s is disposed to prioritize the 
information that e falls under K over the information that e falls under any other event-
kind.  
In the visual experience Hannah had over I1, the salient type of Swing was the event-kind 
that may be characterized as the initial phase of a lob (henceforth abbreviated as IPL). This was 
probably not the only event-kind attributed to Swing by Hannah. Depending on the context, 
the other event-kinds Swing could appear to fall under in Hannah’s experience included ball-
hitting action, right-arm movement (if Hannah had just played against a left-handed player), and 
human activity (if Hannah had just practiced with a ball machine), among others. But given 
Hannah’s task at hand, i.e. returning the ball, Hannah presumably prioritized the information 
that Swing fell under IPL over the information that Swing also fell under those other event-
kinds. For if Hannah had had no idea how to effectively respond to Swing at all, the 
awareness that Swing was an instance of right-arm movement or human activity would not 
have been helpful. The information that Swing was a ball-hitting action was more useful, but 
it was not specific enough. As a consequence, among the various pieces of information 
about event-kinds that were carried by the factual contents of Hannah’s perceptual 
                                                        
 
91 When reporting the contents of an experience, I will sometimes follow Charles Siewert in using the 
locution “it looks to me as if φ”, where φ is a sentence. Siewert describes two kinds of linguistic 
constructions that may be used to report an experience. Suppose one is looking at the uppercase 
letter “X”. To report this experience, one could say “It seems to me the way it does for it to look as 
if there’s an X on my left”; alternatively, one could say “It looks to me as if there’s an X on my left” 
(Siewert 1998, 86). Here I borrow the latter. Siewert himself prefers the former, but the subtle 
difference between the two need not concern us here.  
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experience, Hannah probably only made use of the information about IPL in returning the 
ball. It follows that IPL was the salient type of Swing in Hannah’s experience during I1.  
With the notion of a salient type in hand, we can now define the salience constraint:  
(Salience Constraint)  
Let v be a visual experience of event e that subject s undergoes at time t. Say that for any 
possible world w, w satisfies the salience constraint imposed by v if and only if the following are the 
case in w:  
(1) There is visual experience v* such that v is succeeded by v* at the moment just after t 
and s isn’t surprised by v*;  
(2) The fact that s isn’t surprised by v* at the moment just after t obtains specifically in 
virtue of s’s awareness of e’s salient type in v.  
Condition (1) is straightforward. But what does condition (2) mean? Let’s again focus on 
Hannah’s experience during I1. Given that Swing was represented by the factual contents of 
her experience, Hannah might have expected the following to happen over I2: the distance 
between the ball and the net first decreased and then increased. However, even in a world 
where such an expectation was indeed fulfilled during I2 (such as the actual world), the fact 
that Hannah wasn’t surprised by her experience during I2 cannot be said to have obtained 
specifically in virtue of Hannah’s awareness of Swing’s salient type. For in a world where 
Swing had been replaced by an event in which Edith performed a cross-court shot, a half 
volley or a smash instead of a lob, Hannah would have had the same expectation. In fact, she 
would have had the same expectation so long as she saw Edith swinging the racket to hit the 
ball; it didn’t matter whether the swing indicated a possible lob, a possible cross-court shot 
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or something else. The fact that IPL appeared to be the salient type of Swing in Hannah’s 
experience during I1 thus contributed little to her expectation that the ball would first 
approach the net before flying away from it.  
The above observation suggests a way to further clarify condition (2). Suppose that 
after undergoing visual experience v, whose object is event e, subject s fails to be surprised by 
the succeeding experience v*. Let’s say that the fact s isn’t surprised by v* obtains specifically in 
virtue of s’s awareness of e’s salient type in v if and only if the following holds: if s were not 
aware of e’s salient type in v, s would be surprised by v*. In the actual world, after undergoing 
her experience of Swing, Hannah saw the ball move towards the net and then move away 
from it. She wasn’t surprised by this. But would Hannah have been surprised if she had not 
been aware of Swing’s salient type? No. If Edith had performed a smash, Hannah would not 
have been aware of Swing’s salient type, i.e. IPL. Even in that case, however, Hannah would 
not have been surprised to see the way the ball moved relative to the net. Hence, though 
there was indeed the fact that Hannah wasn’t surprised by the way the ball moved relative to 
the net, the fact didn’t obtain specifically in virtue of IPL. As another example, consider the 
fact that Hannah wasn’t surprised by her experience of Flight. This fact obtained in the 
actual world, and it did obtain specifically in virtue of Hannah’s awareness of IPL. If Hannah 
hadn’t been aware of IPL, she couldn’t have expected the ball to move in a path 
characteristic of a lob. It thus follows from our definition that the actual world satisfies the 
salience constraint imposed by Hannah’s experience of Swing.  
I shall argue in section 5.4.5 that the notions of the expectational base and the 
salience constraint supply the necessary tools for us to conceptualize our awareness of 
completing boundaries in a satisfactory manner. But first things first – I need to defend my 
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definition of the salience constraint. After all, one could ask: why should we focus on salient 
types when looking for salience constraints? An event may have many properties in addition 
to the properties it has in virtue of its salient type. In our tennis example, Hannah could 
perceive Edith’s swing as performed with a red racket, in a stadium with a large audience, or 
carried out by a newly met opponent, etc. Swing’s doesn’t instantiate these properties 
because of its salient type – Hannah is unlikely to prioritize the information that Edith’s 
swing is an action carried out by a newly met opponent, for example. But why not invoke 
these properties in BRV? Wouldn’t Hannah’s awareness that she is playing against a newly 
met opponent make a difference to the expectational contents of Hannah’s experience? My 
answer is that, though properties like the ones just mentioned may be indeed affect one’s 
expectations in general, they have a very limited role in determining one’s expectations of the 
progression of an event. I think this claim can be vindicated on phenomenological grounds, but 
phenomenological disputes are rarely easy to settle. To provide additional support for my 
claim, therefore, I shall argue that it fits well with a sophisticated theory in empirical 
psychology.  
The theory I have in mind is the event segmentation theory (EST) proposed by Jeffrey 
Zacks and his colleagues (Zacks et al. 2007). EST aims to identify the factors that affect how 
people parse a stream of sensory stimuli into multiple events. According to the theory, the 
mechanism responsible for event perception is predictive in nature. It mainly functions to 
predict what happens next given what is perceived to be happening now (Zacks et al. 2007, 
273–74). For example, if I see a traffic light turning yellow now, my perceptual system might 
deploy the mechanism to predict that the traffic light will turn red at the following moment. 
How does the perceptual system make such predictions about incoming stimuli? It does so 
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on the basis of two kinds of representations. The first is obvious: the perceptual system 
extracts information from representations of current stimuli. But EST also posits a more 
special kind of representations – event models. According to the researchers, “An event model 
is a representation of ‘what is happening now,’ which is robust to transient variability in the 
sensory input” (Zacks et al. 2007, 274). The event model activated or created by one’s 
perceptual system in response to a set of stimuli depends in part on one’s event schemata, 
which are “semantic memory representations that capture shared features of previously 
encountered events” and “contain previously learned information about the sequential 
structure of activity” (Zacks et al. 2007, 275). Hence, in the aforementioned sumo case, 
Johannes’ perceptual system and mine activate very different event models in response to 
the perceived actions of the wrestlers, despite the fact that the sensory stimuli reaching our 
perceptual systems may be quite similar. Johannes’ perceptual system might predict that the 
wrestlers are going to run towards each other, but mine certainly makes no such prediction. 
This is the case because the event schemata stored in Johannes’ memory are much more 
detailed than those stored in my memory.  
How does EST account for the way people perceptually identify the boundaries 
between events? According to the researchers, our perceptual system has an error-detection 
component. After predictions about incoming stimuli are generated at time t, they are 
compared with the actual stimuli received at the moment succeeding t. The perceptual 
system then makes adjustments to the event model in place (Zacks et al. 2007, 274–75). If 
the error, i.e. the discrepancy between the predicted and actual stimuli, is not significant, the 
perceptual system retains the current event model. By contrast, if the error is significant, the 
perceptual system modifies the event model in light of the actual stimuli. This might lead to 
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the activation of an alternative event model or the creation of one that is unlike any in the 
past. Significant error also results in the awareness that the transition from one event to 
another has occurred – this is the point at which a perceiver locates the boundary between 
events. Summing these up, the researchers say, “the system alternates between long periods 
of stability and brief periods of change. Periods of stability are perceived by observers as 
events, and periods of change are perceived as the boundaries between events” (Zacks et al. 
2007, 275).  
To make the idea more concrete, consider a connectionist network built by Jeremy 
Reynolds, Jeffrey Zacks and Todd Braver (2007) to test EST computationally. The stimuli 
used to train the network consisted of motion capture data. They depicted the various 
actions of a human figure, in particular the movement trajectories of 18 locations on the 
figure’s body. The spatial locations of these bodily locations were encoded by the units in the 
input layer of the network. The network had a straightforward task: given the stimuli 
received by its input layer at time t, the network had to predict the stimuli that would be 
received at the moment just after t (Reynolds, Zacks, and Braver 2007, 618). In other words, 
given where the figure’s bodily locations were at t, the network had to predict where they 
would be at the moment just after t. This was to be done with the help of a special 
component, an event layer, which was intended to be a computational mechanism realizing the 
event models posited by EST.  
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To see the role played by the event layer, consider the network’s four main steps of 
information processing.92 First, the network received initial stimuli at time t, which were 
represented by the activity of the input layer. Second, signals were transmitted to the event 
layer, processed, and sent to the output layer. The predictions made by the network were 
represented by the activity of the output layer at this point. Third, the network received new 
stimuli at the moment just after t; these were represented by the activity of the input layer at 
the same time. Fourth, an error detection component was activated, which functioned to 
compare the new stimuli with the earlier predictions, thereby determining whether the 
difference between them exceeded the threshold. What was the event layer’s contribution to 
the whole process? The answer is: its distinctive mechanism of combining signals from two 
sources, i.e. the input layer and itself (Reynolds, Zacks, and Braver 2007, 629). Notably, it was 
allowed to receive signals from the input layer at time t only if there was significant 
difference between the stimuli received at t and the predictions made at the moment just 
before t; the event layer would be insulated from the input layer if the difference didn’t 
exceed the threshold.93 When prediction error was limited, therefore, the state of the event 
layer at a time was mainly determined by its own state at the preceding moment. According 
to Reynolds and his colleagues, the network was quite successful in predicting how the 
human figure would move its body in the next phase of the action (Reynolds, Zacks, and 
Braver 2007, 635).  
                                                        
 
92 I have set aside many details that need not concern us now. See the authors’ description of 
Simulation IV (Reynolds, Zacks, and Braver 2007, 635–36).  
93 More precisely, the relative weight of the signals from the input layer was adjusted in accordance 
with an equation whose variables included the amount of error. See (Reynolds, Zacks, and Braver 
2007, 630).  
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What kind of information is used by networks like the one just described? I would 
argue that the relevant information is precisely information about salient types. Note that the 
activities of the event layer, which are computational realizations of the states the event 
model is in, are self-sustaining for most of the time. Once an event model is activated, how 
its state is going to change from moment to moment is largely determined by the 
information it carries on its own. If Edith performs the same stroke 5 times with 5 rackets of 
different colors, the beginnings of the 5 events are largely similar. If one is observing Edith’s 
actions, the initial similarity between the 5 events should enable one’s perceptual system to 
deploy the same event model in predicting what Edith is about to do – this is the case 
despite the individual differences between the 5 events. If the predictions so made are largely 
accurate, the color of Edith’s racket could fail to play any role in determining one’s 
expectations throughout the process of observing Edith’s actions. It then emerges that 
predictions based on event models typically fail to be sensitive to the individual differences 
between events that largely resemble each other. What such predictions are sensitive to are 
patterns that can be repeatedly experienced in roughly the same way.94 This explains why 
such properties as being performed by a newly met opponent play a negligible role in one’s 
expectations of an event’s progression – there are too many ways in which an action 
performed by a newly met opponent could appear to one. It could look like a cross-court 
                                                        
 
94 Note that such patterns need not be those that have been repeatedly experienced over a long 
period of time; as Zacks and his colleagues point out, “Event models are working memory 
representations, which are implemented by transient changes in neural activation rather than long-
term changes in synaptic weights” (Zacks et al. 2007, 274). Even if I am watching a tennis game for 
the first time in my life and I have only seen one backhand volley so far, it is possible that my 
perceptual system has already begun to build an event model for volleys that will affect my 
subsequent experiences of backhand volleys.  
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shot, a clumsy move or a swift action, etc. There isn’t a regular pattern in which such actions 
are typically experienced.  
What are the relevant patterns, then? It seems likely that they just are salient types. A 
salient type is an event-kind, and an event-kind can be plausibly understood as an abstract 
entity prescribing the successive stages an event must go through to be a token of the kind. 
The reason that, say, an event is a dive is precisely that it consists of a sequence of subevents 
– the subevent of standing at a diving board is followed by jumping and then falling, etc. 
Any other event that features the same manner of progression falls under the same event-
kind as the dive. Given this, if certain patterns that are repeatedly observable can be 
discerned in numerically distinct events, these events can be reasonably understood to fall 
under the same event-kind. We can then say that event models facilitate the prediction of 
event progression by supplying information about event-kinds.95 But not any event-kind 
would do. There are many kinds an event might fall under at once, and only the kind that the 
perceiver pays attention to is relevant. In light of this, we should say that event models do 
not simply carry information about some event-kind under which the currently perceived 
event falls – they carry information about the salient type of the currently perceived event. It 
then seems that EST supports the claim that salient types assume a more prominent role 
                                                        
 
95 Some might think that the conception of event-kinds employed here is too restrictive. There may 
be some types of events whose tokens do not share a common pattern of progression, but there is 
no a priori reason not to count these types as event-kinds. If this is true, we could accommodate this 
by adopting a broader conception of event-kinds and modifying the claim about event models 
accordingly. Instead of simply saying that event models represent event-kinds, we say that they 
represent event-kinds of a particular sort, i.e. those types of events that prescribe a principle of 
progression governing their tokens.  
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than anything else in determining the expectational contents of event-representing 
experiences. My proposed definition of the salience constraints thus makes sense.  
5.4.5 BRV Restated  
Recall our definition of expectational relevance in section 5.4.2: given a visual 
experience, the worlds that are expectationally relevant to the experience are those in the 
expectational base of the experience that meet the salience constraint imposed by the 
experience. We have now examined the two components of this definition, so let’s give one 
more example to show how the definition is to be applied. Carl and I are both observing a 
chemical experiment, in which some red liquid is poured into a flask that holds some blue 
liquid. Carl is a chemist, and he has seen flasks being destroyed by liquids. The expectational 
base of Carl’s experience thus contains a world in which the flask is destroyed at the next 
moment. This world does not belong to the expectational base of my experience, as I am 
completely ignorant in chemistry. Now, despite the fact that there are more worlds in the 
expectational base of Carl’s experience than that of mine, the salience constraint imposed by 
Carl’s experience is more stringent than that imposed by mine. Given the behavior of the 
two liquids that Carl is now observing, the only possible scenario that wouldn’t surprise him 
is one in which certain salt-like crystals appear in the flask. It follows that the salience 
constraint imposed by Carl’s experience excludes all the worlds in which such an event of 
crystallization fails to occur. Those worlds would nonetheless meet the salience constraint 
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imposed by my experience. As a consequence, the worlds that are expectationally relevant to 
my experience surpass those expectationally relevant to Carl’s experience in number.96  
As of yet, it remains unclear what we should say about the relation between the 
expectational relevance of a world and the representation of the world by expectational 
contents. That is, if a possible world counts as expectationally relevant, does it follow that 
the perceiver represents some of the occurrences in that world in the expectational contents 
of her experience? It is time to address this issue. Imagine a scenario in which Swing and 
Flight occurred the way they actually did except that Gerda, instead of Hannah, was playing 
against Edith. Unlike Hannah, for Gerda, it didn’t seem impossible for Edith to miss the 
ball. This means that some worlds in which Edith missed the ball belonged to the 
expectational base of Gerda’s experience of Swing. In those worlds, Flight failed to occur 
over I2; let “Flight-Alternatives” denote the possible events that occurred over I2 in those 
worlds. But neither was it obvious to Gerda that Edith would miss the ball, so the 
expectational base of Gerda’s experience of Swing also contained worlds where Flight did 
occur over I2. What, then, did the expectational contents of Gerda’s experience of Swing 
represent? Did they represent Flight, one of the Flight-Alternatives, all of the Flight-
Alternatives, a combination of Flight and Flight-Alternatives, or none of the above?  
                                                        
 
96 Note that even if a world in the expectational base of an experience fails to be expectationally 
relevant, it doesn’t follow that it plays no role in determining the expectational contents of the 
experience. It only follows that it plays no role in determining the expectational contents that enable 
the perceiver to represent completing boundaries. In the present example, though a world in which the flask is 
later destroyed fails to be expectationally relevant to Carl’s experience, we might still have to take the 
world into consideration if we intend to describe Carl’s perceptual experience of the flask. The world 
is irrelevant only with respect to how Carl perceptually represents the point at which the chemical 
reaction has run its course.  
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Here’s my suggestion: the expectational contents of Gerda’s experience of Swing 
represented an event e such that it looked to Gerda as if e could turn out to be either Flight 
or one of the Flight-Alternatives. In other words, the expectational contents jointly 
represented an event whose properties remained to be fully identified in the future. It is 
important not to misunderstand my claim here: I am not saying that there were multiple 
possible events represented by the expectational contents. Rather, there was only one event 
jointly represented by the expectational contents, and the different properties of the event 
were represented with different degrees of specificity. To make the point more precise, let’s 
revisit two ideas brought up earlier. First, given an event, its individuative property is the 
conjunction of all its non-relational properties.97 One component of Swing’s individuative 
property is the property falling under IPL, for example. Second, determination is the relation 
between such properties as being three-dimensional and being a cube.98 According to Yablo, if we 
focus on the metaphysical core of the determination relation, the relation can be defined as 
follows:  
P determines Q (P > Q) only if:  
(i) necessarily, for all x, if x has P then x has Q; and  
(ii) possibly, for some x, x has Q but lacks P. (Yablo 1992, 252)  
If we adopt a stronger version of Yablo’s definition and turn it into a biconditional, then the 
definition allows us to say, for example, that the property being a lob determines the property 
                                                        
 
97 See section 2.4.3.  
98 See section 2.4.2.  
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being a tennis stroke. After all, no action can be a lob without being a tennis stroke, but many 
tennis strokes are not lobs.  
These two notions enable us to address the issue confronting us. Take the 
individuative properties of Flight and all Flight-Alternatives. Let E be the property 
determined by all these individuative properties. My suggestion can now be restated as 
follows: what was represented by the expectational contents of Gerda’s experience of Swing 
was the event whose individuative property was E. What properties did the event have, 
exactly? Though we cannot fully answer this question without considering additional details, 
it is reasonable to assume that the property being the movement of a tennis ball was a component 
of E – since Gerda expected to see the tennis ball move no matter Edith ended up hitting 
the ball or not, every Flight-Alternative featured ball movement. To be sure, the property 
being the movement of a tennis ball is quite indeterminate, but a less indeterminate property is 
unlikely to have been a component of E. Given that the tennis ball could have moved in 
many directions without surprising Gerda, Flight-Alternatives involved many kinds of ball 
movement. If so, it is quite inconceivable that E, the property determined by the 
individuative properties of all Flight-Alternatives, could have comprised the property of 
being a particular kind of ball movement. Hence, in undergoing her experience of Swing, it 
looked to Gerda as if the next phase of the event would be a ball movement, but it wasn’t 
clear to her what kind of ball movement the event would be – it wasn’t clear whether the ball 
would move towards the net or the service line, for example. The next phase of the presently 
perceived event was represented by the expectational contents of Gerda’s experience as a 
ball movement whose direction remained to be seen.  
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What emerges is that identifying E this way has an important implication: the more 
considerably Flight-Alternatives differed with each other in a given aspect, the more 
indeterminately that aspect was represented in the expectational contents of Gerda’s 
experience of Swing. This observation suggests that my criterion captures an important 
difference between an amateur’s experience of an event and an expert’s experience of the 
same event. Recall the example in which Carl and I are observing the same chemical 
reaction. Since an event of crystallization occurs in every world that is expectationally 
relevant to Carl’s experience, the expectational contents of Carl’s experience represent an 
event of crystallization. In contrast, the event that is the object of the expectational contents 
of my experience is represented in a more indeterminate way. Given that my expectations of 
what might happen in a chemical experiment are largely based on the Hollywood movies I 
have watched, the expectational base of my experience contains worlds in which the 
chemical reaction leads to an explosion and those in which it results in leaked poisonous gas 
of a bizarre color. Neither type of world is excluded by the salience constraint imposed by 
my experience, which is much weaker than that imposed by Carl’s experience. But a world in 
which I see an explosion is quite different from one in which I see some gas of a bizarre 
color. The worlds that are expectationally relevant to my experience thus conflict with each 
other. As a result, E, i.e. the property determined by the individuative properties of all the 
events that succeed the presently experienced one in the worlds expectationally relevant to 
my experience, is extremely indeterminate. The event whose individuative property is E 
would be such that something happens to the flask in the event – this much can indeed be 
said about that event. Except for this, however, there are probably not many determinate 
properties that the event would be represented to instantiate. It follows that the 
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expectational contents of my experience are quite impoverished: they collectively represent 
something that is about to happen to the flask but carry little information of what exactly 
that event is.  
It is now time to put the various pieces of BRV together and restate it:  
(BRV)  
Let v be a visual experience whose factual contents represent event e.  
(1) For any event e*, e* is the event represented by the expectational contents of v if and 
only if e* has the individuative property E, where E is the property determined by the 
individuative properties of all the events that succeed e in the worlds that are 
expectationally relevant to v.  
(2) Let f be the event represented by the expectational contents of v. Then:  
(a) v represents e as ongoing if and only if f jointly makes up a larger event with e. In 
this case, s experiences the completing boundary of e as yet to occur.  
(b) v represents e as ending if and only if f doesn’t jointly make up a larger event with e. 
In this case, the currently perceived temporal part of e appears as the completing 
boundary of e.99  
This sums up the ideas we have been exploring. Take Hannah’s experience of Swing as an 
example. Given any world w that is expectationally relevant to Hannah’s experience, Flight is 
a part of the Flight-Alternative that occurs in w. On the assumption that the Flight-
Alternatives in those worlds do not share any other part, Flight just is the event represented 
                                                        
 
99 Note that what is said in footnote 80 still applies (the footnote can be found on p.210).  
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by the expectational contents of Hannah’s experience. Since Hannah is well aware that 
Swing naturally leads to Flight, it looks to Hannah as if there is an event that Flight jointly 
makes up with Swing, i.e. Lob. According to BRV, Hannah perceives Lob as ongoing.  
But what does it take for two events to appear capable of jointly making up a larger 
event with each other? My suggestion is that whether two events so appear depends on what 
Zacks and his colleagues call “event schemata”. As noted in the previous section, event 
schemata belong to the long-term memory; they encode event properties including 
“distinctive physical features such as object and actor movement, statistical information 
about which patterns of activity are likely to follow a given pattern, and information about 
actors’ goals” (Zacks et al. 2007, 275). It seems to me that the information encoded by event 
schemata is sufficient for distinguishing an event that can appropriately function as an 
additional temporal part of the presently perceived event from an event that cannot. Since 
event schemata are one of the factors affecting the perceptual system’s selection of event 
models, it is likely that they are responsible for the perceiver’s conscious awareness that two 
events are, or are not, temporal parts of the same complex event. We can now give another 
example to illustrate BRV. Suppose that Carl has conducted the aforementioned chemical 
experiment countless times in his lab and his lab has a machine that automatically empties 
the flask immediately after crystallization is detected. Let’s focus on Carl’s visual experience 
of the crystallization event. Together with the factual contents of this experience, Carl’s 
kinesthetic experience, background knowledge and awareness of the chemical reaction’s 
salient type yield a set of expectationally relevant worlds whose members all contain an event 
in which the flask appears emptied. According to Carl’s event schemata of both the event of 
crystallization and the emptying of the flask, the latter doesn’t jointly make up a single event 
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with the former. BRV thus entails that Carl perceives the chemical reaction as ending with 
the crystallization event, which appears to be the completing boundary of the chemical 
reaction.  
An important point to note here is that though I have been working with examples 
that involve specialized skills, BRV is by no means a theory that aims exclusively to account 
for specialized skills. I am unfamiliar with tennis or chemical experiments, but I am familiar 
with riding a bike, climbing a ladder, drinking beer or turning the pages of a book. When I 
see people engaging in these everyday activities, the expectational contents of my experience 
can be quite detailed. The awareness of completing boundaries is a pervasive phenomenon 
when it comes to the events people perceive in their everyday life, and this point is properly 
acknowledged by BRV.  
One might be worried that BRV doesn’t really mesh with EST. According to EST, a 
boundary between events is perceived when the predictions made by the perceptual system 
depart considerably from what is subsequently seen. In other words, the awareness of 
boundaries results from the frustration of expectations. But BRV says that one can 
experience completing boundaries even before such frustration occurs. Doesn’t this contradict 
EST? Here’s my response. While EST can be plausibly viewed as a theory of what it takes 
for one to see an event as having ended, BRV is better considered as a theory of what it takes 
for one to see an event as ending or about to end. It is one thing to see a move as the final move 
in a ballet dance and anther to see that a ballet dance has ended and a new dance has begun. 
BRV is mainly a theory of the former, and by having such a focus, it captures certain 
differences between experts’ and amateurs’ experiences that EST pays less attention to. As 
the cases of Hannah and Carl indicate, within the framework of BRV, one experiences an 
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event as ongoing or ending only if the expectational contents of one’s experience are quite 
rich. While experts like Hannah and Carl may experience a tennis stroke or a chemical 
reaction as ongoing or ending, it is less likely for ordinary people to undergo such perceptual 
experiences. I have suggested that if I were to undergo a perceptual experience of the 
chemical experiment, the event that would be represented by the expectational contents of 
my experience would putatively appear in a very indeterminate way – it would probably 
appear as something that is about to happen to the flask but nothing more determinate than 
that. Moreover, my event schemata of chemical reactions don’t provide much useful 
information about the experiment I am observing. It is therefore unclear to me whether the 
events represented by the factual and expectational contents of my experience would jointly 
make up a single event. The right thing to say in such a case, I submit, is that I neither 
experience the presently perceived event as ongoing nor experience it as ending – my 
perceptual experience fails to indicate one way or the other. But we shouldn’t jump to the 
conclusion that I cannot perceive any completing boundaries in the chemical experiment. 
Though I am incapable of perceiving the chemical reaction as ending, it is certainly possible 
for me to perceive it as having ended. The only difference is that my awareness of the 
completing boundary would occur later than Carl’s awareness of the same completing 
boundary. BRV can accommodate my awareness by saying that it occurs either because what 
is perceived to be happening defies my earlier expectations or because the event unfolding 
now appears incapable of making up a single event with the event I perceived at the 
preceding moment. In other words, my awareness of the completing boundary occurs either 
because of frustrated expectations or because of perceived conflicts. Such an analysis is 
compatible with EST, which associates the representation of a completing boundary with the 
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perceptual system’s reaction to significant prediction error. Though the concerns of BRV do 
not entirely overlap those of EST, EST complements BRV rather than contradicts it.  
5.5 Revisiting the Central Thought Experiment  
5.5.1 Are All Expectational Contents Non-Perceptual Contents?  
We are now ready to revisit the thought experiment about the Newtson-style study 
described at the beginning of the chapter, i.e. the Central Thought Experiment. Given the 
difference between Kasimir’s and Alexius’ background knowledge, Kasimir identified more 
boundaries between events than Alexius did even though they were watching the same 
video. We posed the question: did Kasimir and Alexius have different perceptual experiences? It 
is clear now how I would answer the question. Kasimir’s and Alexius’ perceptual experiences 
were indeed different, and that was the case because the expectational contents of their 
perceptual experiences differed. The worlds expectationally relevant to Kasimir’s experience 
were different from those expectationally relevant to Alexius’ experience. Of course, my 
response makes sense only if one is willing to accept a central component of HDC: the claim 
that perception has expectational contents. Some might be unhappy with this claim. To 
defend my response to the Central Thought Experiment, I shall argue for the claim about 
expectational contents in the remainder of the chapter.  
How might one object to the claim? I take it to be uncontroversial that people 
familiar with an event often have expectations that are different from those had by people 
unfamiliar with the event. What is probably more controversial is that such expectations are 
sometimes contents of perception. To clarify the issue, it is helpful to invoke the distinction 
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between what is constitutive of an experience and what causes the experience (Hopp 2011, 53; 
Alston 1999, 185). According to William Alston, constitutive considerations are those about 
“the intrinsic character of experience, not about the causal influences that are responsible for 
that” (1999, 185). An entity constitutive of an experience is a component of the experience 
itself, but the causes of an experience are typically entities distinct from the experience. It is 
possible to frame an objection to the idea that perception has expectational contents in 
terms of the distinction: though expectations sometimes cause perceptual experiences that 
have certain contents, they are never constitutive of those perceptual contents.   
I don’t think the objection stands to scrutiny. To respond to the objection, let’s 
revisit the recurring theme of tennis and consider the following argument from skills. How a 
professional tennis player would respond to a move by the opponent is obviously different 
from how a novice player would respond to the same move. How should we explain such a 
difference? Those rejecting expectational contents could offer the following explanation: the 
skilled player has the same visual experience as the novice player, but the former’s 
dispositions to act are different from those of the latter. As a result, the two players carry out 
different actions in response to the same move. Such an explanation seems untenable to me. 
The novice player has little idea of what to look out for when the opponent is attempting to 
hit the ball. Given her inability to effectively direct her attention, the way the opponent 
swings the racket in performing a lob could look exactly the same as the way the opponent 
swings the racket in performing a down-the-line shot. It follows that the novice player has 
the same visual experience in these different scenarios. If the professional player has the 
same experience as the novice player, then the former also undergoes the same experience in 
the two scenarios. But the professional player’s dispositions to act would then be insufficient 
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to explain why her action is different from the novice player’s. Dispositions can only explain 
why the professional player would act in one way when seeing a move that looks like a lob 
but act in another way when seeing a move that looks like a down-the-line shot. If the player 
were to react in different ways to two moves that look exactly the same, then the player 
would just be acting arbitrarily. That would then entail that the player isn’t disposed to act in 
any particular way – dispositions have no role in the explanation of the player’s behavior. 
The appeal to dispositions thus fails to tell us why the professional player and the novice 
player would react differently to the same move by the opponent.  
As a rejoinder, those rejecting expectational contents might say the following. Even 
if there is indeed a difference between the two players’ visual experiences, it doesn’t follow 
that the difference should be explained in terms of a difference in expectations. Perhaps the 
explanation should be that the two players attend to different aspects of the opponent’s 
action. The first thing to note in responding to this argument is that the argument rests on 
more presuppositions than the previous one. While it is quite conceivable that one’s 
expectations may remain unchanged even when one’s dispositions to act have changed, it is 
less clear that variations in attention can occur without variations in expectations. To deny 
that there are expectations constitutive of perceptual contents, therefore, one has to show 
that the independent variation of attention is possible. I doubt that it is possible. Suppose 
the amateur player is told what the skilled player would focus on and asked to attentively 
track the aspects of the opponent’s move that the skilled player would attentively track. 
Would the amateur player succeed? My prediction is that the player would fail. The only way 
for one to deploy one’s attention the way a professional player does is to become a 
professional player; the ability to effectively deploy one’s attention cannot be learned 
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independently of the other tennis skills. But why? My suggestion is that one has to learn to 
entertain the right expectations, and one’s expectations depend on one’s kinesthetic 
experiences and event schemata. Before one has mastered the relevant range of bodily skills, 
one is simply incapable of undergoing the necessary kinesthetic experiences and acting in 
accordance with the relevant event models.  
To see this, imagine a counterfactual scenario similar to the one just described, 
except that the opponent made some additional gestures intended to confuse. The 
professional player was able to ignore the gestures: she expected the gestures to contribute 
nothing to a successful shot. In light of such expectations, the professional player was able 
to direct her attention elsewhere upon seeing the gestures. But the amateur was confused by 
the gestures. Given that she had no idea what to expect given what she was seeing, she had 
to pay attention to any detail she happened to see, whether the detail could be safely ignored 
or not. As a consequence, her use of attentional resources was much less effective than that 
of the professional player’s. This suggests that a genuine ability to deploy one’s attention is 
premised upon one’s ability to entertain the relevant kind of expectation. If so, the reason 
that professional and novice players direct their attention in different ways when seeing the 
same move may well be that different expectations are elicited when they see the move. We 
should therefore uphold the thesis that perception has expectational contents. The fact that 
tennis players with different levels of expertise attend to the same move in different ways is 
likely to support the thesis rather than contradict it.  
But perhaps there is yet another argument that those rejecting expectational contents 
could make. They could argue that though the same event is represented differently by the 
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two tennis players in our example, the representational difference can be explained in terms 
of beliefs. In the next section, I discuss the reasons that such a view is objectionable.  
5.5.2 Are All Expectational Contents Belief Contents?  
I take the issue at hand to be more circumscribed than the heatedly debated issue of 
the conceptual contents of perception. Philosophers have conflicting views on the extent to 
which perceptual contents are conceptual, and no consensus has been reached on what kinds 
of contents count as conceptual. Here I am only interested in one variety of conceptual 
contents: the contents of beliefs. I will not take a stand on whether all belief contents are 
conceptual or whether all conceptual contents are belief contents. My only concern is to 
argue against the idea that all expectational contents are belief contents. Given that the topic 
here is not the nature of beliefs, I will simply assume that there is an intuitive distinction 
between perceptual experiences and beliefs. As A. D. Smith observes in discussing the 
Müller-Lyer illusion, “Being familiar with the Müller-Lyer illusion, I do not believe its two 
principal lines to be unequal, though they certainly do look it” (2001, 287). In this case, 
though one’s visual experience of the Müller-Lyer diagram is accompanied by a belief, the 
contents of the experience are different from the contents of the belief. One’s belief and 
experience represent the same object to exemplify different properties.  
How might one go about arguing that all expectational contents are belief contents? 
An intuitively appealing argument can be found by modifying what Hopp calls “the 
argument from perceiving-as”, whose key premise can be stated in one sentence: “if every 
object of perception is conceptualized, then perception must always have conceptual 
content” (2011, 47). When one sees, say, a cantaloupe, one typically perceives it as a 
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cantaloupe – one categorizes it as a cantaloupe. But to categorize an object is to 
conceptualize it. According to the key premise of the argument from perceiving-as, one’s 
perceptual experiences of cantaloupes have conceptual contents. The same reasoning applies 
to any other perceptual experience. To adapt this argument to the case of expectations, one 
could point out that the object of an expectation always appears as being a certain way – as a 
lob, as a dive, as involving many people or as taking place in a tennis court, for example. If 
so, what one expects is always represented as being p, where p is some property. But one 
cannot represent an entity as being p without entertaining some beliefs about what it takes 
for something to be p. It follows that expectations cannot occur without co-occurring 
beliefs. Since nothing is lost if we go further and identify expectations with beliefs, we 
should make this move to achieve theoretical parsimony. We can then conclude that the 
contents of expectations are exhausted by belief contents.  
The premise I find the most contestable in this argument is that one has to entertain 
beliefs about a property in order to represent something as having that property. To be sure, 
such a premise seems compelling: is it really possible for one to expect there to be a lob or a 
dive without entertaining some beliefs about what a lob or a dive is? Yes, it is. One can be 
said to expect a lob insofar as one expects an entity that looks like a tennis ball to move 
along a path characteristic of a lob. Unless we make the contentious assumption that all 
representations of motion, shape and color presuppose beliefs about motion, shape and 
color, it is possible for such an expectation to occur independently of any beliefs. And there 
is no reason to accept the contentious assumption. Based on the data accumulated in 
empirical research, the psychologist Jeremy Wolfe has compiled a list of properties that are 
various described as “stimulus attributes that guide attention”, “preattentive dimensions” 
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and “pop-out features” (Wolfe 2014, 23). When one looks for something in one’s 
environment, these are the properties that can be used to make one’s searching process more 
efficient (2014, 20). For example, if one is asked to stare at a screen and identify the number 
of rotating color patches that are triangular in shape, one might use the property of rotation 
to differentiate those stimuli that one should pay attention to from those that one shouldn’t, 
i.e. the stationary color patches. If this happens, rotation is a pop-out feature, and attention 
isn’t necessary for the representation of pop-out features. In the list compiled by Wolfe, 
color and motion are among the “undoubted” pop-out features, and shape is among the 
“probable and possible” ones (2014, 23–25). Now, if pop-out features can be perceived 
without attention, it seems unlikely that the perception of such features requires beliefs 
about them. There are always many properties that are perceptually represented without 
being attended to, and one is usually incapable of entertaining beliefs about all these 
properties. But if one can perceive pop-out features without entertaining beliefs about them, 
why cannot one expect them without entertaining beliefs about them? And if beliefs aren’t 
necessary for the expectations of such properties, nothing prevents us from treating them as 
perceptual contents to accommodate the observation that acquiring such expectations makes 
a lot of difference to one’s visual experiences.  
If the above reasoning is plausible, there are expectational contents that are not 
belief contents. This point is further supported by the observations offered by scholars 
working in the phenomenological tradition. Developing an idea found in Dahlstrom (2006) 
and Yoshimi (2009), Hopp argues that “Horizons… are radically situation-dependent, so 
much so that any two experiences with different intuitive contents must have different 
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horizonal contents. But concepts are not individuated that finely” (Hopp 2010, 20).100 
Insofar as belief contents are conceptual contents, it is possible for me to entertain the belief 
“this is a watermelon” both when I see a watermelon sliced in half and when I see an intact 
watermelon. But it is impossible for me to have exactly the same expectations on these two 
occasions. This means that the kind of expectations entertained on these occasions cannot 
be construed as beliefs.  
I think we can reinforce Hopp’s point by taking into consideration the relation 
between perspectives and fulfillment. A belief imposes little perspective-based constraints on 
the range of experiences that could fulfill the belief. This is the case not only for ordinary 
beliefs but also for those beliefs that consist of what Hopp calls authentically possessed concepts: 
“A person possesses a concept authentically just in case she has sufficiently reliable, 
nondeferential capacities to identify its object over a sufficiently wide range of conditions 
and environments” (Hopp 2011, 195). Take Husserl’s example of seeing a flying black bird 
in Investigation VI of Logical Investigations (Husserl [1913b] 1970, 2:195). If I possess the 
concepts “flying”, “black” and “bird” authentically, then my belief that the black bird I see is 
flying will tend to be veridical whenever it is entertained, no matter how different the entities 
represented by my belief may look on these different occasions. Even if I see a black raven 
on one occasion and a black cowbird on another, I will not be confused by their different 
appearances – I will not entertain a belief that represents a bird in the first case and a belief 
that represents a squirrel in the second case, for example. However, even such beliefs can be 
                                                        
 
100 As mentioned in section 4.3.2, “intuitive contents” and “horizonal contents” are Hopp’s terms for 
what I call “factual contents” and “expectational contents”.  
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fulfilled by the factual contents of a wide variety of perceptual experiences that are had from 
different perspectives. I can look at a flying black bird that is nearby or far away, from above 
or below, with my right eye closed or with my sunglasses on, etc., and my belief will be 
fulfilled by the factual contents of all these perceptual experiences. However authentic my 
possession of the relevant concepts is, any experience in which I perceive a flying black bird 
would verify my belief to some degree – this is the case even though different experiences of 
such a bird might provide different degrees of fulfillment.101 By contrast, expectations 
impose considerable perspective-based constraints on what perceptual experiences could 
fulfill them. If I see a flying black bird nearby and expect it to move towards me, there is no 
way an experience in which the same bird is perceived to be moving towards me from far 
away could possibly fulfill my expectation. Similarly, if I expect the bird to land on a tree 
when I undergo an experience in which I see the bird from below, it is impossible for a later 
experience in which I see the bird from above to fulfill my expectation, even if the later 
experience does represent the bird as landing on the tree. The intimate relation between 
perspectives and the fulfillment of expectations is simply not found when it comes to the 
fulfillment of beliefs.  
Some might worry that there are boundary cases. For example, Madary notes that the 
distinction between beliefs and expectational contents isn’t always clear-cut. He discusses the 
case in which one is told that a surprise is waiting in the room when one is about to enter the 
room. He argues that in this case, one can be said to expect the surprise, but one’s 
                                                        
 
101 See Hopp (2011, 121) for a discussion of how the way an object is perceived might affect the 
degree of fulfillment.  
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expectation “is like a belief in the sense that it is not, or is only minimally, constrained by 
one’s current perceptual context” (2016, 53). After all, one has no idea what is going to 
happen in the room. However, Madary’s example doesn’t show that a distinction between 
expectations and beliefs cannot be drawn on the basis of possible ways to undergo 
fulfillment. In the example, given one’s background knowledge, one would presumably 
expect to see events of the kinds that are typically featured by surprises: a birthday party or a 
special family gathering, for example. It’s just that one doesn’t expect any of these events in 
particular. There is nonetheless a way events of these kinds are usually experienced – one 
usually attends them as a participant, not, say, as a special agent sneaking into the house to 
complete a stealth mission. It is therefore part of one’s background knowledge that the 
people one is about to see will be seen from a position where one can talk to them and 
maintain eye contact, not from a position above people’s heads. In light of this observation, 
let’s add some more details to Madary’s example and suppose there are two ways to enter the 
room: from the door or from the chimney. As our observation suggests, there is a kind of 
expectation that can be fulfilled however one enters the room, but there is another kind of 
expectation whose fulfillment depends upon the exact way one enters the room. One’s 
expectation in the first case is a belief. If one entertains the belief that there are people in the 
room, such a belief can be fulfilled insofar as people are seen in the room – it doesn’t matter 
whether one enters the room from the door as a participant or from the chimney as a special 
agent. But one’s expectation in the second case is not a belief. If one expects to see people in 
the room after undergoing a visual experience of a closed door, such an expectation can only 
be fulfilled by a later experience in which one sees people when standing at the door. In a 
scenario in which one sees people’s heads from above after seeing a closed door, one would 
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begin to doubt one’s senses. Hence, even in a case like the one described by Madary, we can 
still differentiate between belief contents and the expectational contents of perception. It 
won’t do to assimilate the latter to the former.  
5.6 Conclusion  
My response to the Central Thought Experiment completes my presentation of 
BRV. According to BRV, the expectationally relevant worlds are those containing an event 
that the presently perceived event naturally transitions to in accordance with its salient type. 
On the basis of such worlds, we can identify the event represented by the expectational 
contents of one’s experience. If that event is capable of jointly making up a single complex 
event with the presently perceived event, then the presently perceived event is experienced 
as ongoing. If not, then it is experienced as ending.  
Several issues pertinent to my view have not been addressed, but this chapter has 
already been too long. They will therefore have to be addressed elsewhere. Before ending 
this chapter, I would like to mention one such issue. I have been deliberately using the 
ambiguous term “jointly making up with”. How exactly should the term be understood? My 
preferred view is that two events jointly make up another if the former jointly constitute the 
latter. Nevertheless, the boundary representation view is supposed to be a phenomenological 
theory of event perception. Given that my view on event constitution, i.e. dependence-based 
hylomorphism, analyzes constitution in terms of the satisfaction of immediate and specific 
dependence needs, it is not easy to tell in what way the constitution relation figures in 
perception. I believe this problem can be solved by appealing to a suitable notion of 
isomorphism. We could argue that when two events appear to constitute another in 
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conformity with one’s event schemata, there is a relation-preserving mapping from the 
components of the constituted event to the components of one’s experience. But many 
details remain to be fleshed out, and I cannot explore this idea any further here.  
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